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Articles 181 - 210 of 648
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy
Protecting Nature, Freeing Beings, Eileen Crist
Protecting Nature, Freeing Beings, Eileen Crist
Animal Sentience
Large-scale protection of nature is needed to address the ecological crisis. Big animals are connected with this mandate: They are threatened worldwide; they play important ecological roles; and the vast areas they require support a host of lifeforms. But visionary conservation is not only a pragmatic necessity. It is an ethical imperative, for comprehensive nature protection and restoration that supports the good life for all. The story of Asian elephants is part of this bigger story. We must find compassionate ways to free captive elephants and restore a world in which they, and countless others, may live free and flourish.
A “Halfway House” For Improving Captive Welfare, Phyllis C. Lee, W. Keith Lindsay
A “Halfway House” For Improving Captive Welfare, Phyllis C. Lee, W. Keith Lindsay
Animal Sentience
It is certainly time to aim for higher quality management strategies for Thailand’s captive elephants, and to engage with sustainable livelihoods for traditional mahouts. Baker & Winkler’s proposal to rewild Thai elephants by placing them under the guardianship of Karen mahouts is recognized as not “wild” since it remains a form of management requiring elephants to live under the control of human caregivers. We applaud the positive welfare aims of this proposal; however, we caution that few of the long-term consequences for elephants or habitats can be known, and further considerations of elephant population dynamics and forest ecosystems are required …
Elephants And Pandemics, Adrian Treves
Elephants And Pandemics, Adrian Treves
Animal Sentience
Baker & Winkler’s critique of Asian elephant tourism and conservation in Thailand has convinced me that this was “an industry with too many victims.” Yet I fear that B&W’s proposed remedy of returning to past elephant husbandry by Karen hill-peoples has little likelihood of improving the lives of the elephants for long. Who can predict whether the Karen will live up to this hope? B&W advocate for the Karen, but not for “an abolitionist stance on elephant-human relationships.” In my view, whether we discuss elephants or the wild mammals that carry SARS-CoV-2, abolition of many human uses of animals is …
Rewilding And Mixed-Community Collaboration In Conservation, Liv Baker
Rewilding And Mixed-Community Collaboration In Conservation, Liv Baker
Animal Sentience
Rewilding is a psychological and sociocultural event for nonhuman animals that goes beyond the traditional framework of ecology. Elephants need to be seen as political agents in a collaboration. Our commentators shed light on the hierarchical assumptions and politics involved. Mixed-community collaboration can create dynamic and sustainable conservation interventions that are crucial to reconceptualizing the human-elephant relationship beyond the concept of labor. The profound effects of the Covid-19 pandemic have laid bare the fundamental vulnerabilities of the elephant tourism industry. Moreover, how well an elephant has been buffered by the fallout of the pandemic is dependent on the specific relations …
Exploring Eight-Armed Intelligence Through Film, Tierney M. Thys
Exploring Eight-Armed Intelligence Through Film, Tierney M. Thys
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) provides a rich overview of the elements underlying octopus cognition and behavioral flexibility. Recently, two remarkable natural history films, My Octopus Teacher and The Octopus in My House have explored intimate human-octopus relationships with a wild (Octopus vulgaris) and a captive octopus (Octopus cyanea) respectively. Both films show rare behaviors that offer observations to test new hypotheses as well as a novel perspective on our own human relationships and place within the natural world. An interview with filmmaker Craig Foster from My Octopus Teacher reveals the profound and transformative power of forming a trusting …
Human-Controlled Survival Of Nonhumans, Donelson E. Dulany
Human-Controlled Survival Of Nonhumans, Donelson E. Dulany
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. are right about the need for morally just preservation of nonhumans. Their suggestions can move us in that direction. But isn’t what only humans are capable of doing in analyzing and solving these problems, in its broadest sense, “anthropocentrism”?
Group Stereotypes: Human And Nonhuman, Verónica Sevillano
Group Stereotypes: Human And Nonhuman, Verónica Sevillano
Animal Sentience
Treves et al.’s target article emphasizes the importance of including nonhuman animals in the scope of conservation frameworks, countering an anthropocentric orientation in conservation biology. In support, I discuss how stereotypes of other animal species may bias our behavior toward them.
