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Law

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Legal Theory

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Psychology

Law Without Disgust: A Fetid Freedom, Matthew Jordan Cochran Jan 2009

Law Without Disgust: A Fetid Freedom, Matthew Jordan Cochran

Matthew Jordan Cochran

Martha Nussbaum has attacked disgust as an emotion incompatible with political liberal values; a primitive shrinking from animality that is used to subjugate vulnerable groups. Dr. Leon Kass has described disgust as a profound wisdom that teaches us the boundaries beyond which our given human nature becomes compromised. Kass's view of human dignity recognizes the hierarchical nature of being human, while Nussbaum's rather scatological account reduces mankind to a mere species of animal—an animal which is somehow an oppressor for shunning the accouterments of its own mortality. This article compares these two competing views on the interplay between disgust and …


We Don’T Want To Hear It: Psychology, Literature And The Narrative Model Of Judging, Kenworthey Bilz Jan 2009

We Don’T Want To Hear It: Psychology, Literature And The Narrative Model Of Judging, Kenworthey Bilz

Kenworthey Bilz

The “narrative” model of legal judging argues that legal decision makers both do and should render judgments by assembling sensible sto-ries out of evidence (as opposed to using Bayesian-type, linear models). This model is usually understood to demand that before one may judge a situation, one must give the parties the opportunity to tell their story in a manner that invites, or at least allows, empathy from the judger. This Article refers to this as the “inclusionary approach” to the narrative model of judging. Using psychological research in emotions and perspective-taking and the more intuitive techniques of literary criticism, this …


The "Duty" To Be A Rational Shareholder, David A. Hoffman Feb 2006

The "Duty" To Be A Rational Shareholder, David A. Hoffman

David A Hoffman

How and when do courts determine that corporate disclosures are actionable under the federal securities laws? The applicable standard is materiality: would a (mythical) reasonable investor have considered a given disclosure important. As I establish through empirical and statistical testing of approximately 500 cases analyzing the materiality standard, judicial findings of immateriality are remarkably common, and have been stable over time. Materiality's scope results in the dismissal of a large number of claims, and creates a set of cases in which courts attempt to explain and defend their vision of who is, and is not, a reasonable investor. Thus, materiality …


Nullificatory Juries, David A. Hoffman, Kaimipono D. Wenger Oct 2003

Nullificatory Juries, David A. Hoffman, Kaimipono D. Wenger

David A Hoffman

In this Article, we argue that current debates on the legitimacy of punitive damages would benefit from a comparison with jury nullification in criminal trials. We discuss critiques of punitive damages and of jury nullification, noting the surprising similarities in the arguments scholars use to attack these (superficially) distinct outcomes of the jury guarantee. Not only are the criticisms alike, the institutions of punitive damages and jury nullification also turn out to have many similarities: both are, we suggest, examples of what we call "nullificatory juries." We discuss the features of such juries, and consider recent behavioral data relating to …


Can Law And Economics Be Both Practical And Principled?, David A. Hoffman, Michael P. O'Shea Feb 2002

Can Law And Economics Be Both Practical And Principled?, David A. Hoffman, Michael P. O'Shea

David A Hoffman

This article describes important recent developments in normative law and economics, and the difficulties they create for the project of efficiency-based legal reform. After long proceeding without a well articulated moral justification for using economic decision procedures to choose legal rules, scholars have lately begun to devote serious attention to developing a philosophically attractive definition of well-being. At the same time, the empirical side of law and economics is also being enriched with an improved understanding of the complexities of individuals' decision-making behavior. That is where the problems begin. Scholars may have better, more plausible conceptions of well-being in hand, …