Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Economics
Aiming For The Goal: Contribution Dynamics Of Crowdfunding, Joyee Deb, Aniko Öry (Oery), Kevin R. Williams
Aiming For The Goal: Contribution Dynamics Of Crowdfunding, Joyee Deb, Aniko Öry (Oery), Kevin R. Williams
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We study a dynamic contribution game where investors seek private benefits that are offered in exchange for contributions and a single, publicly-minded donor values project success. We show that donor contributions serve as costly signals that encour-age socially-productive contributions by investors who face a coordination problem. Investors and the donor prefer different equilibria but all benefit in expectation from the donor’s ability to dynamically signal his valuation. We explore various contexts in which our model can be applied and delve empirically into the case of Kickstarter. We calibrate our model and quantify the coordination benefits of dynamic signaling in counterfactuals.
Aiming For The Goal: Contribution Dynamics Of Crowdfunding, Joyee Deb, Aniko Öry, Kevin R. Williams
Aiming For The Goal: Contribution Dynamics Of Crowdfunding, Joyee Deb, Aniko Öry, Kevin R. Williams
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We study reward-based crowdfunding campaigns, a new class of dynamic contribution games where consumption is exclusive. Two types of backers participate: buyers want to consume the product while donors just want the campaign to succeed. The key tension is one of coordination between buyers, instead of free-riding. Donors can alleviate this coordination risk. We analyze a dynamic model of crowdfunding and demonstrate that its predictions are consistent with high-frequency data collected from Kickstarter. We compare the Kickstarter mechanism to alternative platform designs and evaluate the value of dynamically arriving information. We extend the model to incorporate social learning about quality.
Aiming For The Goal: Contribution Dynamics Of Crowdfunding, Joyee Deb, Aniko Öry (Oery), Kevin R. Williams
Aiming For The Goal: Contribution Dynamics Of Crowdfunding, Joyee Deb, Aniko Öry (Oery), Kevin R. Williams
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We study reward-based crowdfunding, a new class of dynamic contribution games where a private good is produced only if the funding goal is reached by a deadline. Buyers face a problem of coordination rather than free-riding. A long-lived donor may alleviate this coordination risk, signaling his wealth through dynamic contributions. We characterize platform-, donor-, and buyer-optimal equilibrium outcomes, attained by Markov equilibria with simple donation strategies. We test the model’s predictions using high-frequency data collected from the largest crowdfunding platform, Kickstarter. The model fits the data well, especially for predictions concerning comparative statistics, donation dynamics, and properties of successful campaigns.
Aiming For The Goal: Contribution Dynamics Of Crowdfunding, Joyee Deb, Aniko Öry (Oery), Kevin R. Williams
Aiming For The Goal: Contribution Dynamics Of Crowdfunding, Joyee Deb, Aniko Öry (Oery), Kevin R. Williams
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Fundraising campaigns draw support from a wide pool of contributors. Some contributors are interested in private rewards offered in exchange for contributions (buyers), whereas others are publicly-minded and value success (donors). Buyers face a coordination problem because of the positive externalities of campaign success. A leadership donor who strategically times contributions can promote coordination by dynamically signaling his valuation. The ability to signal increases the probability of success and benefits all participants relative to the donor valuation being known. We validate our modeling assumptions and theoretical predictions using Kickstarter data.