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Psychology Commons

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Philosophy

Journal

2021

Phenomenology

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Psychology

Experience Beyond The Imaginary: Reading Freud’S “Elisabeth Von R.” With Lacan’S “The Mirror Stage”, Jeffrey Mccurry Mar 2021

Experience Beyond The Imaginary: Reading Freud’S “Elisabeth Von R.” With Lacan’S “The Mirror Stage”, Jeffrey Mccurry

Middle Voices

While many read Lacan as a structuralist who sought to overthrow the authority of first-person conscious experience, his work also has resonances and affinities with a broadly phenomenological approach to psychoanalysis. This connection comes into focus when we bring Lacan’s concept of the imaginary stage into dialogue with Freud’s early work on hysteria. Lacan implied that the imaginary stage, while necessary for human development, nevertheless frustrates a significant dimension of being human, viz. the human being’s internally conflictual and contradictory experience that calls into question the very idea of a unified self or subject. When we read the early Freud’s …


The Meaning Of “Phenomenology”: Qualitative And Philosophical Phenomenological Research Methods, Heath Williams Feb 2021

The Meaning Of “Phenomenology”: Qualitative And Philosophical Phenomenological Research Methods, Heath Williams

The Qualitative Report

I show some problems with recent discussions within qualitative research that centre around the “authenticity” of phenomenological research methods. I argue that attempts to restrict the scope of the term “phenomenology” via reference to the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl are misguided, because the meaning of the term “phenomenology” is only broadly restricted by etymology. My argument has two prongs: first, via a discussion of Husserl, I show that the canonical phenomenological tradition gives rise to many traits of contemporary qualitative phenomenological theory that are purportedly insufficiently genuine (such as characterisations of phenomenology as “what-its-likeness” and presuppositionless description). Second, I argue …