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Articles 421 - 450 of 602
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy
A Risk Assessment And Phylogenetic Approach, Culum Brown
A Risk Assessment And Phylogenetic Approach, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
The precautionary principal is often invoked when talking about the evidence of sentience in animals, largely because we can never be certain what any animal is thinking or feeling. Birch (2017) offers a preliminary framework for the use of the precautionary principal for animal sentience combining an epistemic rule with a decision rule. I extend this framework by adding an evolutionary phylogentic approach which spreads the burden of proof across broad taxonomic groups and a risk assessment component which magnifies the likely impact by the number of animals involved.
Precaution, Proportionality And Proper Commitments, Colin Klein
Precaution, Proportionality And Proper Commitments, Colin Klein
Animal Sentience
Birch’s extension of the precautionary principle (PP) is plausible but raises issues about how proportionality ought to be incorporated into law. Following Steel (2013), I suggest that the PP is best considered as a meta-norm, and as such any resulting laws are likely to lack the fineness of grain that we would hope to achieve. To fill the gap, I suggest a parallel with the ethics of studying looted artifacts.
The “Precautionary Principle” – A Work In Progress, Shelley Adamo
The “Precautionary Principle” – A Work In Progress, Shelley Adamo
Animal Sentience
The target article by Birch illustrates the practical difficulties with the “Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle” (ASPP) while presenting potential solutions. However, the ASPP will be difficult to use without guidelines detailing how evidence of sentience should be assessed. Moreover, extrapolating conclusions found for a single species to all species within an Order is problematic. Finally, I recommend that Birch demonstrate his ASPP framework using a controversial test case to help show how it could be used in real-world situations.
What If All Animals Are Sentient?, Arthur S. Reber
What If All Animals Are Sentient?, Arthur S. Reber
Animal Sentience
Birch develops a useful framework for determining when the Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP) should be invoked. He rightly notes that there is a lack of agreement among social scientists, ethicists, and legislators even about whether the precautionary principle is useful, let alone when and how it should be implemented. His proposal is to establish a kind of cognitive threshold, and only when an animal shows a sufficient level of sentience would the ASPP be appropriate. From the point of view of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness model (Reber, 2016), all animals are sentient. If correct, the problems Birch identifies …
Scientific Uncertainty And The Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle, Michael L. Woodruff
Scientific Uncertainty And The Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Jonathan Birch offers the animal sentience precautionary principle (ASPP) as a framework for assigning sentience to animals. In doing this, he defines a BAR which when crossed will lead to action (ACT) and implementation of the ASPP. His effort to create a clear empirical basis for implementation of the precautionary principle in the area of animal welfare regulation is important. I argue, however, that his BAR is so low that the evidence supporting ACT is in danger of being overwhelmed by the problems of induction and the underdetermination of theory by evidence. If this happens, policy makers might well disregard …
Refining The Precautionary Framework, Jonathan Birch
Refining The Precautionary Framework, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
Most of the commentators so far agree that the precautionary principle can be usefully applied to the question of animal sentience. I consider various ways of refining my proposals in light of the suggestions. I amend BAR to implement C. Brown’s suggestion that the scope of animal welfare law should be extensible by phylogenetic inference from orders in which credible indicators of sentience are found. In response to C. Brown, Mallatt, and Woodruff, I amend ACT to allow that a single credible indicator may sometimes call for urgent further investigation rather than immediate protection. In response …
Cognitive Dissonance Or Contrast? It Could Be Both, Thomas Zentall
Cognitive Dissonance Or Contrast? It Could Be Both, Thomas Zentall
Animal Sentience
My target article suggested that cognitive dissonance may be accounted for by a simpler mechanism: contrast. Whether contrast can explain all cognitive dissonance effects is an empirical question, but it is always useful to try to distinguish simpler mechanisms from more complex cognitive ones. The insistence that cognitive dissonance is a human-only process quite different from contrast may be a self-serving means of justifying the exploitation of animals.
