Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 18 of 18
Full-Text Articles in Economics
The Present And Future Of Game Theory, Martin Shubik
The Present And Future Of Game Theory, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A broad nontechnical coverage of many of the developments in game theory since the 1950s is given together with some comments on important open problems and where some of the developments may take place. The nearly 90 references given serve only as a minimal guide to the many thousands of books and articles that have been written. The purpose here is to present a broad brush picture of the many areas of study and application that have come into being. The use of deep techniques flourishes best when it stays in touch with application. There is a vital symbiotic relationship …
Competing For Customers In A Social Network, Pradeep Dubey, Rahul Garg, Bernard De Meyer
Competing For Customers In A Social Network, Pradeep Dubey, Rahul Garg, Bernard De Meyer
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
There are many situations in which a customer’s proclivity to buy the product of any firm depends not only on the classical attributes oft he product such as its price and quality, but also on who else is buying the same product. We model these situations as games in which firms compete for customers located in a “social network.” Nash Equilibrium (NE) in pure strategies exist in general. In the quasi-linear version of the model, NE turn out to be unique and can be precisely characterized. If there are no a priori biases between customers and firms, then there is …
The Uses Of Teaching Games In Game Theory Classes And Some Experimental Games, Martin Shubik
The Uses Of Teaching Games In Game Theory Classes And Some Experimental Games, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The results are presented from several experiments. They include the selection of points in the core, interpersonal comparisons of utility, and the reconsideration of Stone results on prominence in contrast with symmetry.
Classification Of Two-Person Ordinal Bimatrix Games, Imre Bárány, Jon Lee, Martin Shubik
Classification Of Two-Person Ordinal Bimatrix Games, Imre Bárány, Jon Lee, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The set of possible outcomes of a strongly ordinal bimatrix game is studied by imbedding each pair of possible payoffs as a point on the standard two-dimensional integral lattice. In particular, we count the number of different Pareto optimal sets of each cardinality; we establish asymptotic bounds for the number of different convex hulls of the point sets, for the average shape of the set of points dominated by the Pareto optimal set, and for the average shape of the convex hull of the point set. We also indicate the effect of individual rationality considerations on our results. As most …
A Bound Of The Proportion Of Pure Strategy Equilibria In Generic Games, Faruk Gul, David G. Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti
A Bound Of The Proportion Of Pure Strategy Equilibria In Generic Games, Faruk Gul, David G. Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In a generic finite normal form game with 2(α) + 1 Nash equilibria, at least alpha of the equilibria are nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria (that is, they involve randomization by some players).
-Person Game And Endogenous Coalition Formation, Lin Zhou
-Person Game And Endogenous Coalition Formation, Lin Zhou
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The two most fundamental questions in cooperative game theory are: When a game is played, what coalitions will be formed and what payoff vectors will be chosen? No previous solution concepts or theories in the literature provide satisfactory answers to both questions; answers are especially lacking for the first one. In this paper we introduce the refined bargaining set, which is the first solution concept in cooperative game theory that simultaneously provides answers to both of the fundamental questions.
Existence Of Walras Equilibrium Without A Price Player Of Generalized Game, John Geanakoplos, Pradeep Dubey
Existence Of Walras Equilibrium Without A Price Player Of Generalized Game, John Geanakoplos, Pradeep Dubey
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We derive the existence of a Walras equilibrium directly from Nash’s theorem on noncooperative games. No price player is involved, nor are generalized games.
Game Theory Without Partitions, And Applications To Speculation And Consensus, John Geanakoplos
Game Theory Without Partitions, And Applications To Speculation And Consensus, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Decision theory and game theory are extended to allow for information processing errors. This extended theory is then used to reexamine market speculation and consensus, both when all actions (opinions) are common knowledge and when they may not be. Five axioms of information processing are shown to be especially important to speculation and consensus. They are called nondelusion, knowing that you know, nested, balanced, and positively balanced. We show that it is necessary and sufficient that each agent’s information processing errors be nondeluded and (1) balanced so that the agents cannot agree to disagree, (2) positively balanced so that it …
The Interaction Of Implicit And Explicit Contracts In Repeated Agency, Martin Shubik
The Interaction Of Implicit And Explicit Contracts In Repeated Agency, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This article deals with experimental games as they pertain to game theory. As such there is a natural distinction between experimentation with abstract games devoted to testing a specific hypothesis in game theory and games with a scenario from a discipline such as economics or political science where the game is presented in the context of some particular activity.
