Philosophy Commons^™

The Negotiation Of Racial, Ethnic, And Religious Identification In American Heathenry, Thad Nathan Horrell

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

This dissertation is an investigation of religious, ethnic, and racial identification in the social "field" of Heathenry. Heathenry is a reconstructionist religious movement attempting to reconnect with or revive the pre-Christian traditions of the Germanic tribes of northern Europe. Often articulated as an "ethnic religion," Heathenry has also been frequently tied to white supremacist violence and hate crimes. Applying Anthony Wallace's model of revitalization movements, I attempt to make sense of what it is contemporary Heathens are trying to accomplish in today's society: What is it Heathens are trying to revitalize?

As a field of contestation over common-sense meanings …

Raising Consciousness About Chicken Consciousness, Bernard Rollin

Animal Sentience

The topics explored by Marino are definitive, and should work well to lay to rest forever the widespread belief that chickens have no personality, are unintelligent, or in any other way lack a mental life.

Chickens’ Brains, Like Ours, Are Lateralized, Lesley J. Rogers

Animal Sentience

This commentary draws attention to yet another attribute that has been instrumental in demonstrating the cognitive abilities of domestic chicks: lateralization of brain function. The discovery of lateralization in domestic chicks was part of the first evidence showing that humans are not unique in this respect. The effects on cognitive ability of sensory stimulation in critical stages of development have implications for the welfare of chicks, as well as other species.

Are Chicken Minds Special?, Rafael Freire, Susan J. Hazel

Animal Sentience

The number of publications on chicken cognition and emotion exceeds that on most birds and is comparable to the number of publications on some more “advanced” mammals. We argue that the chicken is an excellent model for this type of research because of (1) the presence of well-established fundamental mental processes in the chicken, (2) a challenging ethological environment and (3) social pressures that may have facilitated the evolution of cognitive abilities similar to those of some mammals. Marino’s (2017) review provides an excellent foundation for the continued study of complex mental abilities in this species.

In Memory Of Patrick Bateson, James A. Serpell

Animal Sentience

No abstract provided.

Chickening Out Of Change: Will Knowing More About Thinking Chickens Change Public Perceptions?, Ewan Bottomley, Steve Loughnan

Animal Sentience

This commentary examines the next step in Marino’s target article – changing people’s attitudes and beliefs about chickens. The scientific case seems clear: chickens are far more complex, psychologically and socially, than originally thought. Marino suggests we use this information to make people feel uncomfortable about their dietary choices in the hope of changing them. We review the psychological literature, examining how people maintain meat consumption despite the clash with their moral beliefs (the “meat paradox”). This work highlights the important gap between what science knows about animals and what people think about animals.

Evolutionary Continuity, Anne Benvenuti

Animal Sentience

The principle of evolutionary continuity states that all animal capacities and behaviors exist — with variations in degree — in continuity with other species. Rather than assuming discontinuity, we should ask why any behavior observed in humans would not be found in at least some other sentient animals under similar conditions. In the case of suicide, the more pertinent issue might be the ethical one: our human responsibility for creating conditions under which other animals might deliberately seek to end their own lives.

What Is The Pressing “Animal Question” About? Thinking/Feeling Capacity Or Exploitability?, Gordon Hodson

Animal Sentience

Marino’s timely review highlights what humans go to great lengths to ignore and suppress: non-human animals such as chickens have rich inner lives. Although I share her belief that such evidence should provide the impetus for ending the exploitation of chickens, the psychological literatures on motivated reasoning and group-based dominance suggest not only that this is unlikely but that people will push back precisely because of the implications (as they do for climate change). Human psychology has done a great deal to suppress the recognition of sentience in animals, but it can also shed insights into ending exploitation.

Non-Human Animal Suicide Could Be Tested, David Lester

Animal Sentience

Schaefer (1967) showed that mice can discriminate live from dead mice and lethal from nonlethal environments, and that they avoid a lethal environment; but the experiment lacked some controls. This might be a way to test whether mice would ever choose a lethal environment. Humans may also choose a potentially lethal environment unconsciously.

Understanding Animal Suicide And Death Can Lead To Better End-Of-Life Care, Jessica Pierce

Animal Sentience

Peña-Guzmán’s target article on animal suicide will help inform end-of-life care for animals by emphasizing the need for a broad research focus on animal thanatology. Greater scientific understanding of the continuum of death-related awareness, experiences, and behaviors will help us improve veterinary care for animals at the end of life.

Complicated Grief, Teya Brooks Pribac

Animal Sentience

My commentary discusses complicated grief and the ensuing sense of helplessness that may lead to suicide. I close with a story about a pygmy pig.

Can Nonhuman Animals Commit Suicide?, David M. Peña-Guzmán

Animal Sentience

Many people believe that only humans have the cognitive and behavioral capacities needed for suicidal behavior, such as reflexive subjectivity, free will, intentionality, or awareness of death. Three counterarguments — based on (i) negative emotions and psychopathologies among nonhuman animals, (ii) the nature of self-destructive behavior, and (iii) the problem of model fidelity in suicide research — suggest that self-destructive and self-injurious behaviors among human and nonhuman animals vary along a continuum.

Tribute To Jaak Panksepp, Jonathan Balcombe

Animal Sentience

No abstract provided.

Animal Ethics And Animal Consciousness, Bernard E. Rollin

Ethics and Animal Welfare Collection

Commentary on Marino and Allen (2017) The Psychology of Cows

Forty-Second Annual Midwest Philosophy Colloquium, 2017-2018, University Of Minnesota - Morris. Philosophy Department

Midwest Philosophy Colloquium

Programs for the forty-second Midwest Philosophy Colloquium at the University of Minnesota Morris in 2017-2018.

