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Full-Text Articles in Political Theory
Capture In Financial Regulation" Can We Channel It Toward The Common Good?, Lawrence G. Baxter
Capture In Financial Regulation" Can We Channel It Toward The Common Good?, Lawrence G. Baxter
Lawrence G. Baxter
“Regulatory capture” is central to regulatory analysis yet is a troublesome concept. It is difficult to prove and sometimes seems refuted by outcomes unfavorable to powerful interests. Nevertheless, the process of bank regulation and supervision fosters a closeness between regulator and regulated that would seem to be conducive to “capture” or at least to fostering undue sympathy by regulators for the companies they oversee. The influence of very large financial institutions has also become so great that financial regulation appears to have become excessively distorted in favor of these entities and to the detriment of many other legitimate interests, including …
The Government Shareholder: Regulating Public Ownership Of Private Enterprise, Benjamin A. Templin
The Government Shareholder: Regulating Public Ownership Of Private Enterprise, Benjamin A. Templin
Benjamin A. Templin
During the subprime financial crisis of 2007-2009, the U.S. transformed its policies from a focus on privatization and deregulation to one where the government plays an active role as a market participant. By the end of the 2009 fiscal year, the U.S. government became one of the largest shareholders in the world owning a portfolio of investments valued at $959 billion. Some pundits condemned the investments as socialism. The sudden increase in the government portfolio is better understood as a Keynesian response to market failure rather than a change in the political economy. However, the dramatic increase in the government …