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Other Political Science Commons

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Arts and Humanities

Chapman University

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Democracy

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Full-Text Articles in Other Political Science

Democracy Unchained: Contractualism, Individualism, And Independence In Buchanan’S Democratic Theory, John Thrasher Sep 2019

Democracy Unchained: Contractualism, Individualism, And Independence In Buchanan’S Democratic Theory, John Thrasher

Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research

Contrary to the claims of some of his critics, James Buchanan was an ardent democrat. I argue that Buchanan’s conception of democratic governance organized by a contractually justified constitution is highly distinctive because of his commitment to a strong conception of individualism. For Buchanan, democracy is neither justified instrumentally—by the goods it generates—nor by reference to some antecedent conception of justice. Instead, democracy is the only political option for a society that takes individualism seriously. One implication of this view is that democracies can only be limited by the rules they collectively give themselves in the form of constitutions. I …


The Ethics Of Legislative Vote Trading, John Thrasher Apr 2015

The Ethics Of Legislative Vote Trading, John Thrasher

Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research

It is argued in this article that legislative vote trading by representatives is both ethically permissible and may be ethically required in many cases. This conclusion is an implication of a thin, general account of representation that requires representatives to vote on the basis of the perceived preferences or interests of their constituents. These special duties arise from a thin account of representation and create a weak, defeasible duty for representatives to engage in what they believe will be beneficial vote trades. After establishing this claim, the article considers two objections to this duty. One is based on equating legislative …