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Philosophy

Robert J. Stainton

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Slurs And Register: A Case Study In Meaning Pluralism, Justina Diaz-Legaspe, Chang Liu, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2018

Slurs And Register: A Case Study In Meaning Pluralism, Justina Diaz-Legaspe, Chang Liu, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

Most theories of slurs fall into one of two families: those which understand slurring terms to involve special descriptive/informational content (however conveyed), and those which understand them to encode special emotive/expressive content. Our view is that both offer essential insights, but that part of what sets slurs apart is use-theoretic content. In particular, we urge that slurring words belong at the intersection of a number of categories in a sociolinguistic register taxonomy, one that usually includes [+slang] and [+vulgar] and always includes [-polite] and [+derogatory]. Thus, e.g., what distinguishes ‘Chinese’ from ‘chink’ is neither a peculiar sort of descriptive nor …

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Introduction To Discourse, Structure And Linguistic Choice By T. Price Caldwell, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2017

Introduction To Discourse, Structure And Linguistic Choice By T. Price Caldwell, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

No abstract provided.

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Two Questions About Interpretive Effects, Robert J. Stainton, Christopher Viger Dec 2017

Two Questions About Interpretive Effects, Robert J. Stainton, Christopher Viger

Robert J. Stainton

We discuss central themes in Lepore and Stone's Imagination and Convention. We begin by laying out their view, and then pose both empirical and methodological criticisms.

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Re-Reading Anscombe On 'I', Robert J. Stainton Dec 2017

Re-Reading Anscombe On 'I', Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

According to a certain ‘Straight Reading’ of Elizabeth Anscombe’s ‘The First Person’, she holds a Radically Non-Referring view of ‘I’. Specifically, ‘I’ is analogized to the expletive ‘it’ in ‘It’s raining’. I argue that this is not her position. Her substantive view on ‘I’, rather, is that if what you mean by ‘referring term’ is a certain rich and recherché Frege-inspired notion, then ‘I’ is not one. Her methodological point is that one shouldn’t be bewitched by language into thinking that ‘I’, because of its syntax and logical role, must exhibit ‘reference’ in this sense. Anscombe uses this insight to …

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An Anscombean Reference For I?, Andrew Botterell, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2017

An Anscombean Reference For I?, Andrew Botterell, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

No abstract provided.

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Logical Form And The Vernacular Revisited, Andrew Botterell, Robert J. Stainton Aug 2017

Logical Form And The Vernacular Revisited, Andrew Botterell, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

We revisit a debate initiated some fifteen years ago by Ray Elugardo and Robert Stainton about the domain of arguments. Our main result is that arguments are not exclusively sets of linguistic expressions. Instead, as we put it, some non-linguistic items have ‘logical form’. The crucial examples are arguments, both deductive and inductive, made with unembedded words and phrases.

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Contextualism In Epistemology And Relevance Theory, Mark Jary, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2016

Contextualism In Epistemology And Relevance Theory, Mark Jary, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

We briefly introduce Contextualism in Epistemology, highlight a linguistic challenge that it seemingly faces, and then describe a Relevance Theoretic response to that challenge. We end by contrasting this view with related ones.

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Full-On Stating, Robert J. Stainton Aug 2016

Full-On Stating, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

What distinguishes full-on stating a proposition from merely communicating it? For instance, what distinguishes claiming/asserting/saying that one has never smoked crack cocaine from merely implying/conveying/hinting this? The enormous literature on ‘assertion’ provides many approaches to distinguishing stating from, say, asking and commanding: only the former aims at truth; only the former expresses one’s belief; etc. But this leaves my question unanswered, since in merely communicating a proposition one also aims at truth, expresses a belief, etc.
My aim is not to criticize extant accounts of the state-vs.-merely-convey contrast, but rather to draw on clues from Dummett, functional linguistics and moral …

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Cuasi Factivos, Axel Barcelo Aspeitia, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2015

Cuasi Factivos, Axel Barcelo Aspeitia, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

We introduce a construction which we label 'quasi-factive'. They are heard like factives, in that we immediately take the complement to be true. Yet they aren't really factive at all. Examples include: 'It's not widely known that Marta was born in Canada' (because she was born in Uruguay); 'Don't tell anyone that Carlos will run as a candidate' (because he won't); 'Did it bother Jane that Miguel came?' (no, because Miguel didn't come). We identify sub-categories of our quasi-factives, and then tentatively explore a pragmatic explanation of how they work their magic.

