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Full-Text Articles in Other Political Science
Agreeing To Disagree: Diversity, Political Contractualism, And The Open Society, John Thrasher
Agreeing To Disagree: Diversity, Political Contractualism, And The Open Society, John Thrasher
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
Political contractualism is important in societies characterized by substantial moral and political disagreement and diversity. The very disagreement that makes the social contract necessary, however, also makes agreement difficult. Call this the paradox of diversity, which is the result of a tension between two necessary conditions of political contractualism: existence and stability. The first involves showing the possibility of some agreement, while the second involves showing that the agreement can persist. To solve both of these problems, I develop a multilevel contract theory that I call the “open society” model of political contractualism that incorporates diversity into the contractual model …
Democracy Unchained: Contractualism, Individualism, And Independence In Buchanan’S Democratic Theory, John Thrasher
Democracy Unchained: Contractualism, Individualism, And Independence In Buchanan’S Democratic Theory, John Thrasher
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
Contrary to the claims of some of his critics, James Buchanan was an ardent democrat. I argue that Buchanan’s conception of democratic governance organized by a contractually justified constitution is highly distinctive because of his commitment to a strong conception of individualism. For Buchanan, democracy is neither justified instrumentally—by the goods it generates—nor by reference to some antecedent conception of justice. Instead, democracy is the only political option for a society that takes individualism seriously. One implication of this view is that democracies can only be limited by the rules they collectively give themselves in the form of constitutions. I …
The Ethics Of Legislative Vote Trading, John Thrasher
The Ethics Of Legislative Vote Trading, John Thrasher
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
It is argued in this article that legislative vote trading by representatives is both ethically permissible and may be ethically required in many cases. This conclusion is an implication of a thin, general account of representation that requires representatives to vote on the basis of the perceived preferences or interests of their constituents. These special duties arise from a thin account of representation and create a weak, defeasible duty for representatives to engage in what they believe will be beneficial vote trades. After establishing this claim, the article considers two objections to this duty. One is based on equating legislative …
The Fragility Of Consensus: Public Reason, Diversity And Stability, John Thrasher, Kevin Vallier
The Fragility Of Consensus: Public Reason, Diversity And Stability, John Thrasher, Kevin Vallier
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
John Rawls's transition from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism was driven by his rejection of Theory's account of stability. The key to his later account of stability is the idea of public reason. We see Rawls's account of stability as an attempt to solve a mutual assurance problem. We maintain that Rawls's solution fails because his primary assurance mechanism, in the form of public reason, is fragile. His conception of public reason relies on a condition of consensus that we argue is unrealistic in modern, pluralistic democracies. After rejecting Rawls's conception of public reason, we offer an ‘indirect …
Uniqueness And Symmetry In Bargaining Theories Of Justice, John Thrasher
Uniqueness And Symmetry In Bargaining Theories Of Justice, John Thrasher
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
For contractarians, justice is the result of a rational bargain. The goal is to show that the rules of justice are consistent with rationality. The two most important bargaining theories of justice are David Gauthier’s and those that use the Nash’s bargaining solution. I argue that both of these approaches are fatally undermined by their reliance on a symmetry condition. Symmetry is a substantive constraint, not an implication of rationality. I argue that using symmetry to generate uniqueness undermines the goal of bargaining theories of justice.