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Articles 1 - 30 of 73
Full-Text Articles in Economics
Subjective Distributions, Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler
Subjective Distributions, Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A decision maker has to choose one of several random variables, with uncertainty known distributions. As a Bayesian she behaves as if she knew the distributions. In his paper we suggest an axiomatic derivation of these (subjective) distributions, which is much more economical than the derivations by de Finetti or Savage. They derive the whole joint distribution of all the available random variables.
A Derivation Of Expected Utility Maximization In The Context Of A Game, Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler
A Derivation Of Expected Utility Maximization In The Context Of A Game, Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A decision maker faces a decision problem, or a game against nature. For each probability distribution over the state of the world (nature’s strategies), she has a weak order over her acts (pure strategies). We formulate conditions on these weak orders guaranteeing that they can be jointly represented by expected utility maximization with respect to an almost-unique state-dependent utility, that is, a matrix assigning real numbers to act-state pairs. As opposed to a utility function that is derived in another context, the utility matrix derived in the game will incorporate all psychological or sociological determinants of well-being that result from …
Money And The Monetization Of Credit, Martin Shubik
Money And The Monetization Of Credit, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The relationship between money and credit is discussed in terms of network linkage. Fiat money is the only instrument with the universal recognition of its issuer. Near monies such as bank money and money substitutes such as gasoline credit cards can be classified in terms of their network links. This leads to a way of considering the velocity of money.
Bootstrapping Macroeconometric Models, Ray C. Fair
Bootstrapping Macroeconometric Models, Ray C. Fair
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper outlines a bootstrapping approach to the estimation and analysis of macroeconometric models. It integrates for dynamic, nonlinear, simultaneous equation models the bootstrapping approach to evaluating estimators initiated by Efron (1979) and the stochastic simulation approach to evaluating models’ properties initiated by Adelman and Adelman (1959). It also estimates for a particular model the gain in coverage accuracy from using bootstrap confidence intervals over asymptotic confidence intervals.
Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We build a model of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signalling into general equilibrium. Pools are characterized by their quantity limits on contributions. Households signal their reliability by choosing which pool to join. In equilibrium, pools with lower quantity limits sell for a higher price, even though each household’s deliveries are the same at all pools. The Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance is included as a special case. We show that by recasting their hybrid oligopolistic-competitive story into our perfectly competitive framework, their separating equilibrium always exists (even when they say it doesn’t) and is unique.
Penalised Maximum Likelihood Estimation For Fractional Gaussian Processes, Offer Lieberman
Penalised Maximum Likelihood Estimation For Fractional Gaussian Processes, Offer Lieberman
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We apply and extend Firth’s (1993) modified score estimator to deal with a class of stationary Gaussian long-memory processes. Our estimator removes the first order bias of the maximum likelihood estimator. A small simulation study reveals the reduction in the bias is considerable, while it does not inflate the corresponding mean squared error.
Asymptotic Theory For Multivariate Garch Processes, F. Comte, Offer Lieberman
Asymptotic Theory For Multivariate Garch Processes, F. Comte, Offer Lieberman
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We provide in this paper asymptotic theory for the multivariate GARCH (p,q) process. Strong consistency of the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is established by appealing to conditions given in Jeantheau [19] in conjunction with a result given by Boussama [9] concerning the existence of a stationary and ergodic solution to the multivariate GARCH (p,q) process. We prove asymptotic normality of the quasi-MLE when the initial state is either stationary or fixed.
Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We build a model of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signalling into general equilibrium. Pools are characterized by their quantity limits on contributions. Households signal their reliability by choosing which pool to join. In equilibrium, pools with lower quantity limits sell for a higher price, even though each household’s deliveries are the same at all pools. The Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance is included as a special case. We show that by recasting their hybrid oligopolistic-competitive story into our perfectly competitive framework, their separating equilibrium always exists (even when they say it doesn’t) and is unique.
Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach, Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler
Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach, Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A predictor is asked to rank eventualities according to their plausibility, based on past cases. We assume that she can form a ranking given any memory that consists of finitely many past cases. Mild consistency requirements on these rankings imply that they have a numerical representation via a matrix assigning numbers to eventuality-case pairs, as follows. Given a memory, each eventuality is ranked according to the sum of the numbers in its row, over cases in memory. The number attached to an eventuality-case pair can be interpreted as the degree of support that the past case lends to the plausibility …
Believe And Let Believe: Axiomatic Foundations For Belief Dependent Utility Functionals, Leeat Yariv
Believe And Let Believe: Axiomatic Foundations For Belief Dependent Utility Functionals, Leeat Yariv
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A large body of experimental data demonstrates that people’s beliefs influence their well-being beyond the indirect effect through the actions taken. I present a model that incorporates beliefs into an agent’s utility function. The paper provides axiomatic foundations for a special class of non-additive utility indices defined over infinite streams of beliefs and actions. I assume that: 1) there exists a (null) belief that does not have any effect on future preferences; 2) the agent has finite memory – only finite histories have an effect on current preferences; and 3) if the agent knows she will not be getting any …
Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We build a model of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signalling into general equilibrium. Pools are characterized by their quantity limits on contributions. Households signal their reliability by choosing which pool to join. In equilibrium, pools with lower quantity limits sell for a higher price, even though each household’s deliveries are the same at all pools. The Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance is included as a special case. We show that by recasting their hybrid oligopolistic-competitive story in our perfectly competitive framework, their separating equilibrium always exists (even when they say it doesn’t) and is unique.
On Fair Allocations And Indivisibilities, Ning Sun, Zaifu Yang
On Fair Allocations And Indivisibilities, Ning Sun, Zaifu Yang
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper studies the problem of how to distribute a set of indivisible objects with an amount M of money among a number of agents in a fair way. We allow any number of agents and objects. Objects can be desirable or undesirable and the amount of money can be negative as well. In case M is negative, it can be regarded as costs to be shared by the agents. The objects with the money will be completely distributed among the agents in a way that each agent gets a bundle with at most one object if there are more …
Equilibrium Selection In Global Games With Strategic Complementarities, David M. Frankel, Stephen Morris, Ady Pauzner
Equilibrium Selection In Global Games With Strategic Complementarities, David M. Frankel, Stephen Morris, Ady Pauzner
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for two player, two action games. The surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection.
Differentiated Products Demand Systems From A Combination Of Micro And Macro Data: The New Car Market, Steven T. Berry, James Levinsohn, Ariel Pakes
Differentiated Products Demand Systems From A Combination Of Micro And Macro Data: The New Car Market, Steven T. Berry, James Levinsohn, Ariel Pakes
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In this paper we provide an algorithm for estimating characteristic based demand models from alternative data sources, and apply it to new data on the market for passenger vehicles. We find that, provided care is taken in constructing the demand system and rich enough data are available, the characteristic based model can both rationalize existing results and provide realistic out of sample predictions.
The Optimal Concentration Of Creditors, Ivo Welch, Arturo Bris
The Optimal Concentration Of Creditors, Ivo Welch, Arturo Bris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
There are situations in which dispersed creditors (e.g., public creditors) have more difficulties and higher costs when collecting their claims in financial distress than concentrated creditors (e.g., banks). Under this assumption, our model predicts that measures of debt concentration relate [a] positively to creditors’ chosen aggregate debt collection expenditures; [b] positively to management’s chosen expenditures to avoid paying; [c] positively to total net litigation costs/waste in financial distress; and [d] positively to accomplished claim recovery by creditors (to which we present some preliminary favorable empirical evidence). Under additional assumptions, measures of debt concentration relate [e] positively to intrinsic firm quality; …
Inflationary Bias In A Simple Stochastic Economy, Ioannis Karatzas, Martin Shubik, William D. Sudderth, John Geanakoplos
Inflationary Bias In A Simple Stochastic Economy, Ioannis Karatzas, Martin Shubik, William D. Sudderth, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We construct explicit equilibria for strategic market games used to model an economy with fiat money, one nondurable commodity, countably many time- periods, and a continuum of agents. The total production of the commodity is a random variable that fluctuates from period to period. In each period, the agents receive equal endowments of the commodity, and sell them for cash in a market; their spending determines, endogenously, the price of the commodity. All agents have a common utility function, and seek to maximize their expected total discounted utility from consumption. Suppose an outside bank sets an interest rate rho for …
Higher-Order Improvements Of The Parametric Bootstrap For Markov Processes, Donald W.K. Andrews
Higher-Order Improvements Of The Parametric Bootstrap For Markov Processes, Donald W.K. Andrews
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper provides bounds on the errors in coverage probabilities of maximum likelihood-based, percentile- t , parametric bootstrap confidence intervals for Markov time series processes. These bounds show that the parametric bootstrap for Markov time series provides higher-order improvements (over confidence intervals based on first order asymptotics) that are comparable to those obtained by the parametric and nonparametric bootstrap for iid data and are better than those obtained by the block bootstrap for time series. Additional results are given for Wald-based confidence regions. The paper also shows that k -step parametric bootstrap confidence intervals achieve the same higher-order improvements as …
Comparing Wealth Effects: The Stock Market Versus The Housing Market, Karl E. Case, John M. Quigley, Robert J. Shiller
Comparing Wealth Effects: The Stock Market Versus The Housing Market, Karl E. Case, John M. Quigley, Robert J. Shiller
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We examine the link between increases in housing wealth, financial wealth, and consumer spending. We rely upon a panel of 14 countries observed annually for various periods during the past 25 years and a panel of U.S. states observed quarterly during the 1980s and 1990s. We impute the aggregate value of owner-occupied housing, the value of financial assets, and measures of aggregate consumption for each of the geographic units over time. We estimate regressions relating consumption to income and wealth measures, finding a statistically significant and rather large effect of housing wealth upon household consumption.