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A Deranged Argument Against Public Languages, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2015

A Deranged Argument Against Public Languages, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

My focus is Q: Are there really such things as public languages? I address an argument for a negative answer, extracted from Davidson’s “A Derangement of Epitaphs”. The argument appeals to an empirically attested phenomena, namely novelty and speech errors in successful conversational interactions, to show that knowledge of public language is neither necessary nor sufficient. Thus public languages have no explanatory role. Continues the idea, one should substitute in place of the convention-centric public language picture an alternative, with Prior and Passing theories. My first rebuttal is that there are senses in which knowledge of public language is necessary, …

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Introduction To Linguistic Content, Margaret Cameron, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2014

Introduction To Linguistic Content, Margaret Cameron, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

No abstract provided.

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Brevity, By Laurence Goldstein, Monica Mcmillan, Robert J. Stainton Nov 2014

Brevity, By Laurence Goldstein, Monica Mcmillan, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

No abstract provided.

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Philosophy Of Linguistics, Robert J. Stainton Jun 2014

Philosophy Of Linguistics, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

Rather than attempting to survey the rich array of topics within Philosophy of Linguistics, this article focuses on two questions: “What kind of thing is Linguistics about?” and “What is the proper evidence-base for Linguistics?” After describing various exclusionary answers, it argues for Pluralism on both fronts: the objects of study in Linguistics are metaphysical hybrids, with physical, mental, abstract and social facets; and evidence from every domain should in principle be welcomed.

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Revisiting Pragmatics Abilities In Autism Spectrum Disorders, Jessica De Villiers, Brooke Myers, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2013

Revisiting Pragmatics Abilities In Autism Spectrum Disorders, Jessica De Villiers, Brooke Myers, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

In a 2007 paper, we argued that speakers with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) exhibit pragmatic abilities which are surprising given the usual understanding of communication in that group. That is, it is commonly reported that people diagnosed with an ASD have trouble with metaphor, irony, conversational implicature and other non-literal language. This is not a matter of trouble with knowledge and application of rules of grammar. The difficulties lie, rather, in successful communicative interaction. Though we did find pragmatic errors within literal talk, the transcribed conversations we studied showed many, many successes. A second paper reinforced our finding of a …

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Pragmatic Abilities In Autism Spectrum Disorders: A Follow-Up Study, Jessica Devilliers, Brooke Myers, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2012

Pragmatic Abilities In Autism Spectrum Disorders: A Follow-Up Study, Jessica Devilliers, Brooke Myers, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

Our guiding question, here and in two prior papers, is: Are some pragmatic tasks more difficult than others for people diagnosed with ASDs? For instance, it has been tentatively suggested by Happé (1995) that understanding irony is more difficult for ASD speakers than understanding metaphor is. Or again, our 2007 paper urged, on the basis of corpus examples, that while speakers with ASDs show difficulties with “figurative language” generally – metaphor, irony, conversational implicature (Dennis et al. 2001; Gold et al. 2010; Happé 1995; MacKay & Shaw, 2004) – they are relatively proficient with pragmatic determinants of literal speech act …

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La Psicología De La Justificación, Angeles Erana, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2012

La Psicología De La Justificación, Angeles Erana, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

This essay considers the connections between, on the one hand, two kinds of justification, namely pragmatic and alethic, and on the other hand two cognitive systems, S1 and S2.

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Lying, Misleading And What Is Said, By Jennifer M. Saul, Melissa Macaulay, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2012

Lying, Misleading And What Is Said, By Jennifer M. Saul, Melissa Macaulay, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

No abstract provided.

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Herder And Pragmatics, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2012

Herder And Pragmatics, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

No abstract provided.

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Introduction To The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary In Philosophy, Maite Ezdurdia, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2011

Introduction To The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary In Philosophy, Maite Ezdurdia, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

An introductory survey of the nature and importance of the semantics-pragmatics boundary.

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In Defense Of Public Languages, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2011

In Defense Of Public Languages, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

My modest aim in this note is to sketch three interrelated critiques of public languages, and to respond to them. All allegedly support the same conclusion: that, insofar as they even exist, the study of public languages is not a viable scientific project. (Related critiques of semantics, understood as involving word-world relations, will be touched on as well.)

