Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Consciousness (3)
- Invertebrates (3)
- Sentience (3)
- Nociception (2)
- Pain (2)
-
- Access consciousness (1)
- Animal Welfare (1)
- Arthropoda (1)
- Behavior (1)
- Bilateria (1)
- Canis familiaris (1)
- Cephalisation (1)
- Comparative behavior (1)
- Comparative cognition (1)
- Comparative consciousness (1)
- Crayfish Sentience (1)
- Criteria for Sentience (1)
- Decapod Sentience (1)
- Dogs (1)
- Domestic dog (1)
- Eliminativism (1)
- Emotion (1)
- Evolutionary psychology (1)
- First-person perspective (1)
- Fish (1)
- Flourishing (1)
- Homology (1)
- Humans (1)
- Insect (1)
- Insects (1)
Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Psychology
Sentience In Decapods: Difficulties To Surmount, Michael L. Woodruff
Sentience In Decapods: Difficulties To Surmount, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
In the target article Crump et al. present 8 criteria to assess whether decapods experience pain. Four of these -- sensory integration, motivational trade-offs, flexible self-protection, and associative learning -- could be used to assess sentience in general. In this commentary I discuss difficulties with using these criteria to provide evidence of sentience in decapods, particularly if this evidence is to change public opinion and policies. These difficulties are lack of evidence, the potential to eventually explain the neurobiological basis of the behaviors chosen as criteria, thereby eliminating any explanatory work for sentience, and the reluctance to bring animals that …
A Framework For Evaluating Evidence Of Pain In Animals, Matilda Gibbons, Lars Chittka
A Framework For Evaluating Evidence Of Pain In Animals, Matilda Gibbons, Lars Chittka
Animal Sentience
Crump et al. define eight criteria indicating sentience in animals, with a focus on pain. Here, we point out the risk of false negative or false positive diagnoses of pain. Criteria of different levels of inclusivity are useful for using the precautionary principle in animal welfare considerations, and for more formal scientific evidence of pain. We suggest tightening the criteria -- from more general evidence of sentience to pain alone -- because crucial evidence for animal welfare decisions might otherwise be missed for animals subjected to invasive and injurious procedures.
Inhibition Of Pain Or Response To Injury In Invertebrates And Vertebrates, Matilda Gibbons, Sajedeh Sarlak
Inhibition Of Pain Or Response To Injury In Invertebrates And Vertebrates, Matilda Gibbons, Sajedeh Sarlak
Animal Sentience
In certain situations, insects appear to lack a response to noxious stimuli that would cause pain in humans. For example, from the fact that male mantids continue to mate while being eaten by their partner it does not follow that insects do not feel pain; it could be the result of modulation of nociceptive inputs or behavioural outputs. When we try to infer the underlying mental state of an insect from its behaviour, it is important to consider the behavioural effects of the associated physiological and neurobiological mechanisms.
Whether Invertebrates Are Sentient Matters To Bioethics And Science Policy, Michael L. Woodruff
Whether Invertebrates Are Sentient Matters To Bioethics And Science Policy, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell provide convincing empirical evidence that at least some invertebrates are sentient and hence should be granted moral status. I agree and argue that functional markers should be the primary indicators of sentience. Neuroanatomical homologies provide only secondary evidence. Consensus regarding the validity of these functional markers will be difficult to achieve. To be effective in practice, functional markers of sentience will have to be tested and accepted species by species to overcome the implicit biases against extending moral status to invertebrates.
Smart Sheep Need More Protection, Michael L. Woodruff
Smart Sheep Need More Protection, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
The target article unequivocally establishes that sheep are far more intelligent and cognitively sophisticated than is generally acknowledged. For this reason, the authors advocate for significantly more stringent regulation of agricultural and research practices when sheep are used. I briefly review the existing US regulations governing the use of sheep in research and discuss the extent to which they are applied to sheep. I then discuss weaknesses in the current regulations, concluding that they should be changed to mandate housing all research animals in environments that accommodate the psychosocial needs of each species.
Only The Human Brain Has The Cognitive Capacity For Jealousy, Donatella Marazziti
Only The Human Brain Has The Cognitive Capacity For Jealousy, Donatella Marazziti
Animal Sentience
Jealousy is exclusively a human phenomenon because nonhuman animals lack the brain structures regulating the higher processes underlying jealousy.
Sentience In Fishes: More On The Evidence, Michael L. Woodruff
Sentience In Fishes: More On The Evidence, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
In my target article, I argued that the brains of ray-finned fishes of the teleost subclass (Actinopterygii) are sufficiently complex to support sentience — that these fishes have subjective awareness of interoceptive and exteroceptive sense experience. Extending previous theories centered on the tectum, I focused on the organization of the fish pallium. In this Response to the commentaries, I clarify that I do not propose that the fish pallium is, or must be, homologous to the mammalian neocortex to play a role in sentience. Some form of a functionalist approach to explaining the neural basis of sentience across taxa is …
Canine Emotions As Seen Through Human Social Cognition, Miiamaaria V. Kujala
Canine Emotions As Seen Through Human Social Cognition, Miiamaaria V. Kujala
Animal Sentience
It is not possible to demonstrate that dogs (Canis familiaris) feel emotions, but the same is true for all other species, including our own. The issue must therefore be approached indirectly, using premises similar to those used with humans. Recent methodological advances in canine research reveal what dogs experience and what they derive from the emotions perceptible in others. Dogs attend to social cues, they respond appropriately to the valence of human and dog facial expressions and vocalizations of emotion, and their limbic reward regions respond to the odor of their caretakers. They behave differently according to the …
The Evolutionary History Of Consciousness, Eirik Søvik, Clint Perry
The Evolutionary History Of Consciousness, Eirik Søvik, Clint Perry
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron argue that insects are capable of subjective experience, i.e., sentience. Whereas we mostly agree with the conclusion of their arguments, we think there is an even more important message to be learned from their work. The line of reasoning opened by Klein & Barron proves instructive for how neuroscientists can and should explore the biological phenomenon of consciousness.
Insects Have The Capacity For Subjective Experience, Colin Klein, Andrew B. Barron
Insects Have The Capacity For Subjective Experience, Colin Klein, Andrew B. Barron
Animal Sentience
To what degree are non-human animals conscious? We propose that the most meaningful way to approach this question is from the perspective of functional neurobiology. Here we focus on subjective experience, which is a basic awareness of the world without further reflection on that awareness. This is considered the most basic form of consciousness. Tellingly, this capacity is supported by the integrated midbrain and basal ganglia structures, which are among the oldest and most highly conserved brain systems in vertebrates. A reasonable inference is that the capacity for subjective experience is both widespread and evolutionarily old within the vertebrate lineage. …