Information Structures In Optimal Auctions, Dirk Bergemann, Martin Pesendorfer
Information Structures In Optimal Auctions, Dirk Bergemann, Martin Pesendorfer
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the accuracy by which bidders learn their valuation and to whom to sell at what price. We establish that optimal information structures in an optimal auction exhibit a number of properties: (i) information structures can be represented by monotone partitions, (ii) the cardinality of each partition is finite, (iii) the partitions are asymmetric across agents. These properties imply that the optimal selling strategy of a seller can be …
The Progress Of Computing, William D. Nordhaus
The Progress Of Computing, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The present study analyzes computer performance over the last century and a half. Three results stand out. First, there has been a phenomenal increase in computer power over the twentieth century. Performance in constant dollars or in terms of labor units has improved since 1900 by a factor in the order of 1 trillion to 5 trillion, which represent compound growth rates of over 30 percent per year for a century. Second, there were relatively small improvements in efficiency (perhaps a factor of ten) in the century before World War II. Around World War II, however, there was a substantial …
Bootstrapping Spurious Regression, Peter C.B. Phillips
Bootstrapping Spurious Regression, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The bootstrap is shown to be inconsistent in spurious regression. The failure of the bootstrap is spectacular in that the bootstrap effectively turns a spurious regression into a cointegrating regression. In particular, the serial correlation coefficient of the residuals in the bootstrap regression does not converge to unity, so the bootstrap is not even first order consistent. The block bootstrap serial correlation coefficient does converge to unity and is therefore first order consistent, but has a slower rate of convergence and a different limit distribution from that of the sample data serial correlation coefficient. The analysis covers spurious regressions involving …
Fully Nonparametric Estimation Of Scalar Diffusion Models, Federico M. Bandi, Peter C.B. Phillips
Fully Nonparametric Estimation Of Scalar Diffusion Models, Federico M. Bandi, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We propose a functional estimation procedure for homogeneous stochastic differential equations based on a discrete sample of observations and with minimal requirements on the data generating process. We show how to identify the drift and diffusion function in situations where one or the other function is considered a nuisance parameter. The asymptotic behavior of the estimators is examined as the observation frequency increases and as the time span lengthens (that is, we implement both infill and long span asymptotics). We prove consistency and convergence to mixtures of normal laws, where the mixing variates depend on the chronological local time of …
A Cusum Test For Cointegration Using Regression Residuals, Zhijie Xiao, Peter C.B. Phillips
A Cusum Test For Cointegration Using Regression Residuals, Zhijie Xiao, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We show that the conventional CUSUM test for structural change can be applied to cointegrating regression residuals leading to a consistent residual based test for the null hypothesis of cointegration. The proposed tests are semiparametric and utilize fully modified residuals to correct for endogeneity and serial correlation and to scale out nuisance parameters. The limit distribution of the test is derived under both the null and the alternative hypothesis. The tests are easy to use and are found to perform quite well in a Monte Carlo experiment.
