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Full-Text Articles in Economics
Matching With Incomplete Information, Quingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson
Matching With Incomplete Information, Quingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically assumes that the agents have complete information, and examines core outcomes. We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make from the hypothesis that the current allocation is stable. We show that the set of …
Conflict Leads To Cooperation In Nash Bargaining, Kareen Rozen
Conflict Leads To Cooperation In Nash Bargaining, Kareen Rozen
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We consider a multilateral Nash demand game where short-sighted players come to the bargaining table with requests for both coalition partners and the potentially generated resource. We prove that group learning leads with probability one to complete cooperation and a strictly self-enforcing allocation (i.e., in the interior of the core). Highlighting group dynamics, we demonstrate that behaviors which appear destructive can themselves lead to beneficial and strictly self-enforcing cooperation.
The Theory Of Money And Financial Institutions: A Summary Of A Game Theoretic Approach, Martin Shubik
The Theory Of Money And Financial Institutions: A Summary Of A Game Theoretic Approach, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A game theoretic approach to the theory of money and financial institution is given utilizing both the strategic and coalitional forms for describing the economy. The economy is first modeled as a strategic market game, then the strategic form is used to calculate several cooperative forms that differ from each other in their utilization of money and credit and their treatment of threats. It is shown that there are natural upper and lower bounds to the monetary needs of an economy, but even in the extreme structures the concept of “enough money” can be defined usefully, and for large economies …
The Edgeworth, Cournot And Walrasian Cores Of An Economy, Martin Shubik
The Edgeworth, Cournot And Walrasian Cores Of An Economy, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Three variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted.
A Computational Analysis Of The Core Of A Trading Economy With Three Competitive Equilibria And A Finite Number Of Traders, Alok Kumar, Martin Shubik
A Computational Analysis Of The Core Of A Trading Economy With Three Competitive Equilibria And A Finite Number Of Traders, Alok Kumar, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In this paper we examine the structure of the core of a trading economy with three competitive equilibria as the number of traders ( N ) is varied. We also examine the sensitivity of the multiplicity of equilibria and of the core to variations in individual initial endowments. Computational results show that the core first splits into two pieces at N = 5 and then splits a second time into three pieces at N = 12. Both of these splits occur not at a point but as a contiguous gap. As N is increased further, the core shrinks by N …
The Uses Of Teaching Games In Game Theory Classes And Some Experimental Games, Martin Shubik
The Uses Of Teaching Games In Game Theory Classes And Some Experimental Games, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The results are presented from several experiments. They include the selection of points in the core, interpersonal comparisons of utility, and the reconsideration of Stone results on prominence in contrast with symmetry.
An ‘Average’ Lyapunov Convexity Theorem And Some Core Equivalence Results, Lin Zhou
An ‘Average’ Lyapunov Convexity Theorem And Some Core Equivalence Results, Lin Zhou
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
I prove an “average” version of the Lyapunov convexity theorem and apply it to establish some core equivalence results for an atomless economy.