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Full-Text Articles in Economics
Belief Free Incomplete Information Games, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Belief Free Incomplete Information Games, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We consider the following belief free solution concepts for games with incomplete information: (i) incomplete information rationalizability, (ii) incomplete information correlated equilibrium and (iii) ex post equilibrium. We present epistemic foundations for these solution concepts and establish relationships between them. The properties of these solution concepts are further developed in supermodular games and potential games.
The Role Of The Common Prior In Robust Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
The Role Of The Common Prior In Robust Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in an environment with interdependent values. Specifically, we investigate a model of public good provision which allows for negative and positive informational externalities. In the corresponding direct mechanism, the agents’ reporting strategies are strategic complements with negative informational externalities and strategic substitutes with positive informational externalities. We derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for robust implementation in common prior type spaces and contrast this with our earlier results without the common prior. In the case of strategic complements the necessary and sufficient conditions for robust implementation do not depend …
Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki
Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the marginal contribution mechanism, the ex post incentive and ex post participations constraints are satisfied for all agents after all histories. It is the unique mechanism satisfying ex post incentive, ex post participation and efficient exit conditions. We develop the marginal contribution mechanism in detail for a sequential auction of a single object in which each bidders learn over …