What Can Vigilance Tell Us About Fear?, Guy Beauchamp
What Can Vigilance Tell Us About Fear?, Guy Beauchamp
Animal Sentience
Animal vigilance is concerned with the monitoring of potential threats caused by predators and conspecifics. Researchers have argued that threats are part of a landscape of fear tracking the level of risk posed by predators and conspecifics. Vigilance, which is expected to vary with the level of risk, could thus be used as a measure of fear. Here, I explore the relationship between vigilance and fear caused by predators and conspecifics. The joint occurrence of vigilance and other physiological responses to fear, such as increased heart rate and stress hormone release, would bolster the idea that vigilance can be a …
Individual Variation In Fear Behaviour, Rob Found
Individual Variation In Fear Behaviour, Rob Found
Animal Sentience
Individual variation in behaviour adds another layer of complexity to studies of animal responses to fear and risk, but when individual responses are consistent, and correlated with other behaviours, these patterns can provide a structure that furthers our understanding. I interpret Beauchamp’s review of vigilance and fear from the perspective of my own studies of elk personality. Wild elk responses to changing stimuli (benign or aversive) illustrate how personality is a key factor in explaining variation in vigilance and fear behavior. Personality even influences how wildlife can learn to assess risk and adjust their fear responses accordingly.
Considering Side Biases In Vigilance And Fear, Lesley J. Rogers
Considering Side Biases In Vigilance And Fear, Lesley J. Rogers
Animal Sentience
Measures of vigilance and fear might be more consistently associated if side biases are taken into account, because the right side of the brain is specialised to detect predators and to express fear responses. In species with eyes positioned laterally and with relatively small binocular fields, this brain asymmetry is manifested as eye preferences because each eye sends most of its input to be processed in the opposite side of the brain. Hence, responses elicited by stimuli on the animal’s left side are more likely be associated with fear than are responses to the same stimuli on the animal’s right …
Cautions About Precautions, Jay R. Stauffer Jr.
Cautions About Precautions, Jay R. Stauffer Jr.
Animal Sentience
Assuming an animal to be sentient in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary is an extreme position, hence it should not and could not be the default assumption. Birch explains how the precautionary principle may be used to substantiate decisions to give the animal the benefit of doubt. Although I am reluctant to accept all of his points, Birch has provided an excellent argument for the use of the precautionary principle for the detection of animal sentience. I agree that more research is needed to refine and understand this relationship.
Changing The Subject, Joel Marks
Changing The Subject, Joel Marks
Animal Sentience
I detect at least two unspoken assumptions in Birch’s project, and I question, indeed, reject both of them. One is that welfare is the primary concern of animal ethics. I think liberation is. Birch’s other assumption is that the scientific investigation of animal sentience is key to promoting animal ethics. I think science is largely irrelevant to progress on this front and can even be counterproductive.
Not Statistically Significant, But Still Scientific, Rachael L. Brown
Not Statistically Significant, But Still Scientific, Rachael L. Brown
Animal Sentience
Birch’s formulation is persuasive but not nuanced enough to capture at least one situation where it is reasonable to invoke the precautionary principle (PP): when we have multiple, weak, but convergent, lines of evidence that a species is sentient, but no statistically significant evidence of a single credible indicator of sentience within the order as required by BAR. I respond to the worry that if we include such cases in our framework for applying the PP, we open ourselves to the charge of being “unscientific.”
Dogs Consciously Experience Emotions: The Question Is, Which?, Ralph Adolphs
Dogs Consciously Experience Emotions: The Question Is, Which?, Ralph Adolphs
Animal Sentience
I discuss three themes related to Kujala’s target article. First, the wealth of emerging data on cognitive studies in dogs will surely show that dogs have a very rich repertoire of cognitive processes, for most of which we find homologues in humans. Second, understanding the internal states that mediate social behaviors, such as emotions, requires us to consider both a dog’s behaviors with other dogs, and the emergence of new behavioral patterns in interaction with humans. Third, all of this will certainly narrow the range of justifications for denying that dogs have subjective experiences of emotions.
The Study Of Emotion In Animals, Thomas R. Zentall
The Study Of Emotion In Animals, Thomas R. Zentall
Animal Sentience
The responsiveness of dogs to humans encourages us to attribute human-like emotions to them. Indirect evidence for emotions in other animals can be obtained but one must be careful to find means of distinguishing what we believe to be evidence for such emotions from simpler mechanisms. For example, is a dog’s growl an indication of anger, fear, or possibly an unemotional defense of territory? By carefully designing experiments, we may be able to rule out alternative accounts and show better evidence for underlying emotions.
Emotion In Dogs: Translational And Transformative Aspects, Silvan R. Urfer
Emotion In Dogs: Translational And Transformative Aspects, Silvan R. Urfer
Animal Sentience
Kujala (2017) provides an excellent overview of most aspects of emotion in dogs; however, she does not cover a few fields of research that I think are also relevant to the topic. In this commentary, I discuss the current state of our knowledge regarding cognitive decline and behavioral disorders in dogs as potential models for human neurodegenerative disease and mental illness; how emotion and cognition in dogs interact with sex, gonadectomy, and sexual behavior; as well as the transformative potential of functional MRI imaging of the conscious dog brain in the study of comparative neurophysiology.