Comparative Cognition And Nonhuman Individuality, Catia Correia Caeiro
Comparative Cognition And Nonhuman Individuality, Catia Correia Caeiro
Animal Sentience
Commentators Washington (2019) and Tiffin (2019) point out that the individual vs. collective dichotomy is much more complex than what is considered in the target article. This commentary will focus on why individuals are more important than collectives. Species differences in cognition and emotional processes and individuals’ feelings and experiences need to be taken into account.
Conventional Science Will Not Do Justice To Nonhuman Interests: A Fresh Approach Is Required, Becca Franks, Christine Webb, Monica Gagliano, Barbara Smuts
Conventional Science Will Not Do Justice To Nonhuman Interests: A Fresh Approach Is Required, Becca Franks, Christine Webb, Monica Gagliano, Barbara Smuts
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. (2019) make a convincing case that conservation efforts need to go beyond an anthropocentric worldview. Implementing that vision, however, will require human advocates to represent nonhuman interests. Where will the knowledge of those interests come from? How can humans know what is in the best interest of another animal, a plant, or an ecosystem? We discuss how the values embedded in current scientific practices may be ill-suited to representing nonhuman interests and we offer some ideas for correcting these shortcomings.
Preserving Nature For The Benefit Of All Sentient Individuals, Eze Paez
Preserving Nature For The Benefit Of All Sentient Individuals, Eze Paez
Animal Sentience
I agree with Treves et al.’s proposal for a preservation ethics based on the principle that nonhuman well-being is a matter of justice and compassion. In this commentary, I advance two objections. First, only sentient beings, rather than all life, belong in the moral community. Second, given that nature is probably harmful overall for sentient individuals, preserving it for the benefit of future human and nonhuman generations requires us to modify it as far as practicable.
The Wholeness Of Nature, Marthe Kiley-Worthington
The Wholeness Of Nature, Marthe Kiley-Worthington
Animal Sentience
The target article outlines various positions on conservation and preservation but ignores practical considerations of management since there is no wild habitat left. Population controls, either human or nonhuman mammals, are not discussed. The suggestions for legal changes are vague and will require much more thinking about how to integrate animal welfare with wildlife conservation concerns. “Freedoms” as outlined in the human bill of rights might help with decision making for improving animal welfare. Other commentators have made anthropocentric judgements concerning animal welfare, ignoring the importance of developing other ways of seeing and understanding the “multiplicity within unity,” combining empirical …
Is Anthropocentrism Really The Problem?, Chelsea Batavia
Is Anthropocentrism Really The Problem?, Chelsea Batavia
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. (2019) highlight what they consider soft forms of anthropocentrism in the practice and philosophy of conservation, e.g., when even professed non-anthropocentrists assert the precedence of human over nonhuman interests. I consider a few philosophical cases for maintaining human precedence, but ultimately offer a more psychological explanation: our explanations for why humans take precedence serve to reduce dissonance and discomfort, which arise because the norms and institutions of society often compel us to act in ways that violate our moral responsibilities to nonhuman beings.
Disentangling Different Forms Of Justice, Anna Wienhues
Disentangling Different Forms Of Justice, Anna Wienhues
Animal Sentience
Treves et al.’s article is an important contribution to an emerging interdisciplinary literature on what constitutes a viable and just response to the current biodiversity crisis. My commentary addresses three interrelated themes: (1) overcoming divisions, (2) hierarchies of moral worth and (3) ‘multispecies justice’ in the broader context of justice.
Game Theory And Artificial Intelligence In Just Preservation, David L. Dowe, Nader Chmait
Game Theory And Artificial Intelligence In Just Preservation, David L. Dowe, Nader Chmait
Animal Sentience
We humans can show presumption, arrogance and many dubious traits. By virtue of being land-dwelling, dexterous, relatively intelligent, and having good communication hardware and (good) fortune, we have for recent millennia largely had dominion of our planet. Yet humans often do not treat themselves (let alone other species) particularly well. Treves et al.’s idea of a multispecies justice system — not “prioritizing humans” but “finding practical ways to work within human systems” — invites consideration.
