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Full-Text Articles in Economics
Algorithmic Transparency, Jian Sun
Algorithmic Transparency, Jian Sun
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
I study the optimal algorithmic disclosure in a lending market where lenders use a predictive algorithm to mitigate adverse selection. The predictive algorithm is unobservable to borrowers and uses a manipulable borrower feature as input. A regulator maximizes market efficiency by disclosing information about the statistical properties of variables embedded in the predictive algorithm to borrowers. Under the optimal disclosure policy, the posterior belief consists of two disjoint regions in which the borrower feature is more relevant and less relevant in predicting borrower quality, respectively. The optimal disclosure policy differentiates posterior lending market equilibria by the equilibrium data manipulation levels. …
The Information In Asset Fire Sales, Sheng Huang, Matthew Ringgenberg, Zhe Zhang
The Information In Asset Fire Sales, Sheng Huang, Matthew Ringgenberg, Zhe Zhang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Asset prices remain depressed for several years following mutual fund fire sales. We show that this price pressure is partly due to asymmetric information which leads to an adverse selection problem for arbitrageurs. After a flow shock, fund managers do not scale down their portfolio, rather, they choose to sell a subset of low-quality stocks that subsequently underperform. In other words, fund managers have stock selling ability. Our findings suggest an explanation for the tendency of asset prices to remain depressed following fire sales: information asymmetries make it difficult for arbitrageurs to disentangle pure price pressure from negative information.