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WellBeing International

Speciesism

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Full-Text Articles in Psychology

No Room For Speciesism In Welfare Considerations, Jennifer Vonk Jan 2020

No Room For Speciesism In Welfare Considerations, Jennifer Vonk

Animal Sentience

Speciesism should play no role in determining welfare outcomes. Cognition may vary within species as well as between species, but broad classifications such as invertebrates are functionally meaningless in this context. Cognition should relate to welfare only to the extent that it relates to the capacity to suffer or to experience pleasure.


Becoming The Good Shepherds, Eze Paez Jun 2019

Becoming The Good Shepherds, Eze Paez

Animal Sentience

It is very important that we clarify what we owe to nonhuman animals. To that end, we need a better understanding of animal cognition and emotion. Marino & Merskin’s target article is a welcome contribution to this project. Sheep, like most other animals, are sentient beings with interests of their own. It is wrong to discriminate against them based on species-membership or cognitive sophistication. We are morally required not to harm them, and to help them have the best possible lives, just as we would be in the case of human beings with similar interests. We must become the good …


Using Anthropocentrism To The Benefit Of Other Species, Vanessa Wilson Jan 2018

Using Anthropocentrism To The Benefit Of Other Species, Vanessa Wilson

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman (2018) argue that we should not consider humans as unique or superior to other animals when we have the chance to explore the diversity of the traits of other species. This is a valid and progressive point in our approach to research, but I suggest that an anthropocentric approach can have animal welfare benefits when it helps us perceive other species – especially distantly related ones such as crustaceans – in a human light.


What Is The Pressing “Animal Question” About? Thinking/Feeling Capacity Or Exploitability?, Gordon Hodson Jan 2017

What Is The Pressing “Animal Question” About? Thinking/Feeling Capacity Or Exploitability?, Gordon Hodson

Animal Sentience

Marino’s timely review highlights what humans go to great lengths to ignore and suppress: non-human animals such as chickens have rich inner lives. Although I share her belief that such evidence should provide the impetus for ending the exploitation of chickens, the psychological literatures on motivated reasoning and group-based dominance suggest not only that this is unlikely but that people will push back precisely because of the implications (as they do for climate change). Human psychology has done a great deal to suppress the recognition of sentience in animals, but it can also shed insights into ending exploitation.


Changing Attitudes Towards Animals In The Wild And Speciesism, Oscar Horta Jul 2016

Changing Attitudes Towards Animals In The Wild And Speciesism, Oscar Horta

Animal Sentience

I argue that despite Ng’s claim that we should postpone the defense of those animals that live in the wild, we do have reasons to start spreading concern for them now. We can do it by (i) changing public attitude by heightening awareness of speciesism, by which we will also challenge animal exploitation; and (ii) by disseminating information about the situation of animals in the wild.


Anthropomorphic Denial Of Fish Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, Matthew C. Leach Jan 2016

Anthropomorphic Denial Of Fish Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, Matthew C. Leach

Animal Sentience

Key (2016) affirms that we do not know how the fish brain processes pain but denies — because fish lack a human-like cortex — that fish can feel pain. He affirms that birds, like fish, have a singly-laminated cortex and that the structure of the bird brain is quite different from that of the human brain, yet he does not deny that birds can feel pain. In this commentary we describe how Key cites studies that substantiate mammalian pain but discounts the same kind of data as evidence of fish pain. We suggest that Key's interpretations are illogical, do not …