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Articles 1 - 30 of 371
Full-Text Articles in Psychology
Plant Sentience: A Hypothesis Based On Shaky Premises, Carel Ten Cate
Plant Sentience: A Hypothesis Based On Shaky Premises, Carel Ten Cate
Animal Sentience
Plants may produce fascinating behavioural phenomena for which the label ‘cognitive process’ may be applicable, at least by some definitions. Segundo-Ortin & Calvo (2023) base their hypothesis that plants might be sentient on the premise of demonstrated presence of cognitive complexity. However, the way phenomena are ascribed, and how the term ‘cognitive’ is used by Segundo-Ortin & Calvo, deviates from the common practice in studies of animal cognition, implying greater complexity than seems justified. It thus provides a questionable basis for attributing sentience to plants.
Questions About Sentience Are Not Scientific But Cultural, Yoram Gutfreund
Questions About Sentience Are Not Scientific But Cultural, Yoram Gutfreund
Animal Sentience
Abstract: The findings of complex cognitive-like behaviours in plants are surprising and exciting. However, they do not provide a scientific reason for ascribing sentience to plants. The target article, in trying to provide evidence for sentience in plants, exposes the weakness of the science of animal consciousness in general. In this commentary, I try to explain why the scientific method is incapable of resolving the question of which organisms or systems are sentient.
Insentient “Cognition”?, Stevan Harnad
Insentient “Cognition”?, Stevan Harnad
Animal Sentience
A sentient state is a state that it feels like something to be in. Cows have them, cars don’t. Cognitive capacities are a subset of behavioral capacities. Not all behavioral capacities are cognitive (but the distinction is fuzzy). Might the difference have something to do with whether the behaver is sentient?
Time To Stop Pretending We Don’T Know Other Animals Are Sentient Beings, Marc Bekoff
Time To Stop Pretending We Don’T Know Other Animals Are Sentient Beings, Marc Bekoff
Animal Sentience
Rowan et al.’s target article is an outstanding review of some of the history of the science of sentience, but one would have liked to see a much stronger “call to action.” We don’t need any more data to know that many other animals are sentient beings whose lives must be protected from harm in a wide variety of contexts. It is not anti-science to want more action on behalf of other animals right now.
Sentience In Decapod Crustaceans: A General Framework And Review Of The Evidence, Andrew Crump, Heather Browning, Alex Schnell, Charlotte Burn, Jonathan Birch
Sentience In Decapod Crustaceans: A General Framework And Review Of The Evidence, Andrew Crump, Heather Browning, Alex Schnell, Charlotte Burn, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
We outline a framework for evaluating scientific evidence of sentience, focusing on pain experience. It includes eight neural and cognitive-behavioural criteria, with confidence levels for each criterion reflecting the reliability and quality of the evidence. We outline the rationale for each criterion and apply our framework to a controversial sentience candidate: decapod crustaceans. We have either high or very high confidence that true crabs (infraorder Brachyura) satisfy five criteria, amounting to strong evidence of sentience. Moreover, we have high confidence that both anomuran crabs (infraorder Anomura) and astacid lobsters/crayfish (infraorder Astacidea) meet three criteria—substantial evidence of sentience. The case is, …
All Living Organisms Are Sentient, Arthur S. Reber, Frantisek Baluska, William B. Miller Jr.
All Living Organisms Are Sentient, Arthur S. Reber, Frantisek Baluska, William B. Miller Jr.
Animal Sentience
We argue that all living organisms, from the simplest unicellular prokaryotes to Homo sapiens, have valenced experiences—feelings as states of preference—and are capable of cognitive representations. Bacteria can learn, form stable memories, and communicate, hence solve problems. Rowan et al.'s statement that "Subjective feelings are just that — subjective — and are available only to the animal (or human) experiencing them" is true but irrelevant. When we see a fish flopping about in the bottom of a boat we immediately recognize suffering without having a glimpse of the nature of piscine distress. Some controlled anthropomorphism can go a …
Legal Recognition Of Animal Sentience: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Jane Kotzmann
Legal Recognition Of Animal Sentience: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Jane Kotzmann
Animal Sentience
Rowan et al.’s target article provides a valuable indication of the work that was required to reach the point where animals are recognised as sentient in various laws. To ensure this work was not in vain, the language of sentience needs to be used as a moral currency to demand further cultural change involving greater human respect for animals.