Direct Perception Of Animal Mind, Paul Morris
Direct Perception Of Animal Mind, Paul Morris
Animal Sentience
Kujala’s (2017) target article is ostensibly focused on how everyday folk (fail to) make sense of canine emotions. However, the theories outlined in the article apply to making sense of all aspects of the mentality of both human and non-human animals. The target article neglects the fundamental arguments surrounding the problem of other minds. I explore the relevant arguments and briefly review approaches suggesting that our everyday-life sense that both human and non-human animals are thinking, feeling, emotional beings has a secure epistemological basis.
Canine Emotions And The Bond Between Humans And Dogs, Robert G. Franklin Jr.
Canine Emotions And The Bond Between Humans And Dogs, Robert G. Franklin Jr.
Animal Sentience
I explore how the findings reviewed by Kujala (2017) influence our understanding of the human-dog bond. The special social cognitive abilities of dogs may be unique among animal species, probably influenced by the circumstances surrounding canine domestication. The bond has influenced animal welfare policies, giving dogs a privileged place among animals. To determine what protections other species should have in a rational animal welfare policy, more research is needed on whether other species have similar social cognitive abilities.
Communicating Canine And Human Emotions, Juliane Bräuer, Karine Silva, Stefan R. Schweinberger
Communicating Canine And Human Emotions, Juliane Bräuer, Karine Silva, Stefan R. Schweinberger
Animal Sentience
Kujala (2017) reviews a topic of major relevance for the understanding of the special dog-human relationship: canine emotions (as seen through human social cognition). This commentary draws attention to the communication of emotions within such a particular social context. It highlights challenges that need to be tackled to further advance research on emotional communication, and it calls for new avenues of research. Efforts to disentangle emotional processes from cognitive functioning might be necessary to better comprehend how they contribute, alone and/or in combination, to the communication of emotions. Also, new research methods need to be developed to account for the …
Do We Understand What It Means For Dogs To Experience Emotion?, Lasana T. Harris
Do We Understand What It Means For Dogs To Experience Emotion?, Lasana T. Harris
Animal Sentience
Psychologists who study humans struggle to agree on a definition of emotion, falling primarily into two camps. Though recent neuroscience advances are beginning to settle this ancient debate, it cannot solve the private-language problem at the heart of inferences about social cognition. This suggests that when we consider the emotional experiences of other species like canines, biological and physiological homologs do not provide enough evidence of emotional experiences similar to those of humans. Secondary complex emotional experiences are even more difficult to attribute to non-humans since such experiences rely, by definition, on social cognition. Given the contextual differences between human-human …
Empathy In Dogs: With A Little Help From A Friend – A Mixed Blessing, Sabrina Karl, Ludwig Huber
Empathy In Dogs: With A Little Help From A Friend – A Mixed Blessing, Sabrina Karl, Ludwig Huber
Animal Sentience
Kujala (2017) presents an extensive overview of existing research on canine emotions in comparison to those of other non-human animals and humans. This commentary provides some additional research results on the intensively debated field of empathy in dogs. We focus on recent advances in the understanding of a fundamental building block of empathy — emotional contagion — and on dogs’ remarkable sensitivity for human emotions, including the skills of assistance dogs.
Studying Dog Emotion Beyond Expression And Without Concern For Feeling, Peter F. Cook
Studying Dog Emotion Beyond Expression And Without Concern For Feeling, Peter F. Cook
Animal Sentience
Studies of dog emotion have focused on the expression of social emotion, either because this is taken to suggest human-like feeling states in dogs or because it has been the most accessible signal of dog emotional processing. I argue for an approach grounded in affective neuroscience, relying on direct measures of physiology across different contexts. This work may be particularly fertile in exploring social emotion in the dog, not because dogs necessarily share human emotional states, but because they are unique in having likely evolved to fit a human social niche.
Inferring Emotion Without Language: Comparing Canines And Prelinguistic Infants, Stefanie Hoehl
Inferring Emotion Without Language: Comparing Canines And Prelinguistic Infants, Stefanie Hoehl
Animal Sentience
Research on canine emotions has to deal with challenges quite similar to psychological research on social and emotional development in human infants. In both cases, verbal reports are unattainable, and behavioral and physiological methods have to be adjusted to the specific population. I will argue that both regarding empirical approaches and conceptual work, advances in research on social-cognitive development in human infants can inform the study of canine emotions.