Conflicts And Triage, Kate E. Lynch, Daniel T. Blumstein
Conflicts And Triage, Kate E. Lynch, Daniel T. Blumstein
Animal Sentience
To represent diverse interests successfully, a strategy for dealing with conflicts is needed. We discuss an approach to maximizing the interests of the greatest number of individuals, present and future.
Just Preservation, Trusteeship And Multispecies Justice, Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila, Adrian Treves, William Lynn
Just Preservation, Trusteeship And Multispecies Justice, Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila, Adrian Treves, William Lynn
Animal Sentience
We are grateful to all the commentators who engaged with our target article. Some commentators have offered important insights into our proposed design and methods for legally intervening on behalf of futurity. Others have focused on theoretical considerations central to our proposal for multispecies justice and trusteeship. All have inspired modifications and further elaboration of our initial proposal. In this Response, we engage with the commentaries, integrating their suggestions, striving for convergence and complementarity, but also discussing points of divergence with our proposed framework where necessary. There is substantial overlap in the points of view of the three co-authors, but …
Minds Without Spines: Evolutionarily Inclusive Animal Ethics, Irina Mikhalevich, Russell Powell
Minds Without Spines: Evolutionarily Inclusive Animal Ethics, Irina Mikhalevich, Russell Powell
Animal Sentience
Invertebrate animals are frequently lumped into a single category and denied welfare protections despite their considerable cognitive, behavioral, and evolutionary diversity. Some ethical and policy inroads have been made for cephalopod molluscs and crustaceans, but the vast majority of arthropods, including the insects, remain excluded from moral consideration. We argue that this exclusion is unwarranted given the existing evidence. Anachronistic readings of evolution, which view invertebrates as lower in the scala naturae, continue to influence public policy and common morality. The assumption that small brains are unlikely to support cognition or sentience likewise persists, despite growing evidence that arthropods …
No Room For Speciesism In Welfare Considerations, Jennifer Vonk
No Room For Speciesism In Welfare Considerations, Jennifer Vonk
Animal Sentience
Speciesism should play no role in determining welfare outcomes. Cognition may vary within species as well as between species, but broad classifications such as invertebrates are functionally meaningless in this context. Cognition should relate to welfare only to the extent that it relates to the capacity to suffer or to experience pleasure.
Invertebrates Should Be Given Ethical Consideration, Marie-Claire Cammaerts
Invertebrates Should Be Given Ethical Consideration, Marie-Claire Cammaerts
Animal Sentience
Invertebrates are far more numerous than vertebrates. Most of them are essential to the survival of humanity. Their physiology, behavior, know-how, and cognitive abilities are often as complex as those of vertebrates. Invertebrates should be considered and studied as are vertebrates, i.e., ethically, and cautiously.
Invertebrate Welfare In The Wild, Asher Soryl
Invertebrate Welfare In The Wild, Asher Soryl
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell argue that certain cognitive-affective biases might distort people’s consideration of invertebrate minds and that the moral risks of false negatives in sentience research deserve greater consideration under precautionary frameworks. In this commentary, I draw comparisons between biases that concern wild animals and conditions in nature, arguing that the moral risks of disregarding the possible mental welfare of invertebrates are compounded by facts about their lives in the wild.
Intuition And The Invertebrate Dogma, Jonathan Balcombe
Intuition And The Invertebrate Dogma, Jonathan Balcombe
Animal Sentience
Just as intuition, fueled by hubris, led us to exclude insects from moral consideration, so intuition can lead to the opposite conclusion. Observed insect behavior, combined with scientific support for insect consciousness summarized in Mikhalevich & Powell’s target article, and bolstered by the Precautionary Principle, all militate against completely denying moral status to insects.
Do Arthropods Respond To Noxious Stimuli Purely By Reflex?, Robert W. Elwood
Do Arthropods Respond To Noxious Stimuli Purely By Reflex?, Robert W. Elwood
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong to dismiss the idea of sentience in invertebrates. Here, I expand on the evidence for crustaceans responding to noxious stimuli in ways that are not explained by mere reflexes, and that are consistent with pain. I consider the idea that male praying mantids must not feel pain because they may continue to mate whilst being consumed by the female. I finish with thoughts about the idea that because robots may be constructed to act as if they experience pain, the argument that animals might experience pain is diminished.
