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Sagp Newsletter 2007/8.1 (December), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Includes the SAGP Programs with the Eastern Division (December 28, 2007) in Baltimore, with the American Philological Association (January 4, 2008) in Chicago, with the Pacific Division (March 2008) in Pasadena, and with the Central Division (April 2008) in Chicago.

Sagp/Ssips 2007 Abstract Collection, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

This is a collection of abstracts from the 2007 SAGP/SSIPS conference, in alphabetical order by name of author.

Aristotle On Mathematical Existence, Phil Corkum

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Do mathematical objects exist in some realm inaccessible to our senses? It may be tempting to deny this. For one thing, how we could come to know mathematical truths, if such knowledge must arise from causal interaction with non-empirical objects? However, denying that mathematical objects exist altogether has unsettling consequences. If you deny the existence of mathematical objects, then you must reject all claims that commit you to such objects, which means rejecting much of mathematics as it is standardly understood. For, as David Papineau (1990) vividly puts it, it is doublethink to deny that mathematical objects exist but to …

On The (In)Consistency Of Aristotle's Philosophy Of Time, Tiberiu Popa

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle’s mind-dependence theory of time is considerably more than an eccentric afterthought formulated in a short passage, as many believe; rather, it is firmly anchored in Physics IV, especially in Ch. 11. A number of formulations that may seem purely epistemic or propaedeutic in nature do in fact have ontological significance, pointing to the fact that time’s existence hinges crucially on our capacity to perceive change. Aristotle seems to be echoed in crucial respects by contemporary theories of time, notably by A. Grünbaum’s.

Socrates's Great Escape: Philosophy And Politics In The Crito, Matthew King

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Many contemporary students of Plato hold that the arguments Socrates gives the personified Laws in the Crito do not represent Socrates’s own views, but rather work on assumptions to which Crito adheres, but Socrates does not. But if the Laws’ arguments are not Socrates’s own, then we seem to be left with a bewildering problem: why would Plato provide us with arguments that Socrates does not believe in, for a conclusion which Socrates evidently does believe in? After all, Socrates does remain in prison to face his execution; evidently, he believes that that is what he ought to do. This …

The Tension Between Altruistic Character And Self-Serving Possession In A Classical Socio-Political Ethic, Jeremy S. Neill

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Much of the Nicomachean Ethics treats egocentrism as an ineffectual and pernicious social vice out of which humans ought to be habituated. In the Politics self-centeredness is almost universally portrayed as a useful and enduring constituent of human psychology. The system of private property described in the Politics can hardly be a necessary social institution when Aristotle claims in the Ethics that the habituation process is capable of permanently fixing our attention upon public and altruistic fiscal ventures. This interpretive discrepancy between the two texts demonstrates that Aristotle’s defense of private property is ineffectual in its attempt to preserve the …

Sagp Newsletter 2006/7.2, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Programs of the Society with the Pacific Division, April 7, 2007, in San Francisco, and with the Central Division, April 20, 2007, in Chicago.

Resembling Nothing: Image And Being In Plato, Yancy Hughes Dominick

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

A crucial application of Plato’s views on the use of images in philosophy occurs through the use of the image relationship as an image for the relation of forms and particulars. The relation of a picture to the object it depicts, or that between a reflection and what it reflects, can be seen as analogous to the relation of a particular to the form in which it participates. Although the attack on the image model as analogous to the relation of forms and particulars in the Parmenides threatens to undermine any reliance on that model, this essay will present a …

Aristotle On Sense Perception: The Enemy Of My Enemy Is Not My Friend: A Reply To Martha Nussbaum And Hilary Putnam, Anthony Crifasi

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Among the many contributions to twentieth century philosophical scholarship by Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam was their 1992 essay, “Changing Aristotle’s Mind,” in which they appealed to “the Aristotelian form - matter view as a happy alternative” between Cartesian dualism and materialistic reductionism. On the one hand, they argued, Aristotle’s view escapes Cartesian mind-body dualism because for Aristotle, there can be no description of animal functions “without making these functions ... embodied in some matter...” On the other hand, Aristotle does not reduce psychological functions to matter, because the Aristotelian psuche or soul is not identified with the matter of …

Sagp Newsletter 2006/7.1 (December), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp Ssips 2006 List Of Papers, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Alphabetical list of the participants in the 2006 SAGP SSIPS conference at Fordham University.

