Psychology Commons^™

Psychological Construct Validity, Caroline Marie Stone

Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations

A primary concern for any psychological research project is determining how to measure unobservable mental entities, such as "implicit memory", or "intelligence". Psychologists say that a measure has construct validity when they believe that a measurement method measures the construct they intend it to measure, where a construct is any theoretical term that refers to a mental entity. Construct validity, then, is the process of justifying one's belief that a measure has construct validity. My dissertation seeks to answer three related questions, 1. What is construct validity?, 2. What is the best epistemic theory of justification for construct validation?, and …

The Political Psychology Of Crossroads, Ibpp Editor

International Bulletin of Political Psychology

This article elaborates on how the construct of crossroads has situated within political psychological discourse.

Answers To Questions - Martin Wieser’S “Psychology In National Socialism [Psychologie Im Nationalsozialismus] At Sigmund Freud Private University Berlin, July 27–28, 2018”, Martin Wieser, Richard W. Bloom

International Bulletin of Political Psychology

This Scholarly Commons record provides the transcript of the interview IBPP editor Dr. Richard Bloom conducted with Dr. Martin Wieser of Sigmund Freud Private University Berlin on March 2, 2019.

With the publication of Dr. Wieser’s “Psychology in National Socialism [Psychologie im Nationalsozialismus] at Sigmund Freud Private University Berlin, July 27–28, 2018” in History of Psychology, 22(1), 107-109., the IBPP Editor requested that the author provide responses to questions…and Dr. Wieser graciously accepted.

Personality, Psychological Profiling, And Philosophy Of Science: The Insider Threat And Betrayers Of Trust, Ibpp Editor

International Bulletin of Political Psychology

This article describes philosophical challenges to the utility of profiling personality, especially with security and intelligence implications.

An Inquiry Into The Distinction Between Belief And Imagination, Maxwell M. Gatyas

Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Theories of mind typically see belief and imagination as distinct cognitive attitudes. While most admit that imagination is belief-like in many ways—e.g. in its capacity to guide action, cause emotional responses, and aid in decision-making processes—the popular view is to separate the two attitudes when constructing a theory of mental architecture. The similarities are not enough for theorists to admit that the two attitudes are indistinct. Imagination, then, is construed as an “analogue” of belief, similar in many ways, but nevertheless fundamentally different. In what follows I examine these methods of distinguishing between belief and imagination. My method of examination …

Locke, Figure, And Judgement: A Consistent Answer To The Molyneux Problem, Jamale Nagi

Student Research Symposium

Ever since the early modern period the Molyneux Problem has been a topic of debate both in the philosophy of perception and the psychology of perception. The problem centers on whether the senses share representational content between one another, or does each sense modality have its own stock of representational content that becomes associated with the others after some habituation. For example, if you knew a shape only by touch, could you identify that shape when seeing it for the first time without being allowed to touch the object? Typically, rationalists have held to the former claiming yes, while empiricists …

Psychologists Gone Wild: The Politics Of Scientific Psychology, Ibpp Editor

International Bulletin of Political Psychology

With power on the line in science, one should expect controversy beyond the substantive. In scientific psychology—whether discovering human nature or discovering what can be said about it—the search for the what of human nature becomes a mask for human nature.

Who's Afraid Of Multiple Realizability?: Functionalism, Reductionism, And Connectionism, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

Philosophers have argued that on the prevailing theory of mind, functionalism, the fact that mental states are multiply realizable or can be instantiated in a variety of different physical forms, at least in principle, shows that materialism or physical is probably false. A similar argument rejects the relevance to psychology of connectionism, which holds that mental states are embodied and and constituted by connectionist neural networks. These arguments, I argue, fall before reductios ad absurdam, proving too much -- they apply as well to genes, which are multiply realizable, but the reduction of which to DNA is one the core …