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Articles 181 - 190 of 190
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy
Foreword, Chandran Kukathas
Foreword, Chandran Kukathas
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
Hayek's essay 'Why I am not a Concervative' first appeared in 1960 as the final chapter of his treatise, The Constitution of Liberty. Strictly speaking, it was not really a concluding chapter; it was presented as a 'postscript' to the main text-a text whose concern was to articulate and elaborate upon the fundamental principles of classical liberalism. In this postscript Hayek attempted a task which the main treatise did not take up: to explain how the principles of classical liberalism set it apart from the conservatism with which it seemed to have so much in common.
Discourse And Perspective In Daoism: A Linguistic Interpretation Of Ziran, William A. Callahan
Discourse And Perspective In Daoism: A Linguistic Interpretation Of Ziran, William A. Callahan
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
In Chinese philosophical literature, the term zirana is generally rendered as "spontaneity," "natural," or "self-so" by both Chinese and Western trans- lators. I think that these translations not only miss the point being made in the texts, but actually serve to obscure it
Welfare, Contract, And The Language Of Charity, Chandran Kukathas
Welfare, Contract, And The Language Of Charity, Chandran Kukathas
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
No abstract provided.
Confucius, Mencius And The Notion Of True Succession, John N. Williams
Confucius, Mencius And The Notion Of True Succession, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
No abstract provided.
The Preface Paradox Dissolved, John N. Williams
The Preface Paradox Dissolved, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
The preface paradox strikes us as puzzling because we feel that if a person holds a set of inconsistent beliefs, i.e. beliefs such that at least one of them must be correct, then he should give at least one of them up. Equally, if a person's belief is rational, then he has a right to hold it. Yet the preface example is prima facie a case in which a person holds an inconsistent set of beliefs each of which is rational, and thus a case in which that person has a duty to relinquish what he has a right to …
Believing The Self-Contradictory, John N. Williams
Believing The Self-Contradictory, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
Clearly, if a man holds a self-contradictory belief, then his belief cannot be rational, for there can be no set of evidence sufficient to justify it. This is most apparent when the self contradictory belief is a belief in a conjunction, (e.g., a belief that p & ~p), rather than when it is a non-conjunctive self-contradictory belief, e.g. a belief that red is not a color.
The Absurdities Of Moore's Paradoxes, John N. Williams
The Absurdities Of Moore's Paradoxes, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
No abstract provided.
Inconsistency And Contradiction, John N. Williams
Inconsistency And Contradiction, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
Inconsistency and contradiction are important concepts. Unfortunately, they are easily confused. A proposition or belief which is inconsistent is one which is self- contradictory and vice-versa. Moreover two propositions or beliefs which are contradictories are inconsistent with each other. Nonetheless it is a mistake to suppose that inconsistency is the same as contradiction.
Justified Belief And The Infinite Regress Argument, John N. Williams
Justified Belief And The Infinite Regress Argument, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
The background to this paper is the question of how rational belief is possible in the light of the commonly presented infinite regress in reasons. The paper investigates the neglected question of whether this regress is vicious. I argue that given the genuine requirements of rational belief, the regress would require the rational believer to hold an infinity of beliefs, which is impossible. The regress would not entail the rational believer holding an infinitely complex belief, which, admittedly, would be logically impossible.
Moore's Paradox: One Or Two?, John N. Williams
Moore's Paradox: One Or Two?, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
Discussions of what is sometimes called 'Moore's paradox' are often vitiated by a failure to notice that there are two paradoxes; not merely one in two sets of linguistic clothing. The two paradoxes are absurd, but in different ways, and accordingly require different explanations.