Is 'Part Of Justice' Just At All? Reconsidering Aristotle's Politics Iii.9, Steven Skultety

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Here is a summary of my argument: if partisan groups like oligarchs and democrats successfully achieve some degree of justice, it must be the case that they exhibit some degree of that virtue as it is analyzed in Nicomachean Ethics Book V (=Eudemian Ethics Book IV). Justice there is divided into two types: justice as lawfulness (which I will often refer to as “justice in the broad sense”), and justice as the equal (or, alternatively, “justice in the narrow sense”). The former type of justice is complete virtue with respect to others; it is the virtue that allows individuals to …

Eudaimonism And The Demands Of Justice, Andrew Payne

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The ancient eudaimonists were not misguided when they gave a prominent place to the human function in their ethical theory. Most modern reconstructions of eudaimonism do not employ the human function in this way. Though this gives them the appearance of being more streamlined and plausible, they fail to unify a life which respects the demands of justice. It is evident that in the Republic and other ancient ethical works humans are presented as acting out of concern for the good of others. They show respect for justice and act from altruistic motivation, and this is one source of value …

Antisthenes' Theory Of Unique Enunciation: Similarities, Differences, And Possible Influences, Fouad Kalouche

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In this paper I will focus on Antisthenes’ theory of unique enunciation, and will then discuss its similarities and differences with, and/or possible influences on, other theories on language that flourished around the 4th and 3rd centuries BCE. I showed elsewhere that Antisthenes’ theory of language is a practical application or a strategy that has direct implication for his ethical project. My aim here is merely to highlight the originality and relevance of Antisthenes’ theory by presenting it and contextualizing it, before assessing relevant similarities and differences between certain positions of Antisthenes and those of some Skeptics, Sophists, Cyrenaics, and …

The Concept Of Abstraction, Allan Bäck

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Philosophers deal with abstractions. Being reflective, they also have come up with theories about what these abstractions are. Aristotle is no exception, and indeed gave what came to be a canonical account of abstraction. Here I shall investigate what Aristotle thinks abstraction is. I shall conclude that Aristotle views abstraction as selective attention.

As its very name suggests, abstracting (ἀφαιρέω) consists in taking away something from an object. The root verb, αἱρέω, suggests additionally a sense of grasping or of choosing, of taking for oneself something of what lies ready to hand.

These lexical meanings leave open a wide range …

Sagp Newsletter 2005/6 March Pacific, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Των Λογων Ο Πρωτος Τε Και Σμικροτατος, Sph. 262c6-7: The First And Littlest Of Sentences, John J. Mulhern

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In this paper I show that the orthodox syntax suggested in Sophistes 262C6-7 and the surrounding text is not adhered to in the dialogues. Within the limited universe of monadic atomic sentence syntax extended with constants for existence and unity, in fact, all but three of the 14 possible irregular forms are used in one or other of the three dialogues instanced here. Self-predication, which, in the mid-twentieth-century, fascinated so many scholars, turns out to be just one among the many varieties of irregular syntax in the dialogues.

The nonadherence of other interlocutors to the Eleatic Stranger’s description of monadic …

Courage And Knowledge At Protagoras 349e1-351b2, David Wolfsdorf

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

At Protagoras 349E1-350C5 Socrates argues for the identity of courage and knowledge, and at 350C6- 351B2 Protagoras objects to Socrates’ argument. Between 1961 and 1985, a few valuable contributions in English were made to the interpretation of these passages. None, however, is entirely satisfactory. And in the last twenty years, among some cursory treatments in studies not particularly focused on these passages, no notable progress has been made.

The objective of this paper is to present a more satisfactory interpretation of Socrates’ argument and Protagoras’ objection, in particular by engaging with a set of problems with which previous commentators have …

Self-Knowledge, Tyranny, And The Delphic Oracle In Plato's Charmides, Alan Pichanick

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

My focus here is the discussion between Critias and Socrates regarding the message of the oracle at Delphi: “Know yourself”. This is the only substantive discussion of the oracle outside the Apology, so we should give it careful attention, if we are at all interested in the philosophy of Socrates and those who in any way follow or depart from him. For though sôphrosunê may be elusive, the dialogue makes it clear that it is deeply connected, whatever its nature is, to the philosophical outlook of Socrates, tying together his ethical and epistemological stances. The task of understanding sôphrosunê is …