The Science Of Animal Sentience And The Politics Of Animal Welfare Should Be Kept Separate, Marian Stamp Dawkins
The Science Of Animal Sentience And The Politics Of Animal Welfare Should Be Kept Separate, Marian Stamp Dawkins
Animal Sentience
Although linked historically by Rowan et al., the scientific study of animal sentience and political campaigns to improve animal welfare should be kept separate, for at least two reasons. First, the separation makes it clear that standards of evidence acceptable for ethical or political decisions on animal welfare can be lower than those required for a rigorously scientific approach to animal sentience. Second, it helps to avoid confirmatory bias in the form of giving undue weight to results that are in line with pre-conceived ideas and political views.
Revisiting Donald Griffin, Founder Of Cognitive Ethology, Carolyn A. Ristau
Revisiting Donald Griffin, Founder Of Cognitive Ethology, Carolyn A. Ristau
Animal Sentience
Donald Griffin’s writings, beginning with The Question of Animal Awareness (1976), strove to persuade scientists to study the possibility of animal sentience, the basis of Rowan et al.’s efforts to promote animal well-being. Facing great hostility (but also some acceptance) for his ideas, Griffin initially avoided animal welfare advocacy, fearing it would further undermine his efforts to gain recognition of animal sentience. In later years, however, he began to ponder the ethical implications of animal sentience, intending to study wild elephants’ communication and social behavior to better understand their experienced life and apply it to improving conservation methods. As he …
Pain Sentience Criteria And Their Grading, Eva Jablonka, Simona Ginsburg
Pain Sentience Criteria And Their Grading, Eva Jablonka, Simona Ginsburg
Animal Sentience
On the basis of the target article by Crump and colleagues, we suggest a more parsimonious scheme for evaluating the evidence for sentience. Since some of the criteria used by Crump et al. are not independent and some are uninformative we exclude some criteria and amalgamate others. We propose that evidence of flexible learning and prioritization, in conjunction with relevant data on brain organization, is sufficient for assigning pain-sentience to an animal and we suggest a scoring scheme based on four criteria.
Free Will And Animal Suicide, Sabina Schrynemakers
Free Will And Animal Suicide, Sabina Schrynemakers
Animal Sentience
David Peña-Guzmán presents two arguments against the view that because only humans have free will only humans can commit suicide: (1) nonhuman animals may possess free will, and (2) the libertarian notion of free will is incompatible with scientific explanation. The free will objection to animal suicide is indeed mistaken, but Peña-Guzmán’s criticism of the libertarian notion of free will seems misplaced. His target should instead be the assumption that free choices must be made consciously or self-reflectively or the assumption that freedom cannot come in degrees.
Truly Minimal Criteria For Animal Sentience, Mark Solms
Truly Minimal Criteria For Animal Sentience, Mark Solms
Animal Sentience
The criteria for determining animal sentience proposed in the target article are sensible but they lack an explicit functional justification for the focus on pain. This commentary provides an abbreviated account of the most basic functional principles that underpin animal sentience and articulates some minimal criteria for determining its presence.
Sentience In Decapods: Difficulties To Surmount, Michael L. Woodruff
Sentience In Decapods: Difficulties To Surmount, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
In the target article Crump et al. present 8 criteria to assess whether decapods experience pain. Four of these -- sensory integration, motivational trade-offs, flexible self-protection, and associative learning -- could be used to assess sentience in general. In this commentary I discuss difficulties with using these criteria to provide evidence of sentience in decapods, particularly if this evidence is to change public opinion and policies. These difficulties are lack of evidence, the potential to eventually explain the neurobiological basis of the behaviors chosen as criteria, thereby eliminating any explanatory work for sentience, and the reluctance to bring animals that …
Distinguishing Epistemic And Moral Grounds For Legal Protection, Carlos Montemayor
Distinguishing Epistemic And Moral Grounds For Legal Protection, Carlos Montemayor
Animal Sentience
The criteria proposed by Crump et al. are based on various cognitive roles associated with sentience. A subset of them may be sufficient for certain kinds of welfare, but the presence of all of them should be considered as clearly sufficient for substantial kinds of legal protection based on their relation to capacities that we consider essential for moral standing in human beings.
