Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Economics
Interfirm Network Analysis In Marginal Tourist Destinations: The Mediator Company In Business Relationships, Giovanni Ruggieri, Gaspare Varvaro, Salvatore Iannolino
Interfirm Network Analysis In Marginal Tourist Destinations: The Mediator Company In Business Relationships, Giovanni Ruggieri, Gaspare Varvaro, Salvatore Iannolino
International Journal of Islands Research
The literature on tourist destinations and the use of empirical approaches evidence the need to adopt this model to increase tourism economies. In model application, the enterprises, and local stakeholders, sometimes represent limitations or opportunities. This article opens the view to tourist destination networks, described as relational structures that can influence and determine the destination-building process. The Network Analysis methodology offers a better understanding of inter-firm relational dynamics when applied in a small context, and in this case, the application was undertaken on the island of Sicily, in Menfi town and its hinterland. Findings show the presence of a company …
United We Stand: On The Benefits Of Coordinated Punishment, Vicente Calabuig, Natalia Jiménez, Gonzalo Olcina, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara
United We Stand: On The Benefits Of Coordinated Punishment, Vicente Calabuig, Natalia Jiménez, Gonzalo Olcina, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara
ESI Working Papers
Coordinated punishment occurs when punishment decisions are complements; i.e., this punishment device requires a specific number of punishers to be effective; otherwise, no damage will be inflicted on the target. While societies often rely on this punishment device, its benefits are unclear compared with uncoordinated punishment, where punishment decisions are substitutes. We argue that coordinated punishment can prevent the free-riding of punishers and show, both theoretically and experimentally, that this may be beneficial for cooperation in a team investment game, compared with uncoordinated punishment.
Motives For Cooperation In The One-Shot Prisoner’S Dilemma, Mark Schneider, Timothy W. Shields
Motives For Cooperation In The One-Shot Prisoner’S Dilemma, Mark Schneider, Timothy W. Shields
ESI Working Papers
We investigate the motives for cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). A prior study finds that cooperation rates in one-shot PD games can be ranked empirically by the social surplus from cooperation. That study employs symmetric payoffs from cooperation in simultaneous PD games. Hence, in that setting, it is not possible to discern the motives for cooperation since three prominent social welfare criteria, social surplus (efficiency) preferences, Rawlsian maximin preferences, and inequity aversion make the same predictions. In the present paper, we conduct an experiment to identify which of these social preferences best explains differences in cooperation rates and …
The Organizational Evolution Of Small Food Buying Clubs, Taylor Lange
The Organizational Evolution Of Small Food Buying Clubs, Taylor Lange
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Organizations are pervasive in modern society and the factors of their evolution are the subject of considerable scholarship. Most literature on organizational evolution focuses on the role of leaders and entrepreneurs, specifically their decision making interacts with market forces. However, the behavior and interactions of regular organization members, such as nonmanagerial employees or club members, is surprisingly overlooked. Specifically, examinations of social dilemmas between co-workers and the role of learning are often discounted in the current literature. This dissertation explores how the dynamics of cooperation and the learning of preferences as cultural traits become consequential in the evolution and longevity …