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Full-Text Articles in Economics
On The Alignment Of Consumer Surplus And Total Surplus Under Competitive Price Discrimination, Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, Stephen Morris
On The Alignment Of Consumer Surplus And Total Surplus Under Competitive Price Discrimination, Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A number of producers of heterogeneous goods with heterogeneous costs compete in prices. When producers know their own production costs and consumers know their values, consumer surplus and total surplus are aligned: the information structure and equilibrium that maximize consumer surplus also maximize total surplus. We report when alignment extends to the case where either consumers are uncertain about their own values or producers are uncertain about their own costs, and we also give examples showing when it does not. Less information for either producers or consumers may intensify competition in a way that benefits consumers but results in inefficient …
Personalized Pricing And Competition, Andrew Rhodes, Jidong Zhou
Personalized Pricing And Competition, Andrew Rhodes, Jidong Zhou
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We study personalized pricing (or first-degree price discrimination) in a general oligopoly model. In the short-run, when the market structure is fixed, the impact of personalized pricing hinges on the degree of market coverage (i.e., how many consumers buy). If coverage is high (e.g., because the production cost is low, or the number of firms is large), personalized pricing intensifies competition and so harms firms but benefits consumers, whereas the opposite is true if coverage is low. However in the long-run, when the market structure is endogenous, personalized pricing always benefits consumers because it induces the socially optimal level of …
Personalized Pricing And Competition, Andrew Rhodes, Jidong Zhou
Personalized Pricing And Competition, Andrew Rhodes, Jidong Zhou
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We study personalized pricing in a general oligopoly model. When the market structure is fixed, the impact of personalized pricing relative to uniform pricing hinges on the degree of market coverage. If market conditions are such that coverage is high, personalized pricing harms firms and benefits consumers, whereas the opposite is true if coverage is low. However, when the market structure is endogenous, personalized pricing benefits consumers because it induces socially optimal firm entry. Finally, when only some firms have data to personalize prices, consumers can be worse off compared to when either all or no firms personalize prices.
Selling Consumer Data For Profit: Optimal Market-Segmentation Design And Its Consequences, Kai Hao Yang
Selling Consumer Data For Profit: Optimal Market-Segmentation Design And Its Consequences, Kai Hao Yang
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A data broker sells market segmentations created by consumer data to a producer with private production cost who sells a product to a unit mass of consumers with heterogeneous values. In this setting, I completely characterize the revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the data broker. In particular, every optimal mechanism induces quasi-perfect price discrimination. That is, the data broker sells the producer a market segmentation described by a cost-dependent cutoff, such that all the consumers with values above the cutoff end up buying and paying their values while the rest of consumers do not buy. The characterization of optimal mechanisms leads to …
Dynamic Airline Pricing And Seat Availability, Kevin R. Williams
Dynamic Airline Pricing And Seat Availability, Kevin R. Williams
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Airfares fluctuate over time due to both demand shocks and intertemporal variation in willingness to pay. I develop and estimate a model of dynamic airline pricing accounting for both forces with new flight-level data. With the model estimates, I disentangle key interactions between the arrival pattern of consumer types and scarcity of remaining capacity due to stochastic demand. I show that dynamic airline pricing expands output by lowering fares charged to early-arriving, price-sensitive customers. It also ensures seats for late-arriving travelers with the highest willingness to pay (e.g. business travelers) who are then charged high prices. I find that dynamic …
Dynamic Airline Pricing And Seat Availability: Evidence From Airline Markets, Kevin R. Williams
Dynamic Airline Pricing And Seat Availability: Evidence From Airline Markets, Kevin R. Williams
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Airfares fluctuate due to demand shocks and intertemporal variation in willingness to pay. I estimate a model of dynamic airline pricing accounting for both sources of price adjustments using flight-level data. I use the model estimates to evaluate the welfare effects of dynamic airline pricing. Relative to uniform pricing, dynamic pricing benefits early-arriving, leisure consumers at the expense of late-arriving, business travelers. Although dynamic pricing ensures seat availability for business travelers, these consumers are then charged higher prices. When aggregated over markets, welfare is higher under dynamic pricing than under uniform pricing. The direction of the welfare effect at the …
The Design And Price Of Information, Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Alex Smolin
The Design And Price Of Information, Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Alex Smolin
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper analyzes the trade of information between a data buyer and a data seller. The data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty and seeks to augment his initial private information with supplemental data. The data seller is uncertain about the willingness-to-pay of the data buyer due to this private information. The data seller optimally offers a menu of (Blackwell) experiments as statistical tests to the data buyer. The seller exploits differences in the beliefs of the buyer’s types to reduce information rents while limiting the surplus that must be sacrificed to provide incentives.
The Design And Price Of Information, Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Alex Smolin
The Design And Price Of Information, Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Alex Smolin
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty. He can augment his initial private information with supplemental data from a data seller. His willingness to pay for supplemental data is determined by the quality of his initial private information. The data seller optimally offers a menu of statistical experiments. We establish the properties that any revenue-maximizing menu of experiments must satisfy. Every experiment is a non-dispersed stochastic matrix, and every menu contains a fully informative experiment. In the cases of binary states and actions, or binary types, we provide an explicit construction of the optimal menu of experiments.
Selling Experiments: Menu Pricing Of Information, Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Alex Smolin
Selling Experiments: Menu Pricing Of Information, Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Alex Smolin
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A monopolist sells informative experiments to heterogeneous buyers. Buyers differ in their prior information, and hence in their willingness to pay for additional signals. The monopolist can profitably offer a menu of experiments. We show that, even under costless information acquisition and free degrading of information, the optimal menu is quite coarse. The seller offers at most two experiments, and we derive conditions under which at vs. discriminatory pricing is optimal.
One-Way Essential Complements, Keith M. Chen, Barry Nalebuff
One-Way Essential Complements, Keith M. Chen, Barry Nalebuff
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
While competition between firms producing substitutes is well understood, less is known about rivalry between complementors. We study the interaction between firms in markets with one-way essential complements. One good is essential to the use of the other but not vice versa, as arises with an operating system and applications. Our interest is in the division of surplus between the two goods and the related incentive for firms to create complements to an essential good. Formally, we study a two-good model where consumers value A alone, but can only enjoy B if they also purchase A. When one firm sells …
Network Markets And Consumer Coordination, Attila Ambrus, Rossella Argenziano
Network Markets And Consumer Coordination, Attila Ambrus, Rossella Argenziano
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it is in their best interest to do so, and when coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium if consumers have heterogeneous reservation values. A monopolist provider might choose to operate multiple networks to price differentiate consumers on both sides of the market. Competing network providers might operate networks such that one of them targets high reservation value consumers on one side of the market, while the other targets high reservation value consumers on the other …