The Power Of Commitment, Chien-Fu Chou, John Geanakoplos
The Power Of Commitment, Chien-Fu Chou, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
History has seen many examples of the lone man — like Christ, Luther, Gandhi, or Hitler — who without initial wealth or position, succeeds in changing the behavior of an entire society, for good or for ill. Whence comes this power. No doubt such leaders have possessed extraordinary ability, and have formulated original ideas with great appeal which others could readily follow. But there is another striking similarity among these leaders; namely their single-minded devotion to their, ideals, and their uncompromising attitude toward those who opposed them, no matter what the personal cost. There is hardly any need to document …
Warranties As Signals Under Consumer Moral Hazard, Nancy A. Lutz
Warranties As Signals Under Consumer Moral Hazard, Nancy A. Lutz
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In this paper, I examine whether and how warranties serve as signals of product quality in an environment where there are opportunities for consumer moral hazard. My model is very similar to Grossman’s. A risk neutral monopolist produced a good of fixed and exogenous quality. This product is offered to a market of identical risk-averse consumers, and it can be bundled with a warranty of the monopolist’s choosing. The probability that the product breaks down is a function of its quality and the effort the consumer takes in using it. This consumer effort cannot be observed by the monopolist or …
Game Theory. Models Of Strategic Behavior And Nuclear Deterrence, Martin Shubik
Game Theory. Models Of Strategic Behavior And Nuclear Deterrence, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This essay offers an exposition of the potential uses of game theoretic reasoning and mathematical models in the study of the prevention of nuclear war.
A Game Theoretic Approach To The Theory Of Money And Financial Institutions, Martin Shubik
A Game Theoretic Approach To The Theory Of Money And Financial Institutions, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This is a sketch of a game theoretic and gaming approach to the development of an appropriate microeconomic theory of money and financial institutions. The phrase “money and financial institutions” is used to stress that a theory of money alone cannot be fruitfully constructed in an institutional vacuum. The monetary and financial system of an economy are part of the socio-politico-economic control mechanism used by every state to connect the economy with the polity and society. This neural network provides the administrative means to collect taxes, direct investment, provide public goods, trade. The money measures provide a crude but serviceable …
The Uses, Value And Limitation Of Game Theoretic Methods In Defense Analysis, Martin Shubik
The Uses, Value And Limitation Of Game Theoretic Methods In Defense Analysis, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The central contribution of game theory to defense analysis has been a language for the understanding of how to formulate and study strategic or cross-purposes optimization in situations involving two or more actors. It is suggested here in this discussion that two fundamentally different classes of application of game theory to problems in defense have emerged. The first is the application of two-person zero sum game theory to military, primarily tactical situations which for the purposes at hand can be reasonably well modeled in this manner. The second is the application of two or more person nonconstant sum game theory …
The Use Of Simple Games To Illustrate Concepts And To Provide Experimental Evidence, Martin Shubik
The Use Of Simple Games To Illustrate Concepts And To Provide Experimental Evidence, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper is devoted to a discussion of several simple experimental games used in a series of lectures on game theory. The prime purpose of these games was to raise questions and illustrate problems in the construction of game theoretical models in the social sciences. The students were asked to make choices or to give opinions as to what imputation should be recommended as a solution in a cooperative game.
Some Three Person Games In Coalitional Form For Teaching And Experimentation, Martin Shubik
Some Three Person Games In Coalitional Form For Teaching And Experimentation, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Since 1973 I have used several three person games in coalitional form for both teaching and experimental purposes. They have been run in primarily a normative mode. The individuals have been asked to act as judges called upon to recommend a division of assets among three players. The basic use of these games has been to help to raise questions about context and solution concepts in cooperative game theory. Since 1980 the three basic games noted below have been used with five more or less similar groups of students at Yale. The games, their didactic purpose and the results from …
Games With Perceptive Commanders But Less Perceptive Subordinates, Martin Shubik
Games With Perceptive Commanders But Less Perceptive Subordinates, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We introduce a model of the 2 x 2 games played by agents or subordinates of the players. We assume that each agent or subordinates of the players. We assume that each agent is not as perceptive as his commander in that he can make only two distinctions among the four outcomes whose value can be distinguished by the commanders.
Plausible Outcomes For Games In Strategic Form, Martin Shubik
Plausible Outcomes For Games In Strategic Form, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This is the first projected series of papers on solutions to games in matrix and extensive form.