Arts and Humanities Commons^™

What distinguishes full-on stating a proposition from merely communicating it? For instance, what distinguishes claiming/asserting/saying that one has never smoked crack cocaine from merely implying/conveying/hinting this? The enormous literature on ‘assertion’ provides many approaches to distinguishing stating from, say, asking and commanding: only the former aims at truth; only the former expresses one’s belief; etc. But this leaves my question unanswered, since in merely communicating a proposition one also aims at truth, expresses a belief, etc.

My aim is not to criticize extant accounts of the state-vs.-merely-convey contrast, but rather to draw on clues from Dummett, functional linguistics and moral …

We introduce a construction which we label 'quasi-factive'. They are heard like factives, in that we immediately take the complement to be true. Yet they aren't really factive at all. Examples include: 'It's not widely known that Marta was born in Canada' (because she was born in Uruguay); 'Don't tell anyone that Carlos will run as a candidate' (because he won't); 'Did it bother Jane that Miguel came?' (no, because Miguel didn't come). We identify sub-categories of our quasi-factives, and then tentatively explore a pragmatic explanation of how they work their magic.

My focus is Q: Are there really such things as public languages? I address an argument for a negative answer, extracted from Davidson’s “A Derangement of Epitaphs”. The argument appeals to an empirically attested phenomena, namely novelty and speech errors in successful conversational interactions, to show that knowledge of public language is neither necessary nor sufficient. Thus public languages have no explanatory role. Continues the idea, one should substitute in place of the convention-centric public language picture an alternative, with Prior and Passing theories. My first rebuttal is that there are senses in which knowledge of public language is necessary, …