An Introduction To Positive Sum Design, Ian Gonsher

Articles

No abstract provided.

A Former Student And Colleague Remembers Gil Scott-Heron, Linwood Gato Martinez-Bentley

The Journal of Traditions & Beliefs

No abstract provided.

Getting To The Other Side, Debra Merskin

Animal Sentience

Marino’s comprehensive, detailed, and timely review provides clear evidence of the sentience of chickens and strong support for those wishing to challenge their exclusion from even the limited protections currently accorded to animals grown for food.

Sentience Does Not Require “Higher” Cognition, Giorgio Vallortigara

Animal Sentience

I agree with Marino (2017a,b) that the cognitive capacities of chickens are likely to be the same as those of many others vertebrates. Also, data collected in the young of this precocial species provide rich information about how much cognition can be pre-wired and predisposed in the brain. However, evidence of advanced cognition — in chickens or any other organism — says little about sentience (i.e., feeling). We do not deny sentience in human beings who, because of cognitive deficits, would be incapable of exhibiting some of the cognitive feats of chickens. Moreover, complex problem solving, such as transitive inference, …

Misperceiving And Underestimating The Ubiquitous Chicken, Carrie P. Freeman

Animal Sentience

Marino has provided an accurate and nuanced view about chickens’ complex capabilities as sentient individuals. I explore the implications of these findings for scholars as well as for activists in the protection of farmed animals.

Scientific Advances And Moral Inertia, Kathie Jenni

Animal Sentience

Marino shows that chickens are as complex mentally as other birds and mammals. Yet common perceptions of chickens are slow to change in response to the science. Human capacities for willful ignorance, inattention, and avoidance keep us from learning about the animals we harm, and the inertia of habit and tradition keeps us from taking appropriate action in response to what we learn. It’s essential for teachers and activists to find ways to overcome this inattention and inertia.

Is Psychological Science Committing “Suicide” By Linguistic Muddling?, Roger K. Thomas

Animal Sentience

Beginning mainly with the “cognitive revolution” in psychology in the latter half of the 20^th century, psychological science has been committing “suicide” slowly via linguistic muddling. Peña-Guzmán’s target article is but one of thousands of cuts contributing to this death by “suicide.” Having said that, given the current state of affairs in animal cognition research, there is much to commend in Peña-Guzmán’s article. I leave that to others, however. This commentary explains how the suicide by muddling of psychological science is happening in general, with the understanding that it applies also to Peña-Guzmán’s target article.

On Assisted Suicide, Clark Glymour

Animal Sentience

What would be the moral implications of the capacity for suicide in nonhuman animals? Humans can be helped to end their lives if they no longer find them bearable. Should captive animals not be given the same possibility?

Patrick Mcnamara: The Neuroscience Of Religious Experience, R Younis

Philosophy Papers and Journal Articles

Book Review

Patrick McNamara: The Neuroscience of Religious Experience. Cambridge University Press 2009.

A Conditional Defense Of Shame And Shame Punishment, Erick Ramirez

Philosophy

In this paper I argue that, if we properly understand the nature of shame, it is sometimes justifiable to shame others in the context of a pluralistic multicultural society. I begin by assessing the accounts of shame provided by Cheshire Calhoun (2004) and Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno and Fabrice Teroni (2012). I argue that both views have problems. I defend a theory of shame and embarrassment that connects both emotions to ‘whole-self’ properties. Shame and embarrassment, I claim, are products of the same underlying emotion. I distinguish between moralized and non-moralized shame in order to show when, and how, moral …

The Yin And Yang Of Conflict Management And Resolution, Guo-Ming Chen

Communication Studies Faculty Publications

The increasing interaction among cultural groups due to the impact of globalization has not only made the relationship between conflict and culture more interdependent and complicated, but also demands that a new way be found for studying conflict management and resolution from a more dynamic perspective. Eastern and Western cultures are distinct societies in terms of axiological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. The axiological assumptions are especially useful for understanding the differences between Eastern and Western conflict behaviors. From the perspective of human interaction, the dynamic nature of culture can be more specifically displayed intraculturally by internal variations and interculturally by …

If You Believe, You Believe: A Constitutive Account Of Knowledge Of One’S Own Beliefs, Peter Baumann

Philosophy Faculty Works

Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore's paradox. It shows that if one believes that one believes that p then one believes that p – even though one can believe that p without believing that one believes that p.

Power, Soft Or Deep? An Attempt At Constructive Criticism, Peter Baumann

Philosophy Faculty Works

This paper discusses and criticizes Joseph Nye’s account of soft power. First, we set the stage and make some general remarks about the notion of social power. In the main part of this paper we offer a detailed critical discussion of Nye’s conception of soft power. We conclude that it is too unclear and confused to be of much analytical use. However, despite this failure, Nye is aiming at explaining an important but also neglected form of social power: the power to influence the will and not just the behavior of other agents. In the last part of this paper …

Review Of "Anger And Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice" By M. C. Nussbaum, Krista Karbowski Thomason

Philosophy Faculty Works

No abstract provided.

“This Most Human Predicament”: Cavell On Language, Intention, And Desire In Shakespeare, Richard Thomas Eldridge

Philosophy Faculty Works

In the second paragraph of “The Avoidance of Love,” the earliest of his essays on Shakespeare, Cavell asks, “What has discouraged attention from investigations of character?” in Shakespeare criticism of the mid-twentieth century. “What […] has [instead] specifically motivated an absorbing attention to words?”, as in the criticism of William Empson and G. Wilson Knight. The answer that Cavell offers is that it is “the merest assumption,” foisted off on us “by some philosophy or other, that [literary] characters are not people, [and] that what can be known about people cannot be known about characters” (DK, 40). Cavell then goes …