Does The Sentience Framework Imply All Animals Are Sentient?, Kristin Andrews
Does The Sentience Framework Imply All Animals Are Sentient?, Kristin Andrews
Animal Sentience
The eight criteria proposed in Crump et al.’s framework for evaluating pain sentience in decapod crustaceans are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to markers that could increase confidence in an animal’s sentience more generally. Some of the commentaries have already pointed out that pain is only one kind of sentience (Souza Valente). It has also already been pointed out that there are other criteria for pain that could be usefully added to the framework’s eight (Burrell). This expansive thinking about criteria that can be used to increase confidence in sentience raisess the question: in an expansive …
Sentience As Part Of Emotional Lives, Frans B. M. De Waal
Sentience As Part Of Emotional Lives, Frans B. M. De Waal
Animal Sentience
It is high time to explore the sentience of invertebrate animals, but this topic cannot be discussed without also exploring their emotional lives, including positive emotions. Sentience probably evolved to allow the regulation of emotions by endowing them with feelings.
Pros And Cons Of A Framework For Evaluating Potential Pain In Decapods, Robert W. Elwood
Pros And Cons Of A Framework For Evaluating Potential Pain In Decapods, Robert W. Elwood
Animal Sentience
The rigorous framework for research into potential pain in decapods was successful in allowing legislators in the United Kingdom to evaluate a complex scientific issue. However, it might produce problems for research. I discuss doubts about the usefulness of the eight criteria. Some have yet to receive any investigation and others do not allow much inference about pain. In addition, some existing studies are not covered in the framework. Most worrying, however, is the potential for stifling future research of novel areas that are excluded from the framework.
Sentience Politics : A Fishy Perspective, Culum Brown
Sentience Politics : A Fishy Perspective, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
The plight of fishes has almost certainly got worse since Bentham (1789) coined the phrase “The question is not Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but Can they suffer?” Despite the fact that fishes are increasingly recognised as sentient animals worthy of protection under animal welfare legislation in many countries around the world, fishing practices are almost universally exempt activities. The human population continues to grow, and, surprisingly, per capita intake of fish is still increasing (FAO 2020). The source of this fish is not wild stocks (catches of which have remained more or less stagnant for …
The Reality And Prevalence Of Animal Sentience, Antonio Damasio
The Reality And Prevalence Of Animal Sentience, Antonio Damasio
Animal Sentience
Rowan et al use findings from neurobiology, clinical neurology, and general biology to argue for the extensive presence of sentience in animals, but they are wisely cautious concerning when in the phylogenetic scale that emergence occurred.
Motivated Science: What Humans Gain From Denying Animal Sentience, Uri Lifshin
Motivated Science: What Humans Gain From Denying Animal Sentience, Uri Lifshin
Animal Sentience
Resistance to the idea that non-human animals are sentient resembles erstwhile resistance to the theory that the earth is not the centre of the universe, or that humans evolved from “apes”. All these notions are psychologically threatening. They can remind people of their own creatureliness and mortality and might make them feel guilty or uncertain about their way of life. An honest debate over animal sentience, welfare and rights should consider the human motivation to deprive animals of these things in the first place. I briefly review empirical evidence on the psychological function of denying animal minds.
Defending Human Difference By Raising The Bar, Joe Gough
Defending Human Difference By Raising The Bar, Joe Gough
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman (C&H) offer a theory of why we humans want to believe that we are different: to justify our cruelty to animals. This commentary offers further supporting evidence of this and examines more closely what the claim that humans are ‘different’ amounts to. It also considers some methodological issues in animal psychology closely related to C&H ‘s theory. These problems result from a common strategy for defending hypotheses about human difference.
Consider The Agent In The Arthropod, Nicolas Delon, Peter Cook, Gordon Bauer, Heidi Harley
Consider The Agent In The Arthropod, Nicolas Delon, Peter Cook, Gordon Bauer, Heidi Harley
Animal Sentience
Whether or not arthropods are sentient, they can have moral standing. Appeals to sentience are not necessary and retard progress in human treatment of other species, including invertebrates. Other increasingly well-documented aspects of invertebrate minds are pertinent to their welfare. Even if arthropods are not sentient, they can be agents whose goals—and therefore interests—can be frustrated. This kind of agency is sufficient for moral status and requires that we consider their welfare.