Physis And Nomos In Aristotle's Ethics, Thornton C. Lockwood

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In Nicomachean Ethics V.7, Aristotle claims that political justice (to dikaion politikon) possesses a “natural” (phusikon) pail and a “conventional” (nomikon) part In response to those who separated nature and convention and disparaged the latter because it was different from place to place, Aristotle claims that both nature and convention admit of variation, and his language suggests that the two are ultimately parts which need to be interwoven or combined. Scholars who have struggled with Aristotle’s apparently disparate senses of the idea of nature have assumed that nature is an ethical ideal which can be separated from and serve as …

Sagp Newsletter 2005/6 December East/Philol, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp Ssips 2005 List Of Papers, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Alphabetical listing of the participants in the 2005 SAGP SSIPS meeting at Fordham University.

Plato's Equivocal Wisdom, Mary Lenzi

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

A new interplay between sophia and phronesis emerges in Plato’s conception of wisdom in later dialogues that is quite different from his views in early and middle dialogues. First {Part I), the present inquiry shows that sophia no longer represents primarily theoretical, philosophic wisdom as it does in the Republic (and as Aristotle defines it). Rather, according to the reading and interpretation of the texts presented here, sophia becomes closely akin to Plato’s earlier conception of wisdom in relation to temperance (sophrosyne) in his Socratic dialogues, in that the highest inner harmony and virtue necessarily require sophia qua self- knowledge. …

The Split Gaze Of The Soul: Parts And Wholes In Aristotle's Model Of Epagoge, Mark Faller

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In this paper I will try to clarify Aristotle’s conception of induction or epagoge. I will begin by critiquing a variety of contemporary accounts of Aristotelian induction with reference to how they evaluate its adequacy as a grounding for science. I will then try to establish a set of conditions that must ultimately be met for this grounding to succeed.

It will be my contention that by appreciating how the critical faculty {to krinon) can act with the common sense {koine dunamis) to hold multiple dimensions of consciousness in front of the attention in a unitary “gaze,” we can begin …

The Meno, Recollection, And The Role Of Hypothesis, Joseph A. Novak

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The aim of this paper is to present Plato's doctrine within a perspective that will both explain why Plato found himself prompted to formulate it, as well as explore some enduring insights exhibited in its applications. First, the paper will argue that Plato was prompted to adopt the doctrine given the difficulties that had arisen from the employment of the Socratic elenchus. Second, it will argue that hypothesis, already implicit in the elenchic method, will begin to be developed into a more complex and refined method that Plato sees necessary for the whole learning process. The retention of a hypothesis …

Sagp Newsletter 2005.3 (April), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Program of the Society with the Central Division, April 2005

Aristotle, Epistemic Exemplars, And Virtue Epistemology, Scott Rubarth

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Is contemporary virtue epistemology in fact a revival of Aristotle’s theory of intellectual virtues and an appeal to Aristotelian epistemology? In this paper I will examine Linda Zagzebski's theory of virtue epistemology, the most explicitly Aristotelian version of the agent-based epistemologies. The objective of this analysis is threefold: (1) To examine to what extent Zagzebski's virtue epistemology is genuinely Aristotelian, particularly in the use of moral and epistemic exemplars. (2) To draw attention to some significant concerns regarding the use of exemplars, such as the famous phronimos, in both moral and epistemic evaluation. And finally, (3) to offer a critique …

Plato On Episteme And Propositional Knowledge, Denis Vlahovic

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Epistêmê cannot just be a matter of knowing a logos. Knowledge, it appears, is demonstrated not in the knowledge of any particular logos, but in the ability to defend a logos against refutation. It is precisely the latter ability that is characteristic of epistêmê. This ability, furthermore, cannot be imparted by means of a logos. For, no logos suffices to endow its possessor with the ability to defend it (i.e., the logos) against refutation.

Given that Plato appears to have believed that no knowledge of a logos—no matter how elaborate the logos—is sufficient for epistêmê, one can see why he …

Sagp Newsletter 2005.2 (Pacific), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Aristotle On Consciousness, Phil Corkum

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle sometimes draws analogies between perceiving and thinking. One analogy, for example, concerns the relation holding between faculties and their objects. If thinking is like perceiving, then as the faculty of perception is to the object perceived, so too the faculty of thought is to the intelligible object. Of course, there are also disanalogies between perception and thought. For example, where perception requires external stimulation by sensible substances, thought does not generally require external stimulation. How far then might we push the analogy? In this essay, I’ll argue that the role of the agent intellect in thought is analogous to …