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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
Notice-And-Comment Sentencing, Stephanos Bibas, Richard A. Bierschbach
Notice-And-Comment Sentencing, Stephanos Bibas, Richard A. Bierschbach
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Incentives To Settle Under Joint And Several Liability: An Empirical Analysis Of Superfund Litigation, Howard F. Chang, Hilary Sigman
Incentives To Settle Under Joint And Several Liability: An Empirical Analysis Of Superfund Litigation, Howard F. Chang, Hilary Sigman
All Faculty Scholarship
Congress may soon restrict joint and several liability for cleanup of contaminated sites under Superfund. We explore whether this change would discourage settlements and is therefore likely to increase the program 's already high litigation costs per site. Recent theoretical research by Kornhauser and Revesz finds that joint and several liability may either encourage or discourage settlement, depending on the correlation of outcomes at trial across defendants. We extend their two-defendant model to a richer framework with N defendants. This extension allows us to test the theoretical model empirically using data on Superfund litigation. We find that joint and several …
An Analysis Of Fee Shifting Based On The Margin Of Victory: On Frivolous Suints, Meritorious Suits, And The Role Of Rule 11, Howard F. Chang, Lucian A. Bebchuk
An Analysis Of Fee Shifting Based On The Margin Of Victory: On Frivolous Suints, Meritorious Suits, And The Role Of Rule 11, Howard F. Chang, Lucian A. Bebchuk
All Faculty Scholarship
When plaintiffs cannot predict the outcome of litigation with certainty, neither the American rule (each litigant bears its own litigation expenses) nor the British rule (the losing litigant pays the attorneys' fees of the winning litigant) would induce optimal decisions to bring suit. Plaintiffs may bring frivolous suits when litigation costs are small relative to the amount at stake; plaintiffs may not bring meritorious suits when litigation costs are large relative to this amount. More general fee-shifting rules are based not only on the identity of the winning party but also on how strong the court perceives the case to …