Zones Of Precaution, Jonathan Birch
Zones Of Precaution, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
My commentary focusses on Mikhalevich & Powell’s criticisms of the Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle. I emphasize the pragmatic nature of my rationale for proposing that, rather than extending the scope of animal welfare protection on a species-by-species basis, we should be willing to protect entire Linnaean orders on the basis of evidence from a single species.
Brain Complexity, Sentience And Welfare, Donald M. Broom
Brain Complexity, Sentience And Welfare, Donald M. Broom
Animal Sentience
Neither sentience nor moral standing is confined to animals with large or human-like brains. Invertebrates deserve moral consideration. Definition of terms clarifies the relationship between sentience and welfare. All animals have welfare but humans give more protection to sentient animals. Humans should be less human-centred.
Invertebrate Cognition, Sentience And Biology, Georges Chapouthier
Invertebrate Cognition, Sentience And Biology, Georges Chapouthier
Animal Sentience
All animal species have adapted for survival and no species is superior overall. For cognitive capacities and sentience, invertebrates such as the octopus, although quite unlike vertebrates, can achieve similar performance levels. So can other invertebrates with small brains; hence they too, as sentient beings, deserve moral consideration from humans. How are we to identify these species? Only though a detailed analysis of their behavior. The decision, which is a moral judgment, depends on biological knowledge that still needs to be acquired.
Convergent Evolution Of Sentience?, Culum Brown Prof.
Convergent Evolution Of Sentience?, Culum Brown Prof.
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell make a compelling case that some invertebrates may be sentient and that our moral obligations in the context of welfare should hence extend to them. Although the case is similar to that made for fishes, there is one obvious difference in that examples of invertebrate sentience probably arose independently from vertebrate sentience. We have unequivocal proof that complex cognition arose multiple times over evolutionary history. Given that cognition is our best tool for indirectly quantifying sentience, it seems highly likely that this multiple polygenesis may also have occurred for sentience. In acknowledging this, we must accept that …
Covid-19, Evolution, Brains And Psychology, Frederick Toates
Covid-19, Evolution, Brains And Psychology, Frederick Toates
Animal Sentience
Attention needs to be directed to the processes that control behavior in humans and the adaptive problems that they solved in our early evolutionary environment. The evolutionary mismatch between the current environment and the human brain can yield important insights into the problems that beset us in the context of environmental degradation and nonhuman animal welfare.
The Wholeness Of Nature, Marthe Kiley-Worthington
The Wholeness Of Nature, Marthe Kiley-Worthington
Animal Sentience
The target article outlines various positions on conservation and preservation but ignores practical considerations of management since there is no wild habitat left. Population controls, either human or nonhuman mammals, are not discussed. The suggestions for legal changes are vague and will require much more thinking about how to integrate animal welfare with wildlife conservation concerns. “Freedoms” as outlined in the human bill of rights might help with decision making for improving animal welfare. Other commentators have made anthropocentric judgements concerning animal welfare, ignoring the importance of developing other ways of seeing and understanding the “multiplicity within unity,” combining empirical …
Exploring Eight-Armed Intelligence Through Film, Tierney M. Thys
Exploring Eight-Armed Intelligence Through Film, Tierney M. Thys
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) provides a rich overview of the elements underlying octopus cognition and behavioral flexibility. Recently, two remarkable natural history films, My Octopus Teacher and The Octopus in My House have explored intimate human-octopus relationships with a wild (Octopus vulgaris) and a captive octopus (Octopus cyanea) respectively. Both films show rare behaviors that offer observations to test new hypotheses as well as a novel perspective on our own human relationships and place within the natural world. An interview with filmmaker Craig Foster from My Octopus Teacher reveals the profound and transformative power of forming a trusting …
Comparative Cognition And Nonhuman Individuality, Catia Correia Caeiro
Comparative Cognition And Nonhuman Individuality, Catia Correia Caeiro
Animal Sentience
Commentators Washington (2019) and Tiffin (2019) point out that the individual vs. collective dichotomy is much more complex than what is considered in the target article. This commentary will focus on why individuals are more important than collectives. Species differences in cognition and emotional processes and individuals’ feelings and experiences need to be taken into account.