Value And Politics, John E. Roemer
Value And Politics, John E. Roemer
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A brief, historical review of the study of the interdependency between politics and economic distribution is offered. While the impact of economic interests on politics has been acknowledged for thousands of years, and the impact of politics on distribution for hundreds, it is only in the last thirty years that formal models of the interdependency between economic distribution and politics have been formulated. A general model of political-economic equilibrium is proposed, in which political competition and economic distribution jointly determine each other. Several examples are given. The author proposes that political economy, conceived of as studying this process of joint …
What We Owe Our Children, They Their Children, ..., John E. Roemer, Roberto Veneziani
What We Owe Our Children, They Their Children, ..., John E. Roemer, Roberto Veneziani
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Egalitarian theorists, since Rawls, have in the main advocated equalizing some objective measure of individual well-being, such as primary goods, functioning, or resources, rather than subjective welfare. This discussion, however, has assumed, implicitly, a static environment. By analyzing a society that survives for many generations, we demonstrate that equality of opportunity for some objective condition is incompatible with human development over time. We argue that this incompatibility can be resolved by equalizing opportunities for welfare. Thus, ‘subjectivism’ seems necessary if we are to hope for a society which can both equalize opportunities and support the development of human capacity over …
Nonlinear Instrumental Variable Estimation Of Autoregression, Peter C.B. Phillips, Joon Y. Park, Yoosoon Chang
Nonlinear Instrumental Variable Estimation Of Autoregression, Peter C.B. Phillips, Joon Y. Park, Yoosoon Chang
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Instrumental variable (IV) estimation methods that allow for certain nonlinear functions of the data as instruments are studied. The context of the discussion is the simple unit root model where certain advantages to the use of nonlinear instruments are revealed. In particular, certain classes of IV estimators and associated t -tests are shown to have simpler (standard) limit theory in contrast to the least squares estimator, providing an opportunity for the study of optimal estimation in certain IV classes and furnishing tests and confidence intervals that allow for unit root and stationary alternatives. The Cauchy estimator studied in recent work …
The Equity Premium Consensus Forecast Revisited, Ivo Welch
The Equity Premium Consensus Forecast Revisited, Ivo Welch
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the accuracy by which bidders learn their valuation and to whom to sell at what price. We establish that optimal information structures in an optimal auction exhibit a number of properties: (i) information structures can be represented by monotone partitions, (ii) the cardinality of each partition is finite, (iii) the partitions are asymmetric across agents. These properties imply that the optimal selling strategy of a seller can be …
Egalitarianism Against The Veil Of Ignorance, John E. Roemer
Egalitarianism Against The Veil Of Ignorance, John E. Roemer
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
J. Rawls and R. Dworkin have each used veils of ignorance to justify equality (Rawls) or to compute what equality entails (Dworkin). J. Harsanyi has also derived a distributive ethic from a veil of ignorance argument, which, although not egalitarian, is believed by Harsanyi to be not excessively inegalitarian. Harsanyi’s analysis does not determine a unique social choice function, but rather a family of such functions. Here, by appending more information to Harsanyi’s environment, and an Axiom of Neutrality, I uniquely determine a social welfare function by extending Harsanyi’s argument. I show that this function is strongly inegalitarian, in that …
Liquidity, Default And Crashes: Endogenous Contracts In General Equilibrium, John Geanakoplos
Liquidity, Default And Crashes: Endogenous Contracts In General Equilibrium, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The possibility of default limits available liquidity. If the potential default draws nearer, a liquidity crisis may ensue, causing a crash in asset prices, even if the probability of default barely changes, and even if no defaults subsequently materialize. Introducing default and limited collateral into general equilibrium theory (GE) allows for a theory of endogenous contracts, including endogenous margin requirements on loans. This in turn allows GE to explain liquidity and liquidity crises in equilibrium. A formal definition of liquidity is presented. When new information raises the probability and shortens the horizon over which a fixed income asset may default, …
A Practical Competitive Market Model For Indivisible Commodities, Zaifu Yang
A Practical Competitive Market Model For Indivisible Commodities, Zaifu Yang
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A general and practical competitive market model for trading indivisible goods is introduced. There are a group of buyers and a group of sellers, and several indivisible goods. Each buyer is initially endowed with a sufficient amount of money and each seller is endowed with several units of each indivisible good. Each buyer has reservation values over bundles of indivisible goods above which he will not buy and each seller has reservation values over bundles of his own indivisible goods below which he will not sell. Buyers and sellers’ preferences depend on the bundle of indivisible goods and the quantity …