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Full-Text Articles in Economics
Strategic Distinguishability And Robust Virtual Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Strategic Distinguishability And Robust Virtual Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents. A social choice function — mapping payoff type profiles to outcomes — can be robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every equilibrium on every type space achieves an outcome …
Strategic Distinguishability With An Application To Robust Virtual Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Strategic Distinguishability With An Application To Robust Virtual Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents. A social choice function — mapping payoff type profiles to outcomes — can be robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every equilibrium on every type space achieves an outcome …
Robust Virtual Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Robust Virtual Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two payoff types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents. A social choice function — mapping payoff type profiles to outcomes — can be robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every equilibrium on every type space achieves an …