Consciousness In Teleosts: There Is Something It Feels Like To Be A Fish, Michael L. Woodruff
Consciousness In Teleosts: There Is Something It Feels Like To Be A Fish, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Ray-finned fish are often excluded from the group of non-human animals considered to have phenomenal consciousness. This is generally done on the grounds that the fish pallium lacks a sufficiently expansive gross parcellation, as well as even minimally sufficient neuronal organization, intrinsic connectivity, and reciprocal extrinsic connections with the thalamus to support the subjective experience of qualia. It is also argued that fish do not exhibit the level of behavioral flexibility indicative of consciousness. A review of neuroanatomical, neurophysiological and behavioral studies is presented which leads to the conclusion that fish do have neurobiological correlates and behavioral flexibility of sufficient …
Consciousness, Evidence, And Moral Standing, Irina Mikhalevich
Consciousness, Evidence, And Moral Standing, Irina Mikhalevich
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) claims to have identified the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness (“p-consciousness”) in fishes, and argues that these neurological data, along with behavioral evidence, suggest that teleost fishes are in all probability sentient organisms. Woodruff’s case may be strengthened by challenging key assumptions behind a common criticism of accounts such as his: that fishes cannot be p-conscious because they lack the cortical structures necessary for p-consciousness. A more serious objection to Woodruff’s proposal would be that his evidence for p-consciousness establishes only that fishes are “access-conscious” (“a-conscious”), where a-conscious states are cognitive representations that are made available to cognitive …
Battlefish Contention, Sean Allen-Hermanson
Battlefish Contention, Sean Allen-Hermanson
Animal Sentience
Contrary to Woodruff’s suggestion, investigations into possible reasoning capacities of cichlid fighting fish and trace memory in goldfish do not support claims about sentience. This is disputed by research results about learning and implicit processing, sleep, vegetative states, amnesia, semantic priming, artificial network modeling, and even insects. A novel, deflationary, interpretation of Grosenick et al.'s experiments on A. burtoni is also offered.
Sentience In Living Tissue, Alfredo Pereira Jr.
Sentience In Living Tissue, Alfredo Pereira Jr.
Animal Sentience
I agree with Woodruff’s concept of sentience but must disagree about what he proposes as the biological correlates of feeling. Based on the interpretation of brain function originally presented by Camilo Golgi, I assume that feelings are instantiated by hydro-ionic waves in living tissue. From this viewpoint, the anatomical, physiological and behavioural criteria of Woodruff would not be necessary to argue for sentience in fish.
Nagel-Ing Worries About Fish Sentience, Hugh Lafollette
Nagel-Ing Worries About Fish Sentience, Hugh Lafollette
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleosts’ more sophisticated behaviors make sense only if they are sentient. Moreover, their neuroanatomy, although different from mammalian, is sufficiently complex to support sentience. I answer some potential objections to Woodruff’s argument, and try to trace its moral significance. In so doing, I briefly address Birch’s (2017) target article as well.
Of Cortex And Consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “Access,” Or Otherwise, Scott A. Husband
Of Cortex And Consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “Access,” Or Otherwise, Scott A. Husband
Animal Sentience
From the perspective of a comparative neuroanatomist studying the avian pallium, Woodruff’s (2017) claims about the behavioral and electrophysiological evidence for teleost sentience blur the lines between phenomenal and access consciousness (Block, 1995). I discuss the bias that complex cognition can only arise in the cortical layering typical of the mammalian pallium and conclude that Woodruff makes a good case that the tecto-pallial connections in teleosts are sufficiently complex to support something like sentience.
Learning, Memory, Cognition, And The Question Of Sentience In Fish, Robert Gerlai
Learning, Memory, Cognition, And The Question Of Sentience In Fish, Robert Gerlai
Animal Sentience
Evolutionarily conserved features have been demonstrated at many levels of biological organization across a variety of species. Evolutionary conservation may apply to complex behavioral phenomena too. It is thus not inconceivable that a form of sentience does exist even in the lowest order vertebrate taxon, the teleosts. How similar it is to human sentience in its level of complexity or in its multidimensional features is a difficult question, especially from an experimental standpoint, given that even the definition of human sentience is debated. Woodruff attempts a Turing-like test of fish sentience, and lists numerous neuroanatomic, neurophysiological and behavioral similarities between …