On The Possibility Of Invertebrate Sentience, David Degrazia
On The Possibility Of Invertebrate Sentience, David Degrazia
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) set up the basic criteria for according moral status equitably, including the capacity for affect. They argue persuasively against assuming that all invertebrates are insentient and hence ineligible for moral consideration. In addition to the relatively clear case of cephalopods, various arthropods may prove to be sentient. We should be aware of various sources of prejudice that M&P discuss and not assume that it would be absurd to attribute sentience and moral status to certain invertebrates.
Whether Invertebrates Are Sentient Matters To Bioethics And Science Policy, Michael L. Woodruff
Whether Invertebrates Are Sentient Matters To Bioethics And Science Policy, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell provide convincing empirical evidence that at least some invertebrates are sentient and hence should be granted moral status. I agree and argue that functional markers should be the primary indicators of sentience. Neuroanatomical homologies provide only secondary evidence. Consensus regarding the validity of these functional markers will be difficult to achieve. To be effective in practice, functional markers of sentience will have to be tested and accepted species by species to overcome the implicit biases against extending moral status to invertebrates.
Lessons From Miniature Brains: Cognition Cheap, Memory Expensive (Sentience Linked To Active Movement?), Giorgio Vallortigara
Lessons From Miniature Brains: Cognition Cheap, Memory Expensive (Sentience Linked To Active Movement?), Giorgio Vallortigara
Animal Sentience
Studies on invertebrate minds suggest that the neural machinery for basic cognition is cheap, and that bigger brains are probably associated with greater memory storage rather than more advanced cognition. Sentience may be linked to feedforward mechanisms (Reafferenzprinzip) that allow organisms with active movement to distinguish active and passive sensing. Invertebrates may offer special opportunities for testing these hypotheses.
Sentience In All Organisms With Centralized Nervous Systems, Lori Marino
Sentience In All Organisms With Centralized Nervous Systems, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue for considering the welfare of invertebrates, especially insects, by asking whether invertebrates have the cognitive and neural characteristics necessary for sentience. This approach assumes that human neural and cognitive complexity is the basis of sentience. But insight might also be gained by turning this approach on its head and examining the notion that sentience may be a fundamental biological property, appearing very early in the evolution of life in all organisms with centralized nervous systems.
Does Sentience Come In Degrees?, Andrew Y. Lee
Does Sentience Come In Degrees?, Andrew Y. Lee
Animal Sentience
This commentary is about whether sentience, or what philosophers call “phenomenal consciousness,” comes in degrees.
Ethical Considerations For Invertebrates, Scarlett R. Howard, Matthew R.E. Symonds
Ethical Considerations For Invertebrates, Scarlett R. Howard, Matthew R.E. Symonds
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) have built on the discussion about which species deserve inclusion in animal ethics and welfare considerations. Here, we raise questions concerning the assessment criteria. We ask how to assess different species for their ability to fulfill the criteria, which criteria are most important, how we quantify them (absolute or on a continuum), and how non-animals such as fungi and plants fit into this paradigm.
Becoming The Good Shepherds, Eze Paez
Becoming The Good Shepherds, Eze Paez
Animal Sentience
It is very important that we clarify what we owe to nonhuman animals. To that end, we need a better understanding of animal cognition and emotion. Marino & Merskin’s target article is a welcome contribution to this project. Sheep, like most other animals, are sentient beings with interests of their own. It is wrong to discriminate against them based on species-membership or cognitive sophistication. We are morally required not to harm them, and to help them have the best possible lives, just as we would be in the case of human beings with similar interests. We must become the good …
Intelligence, Complexity, And Individuality In Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin
Intelligence, Complexity, And Individuality In Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin
Animal Sentience
Domestic sheep (Ovis aries) are among the earliest animals domesticated for human use. They are consumed worldwide as mutton, hogget, and lamb, kept as wool and milk producers, and used extensively in scientific research. The popular stereotype is that sheep are docile, passive, unintelligent, and timid, but a review of the research on their behavior, affect, cognition, and personality reveals that they are complex, individualistic, and social.