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The Role Of Psychology In The Philosophy Of Language, Robert J. Stainton Jan 2011

The Role Of Psychology In The Philosophy Of Language, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

Are psychological facts relevant to philosophy of language; and, in particular, does scientific psychology have a legitimate role to play? For example, is it methodologically permissible for philosophers of language to rely upon evidence from neurological development, experiments about processing, brain scans, clinical case histories, longitudinal studies, questionnaires, etc.? If so, why? These two questions are the focus of this survey. I address them in two stages. Psychology may seem obviously relevant. I thus begin by introducing arguments against relevance, to motivate the discussion. I will urge that these ultimately fail, and that the appearance of relevance should be taken …

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Terminological Reflections Of An Enlightened Contextualist, Robert J. Stainton Feb 2010

Terminological Reflections Of An Enlightened Contextualist, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

No abstract provided.

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Really Intriguing, That Pred Np!, Ileana Paul, Robert Stainton Feb 2010

Really Intriguing, That Pred Np!, Ileana Paul, Robert Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

No abstract provided.

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The Contribution Of Domain Specificity In The Highly Modular Mind, Axel Barcelo Aspeitia, Angeles Erana, Robert J. Stainton Jan 2010

The Contribution Of Domain Specificity In The Highly Modular Mind, Axel Barcelo Aspeitia, Angeles Erana, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

Is there a notion of domain specificity which affords genuine insight in the context of the highly modular mind, i.e. a mind which has not only input modules, but also central ‘conceptual’ modules? Our answer to this question is no. The main argument is simple enough: we lay out some constraints that a theoretically useful notion of domain specificity, in the context of the highly modular mind, would need to meet. We then survey a host of accounts of what domain specificity is, based on the intuitive idea that a domain specific mechanism is restricted in the kind of information …

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Contextualism In Epistemology And The Context Sensitivity Of 'Knows', Robert J. Stainton Jan 2010

Contextualism In Epistemology And The Context Sensitivity Of 'Knows', Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

The central issue of this paper is whether contextualism in epistemology is genuinely in conflict with recent claims that ‘know’ is not in fact a context sensitive word. To address this question, I’ll first rehearse three key aims of contextualists and the broad strategy they adopt for achieving them. I then introduce two linguistic arguments to the effect that the lexical item ‘know’ is not context sensitive: one from Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore, one from Jason Stanley. I find these and related arguments quite compelling. In particular, I think Cappelen & Lepore (2003, 2005a) show pretty definitively that ‘know’ …

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Identity Through Change And Substitutivity Salva Veritate, Ray Elugardo, Robert J. Stainton Jan 2010

Identity Through Change And Substitutivity Salva Veritate, Ray Elugardo, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

This paper has three modest aims: to present a puzzle, to show why some obvious solutions aren’t really “easy outs”, and to introduce our own solution. The puzzle is this. When it was small and had waterlogged streets, Toronto carried the moniker ‘Muddy York’. Later, the streets were drained, it grew, and Muddy York officially changed its name to ‘Toronto’. Given this, each premise in the following argument seems true. Yet the conclusion is a contraction. P1: Muddy York = Toronto P2: Muddy York evolved into Toronto P3: The context “__ evolved into Toronto” is transparent, i.e., it allows substitution …

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Philosophy Of Language, Robert J. Stainton Jan 2010

Philosophy Of Language, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

No abstract provided.

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Clinical Pragmatics, By Louise Cummings, Robert J. Stainton Jan 2010

Clinical Pragmatics, By Louise Cummings, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

No abstract provided.

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Differential Pragmatic Abilities And Autism Spectrum Disorders: The Case Of Pragmatic Determinants Of Literal Content, Jessica De Villiers, Brooke Myers, Robert J. Stainton Jan 2010

Differential Pragmatic Abilities And Autism Spectrum Disorders: The Case Of Pragmatic Determinants Of Literal Content, Jessica De Villiers, Brooke Myers, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

No abstract provided.

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Pragmatic Impairments, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2009

Pragmatic Impairments, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

This review essay addresses the question, "What, properly speaking, is a pragmatic impairment?" Drawing on work from two recent books, it presents three possible answers, and evaluates them.

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