Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Economics
Belief Free Incomplete Information Games, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Belief Free Incomplete Information Games, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We consider the following belief free solution concepts for games with incomplete information: (i) incomplete information rationalizability, (ii) incomplete information correlated equilibrium and (iii) ex post equilibrium. We present epistemic foundations for these solution concepts and establish relationships between them. The properties of these solution concepts are further developed in supermodular games and potential games.
The Role Of The Common Prior In Robust Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
The Role Of The Common Prior In Robust Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in an environment with interdependent values. Specifically, we investigate a model of public good provision which allows for negative and positive informational externalities. In the corresponding direct mechanism, the agents’ reporting strategies are strategic complements with negative informational externalities and strategic substitutes with positive informational externalities. We derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for robust implementation in common prior type spaces and contrast this with our earlier results without the common prior. In the case of strategic complements the necessary and sufficient conditions for robust implementation do not depend …
Strategic Distinguishability And Robust Virtual Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Strategic Distinguishability And Robust Virtual Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents. A social choice function — mapping payoff type profiles to outcomes — can be robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every equilibrium on every type space achieves an outcome …
Strategic Distinguishability With An Application To Robust Virtual Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Strategic Distinguishability With An Application To Robust Virtual Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents. A social choice function — mapping payoff type profiles to outcomes — can be robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every equilibrium on every type space achieves an outcome …
Robust Virtual Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Robust Virtual Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two payoff types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents. A social choice function — mapping payoff type profiles to outcomes — can be robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every equilibrium on every type space achieves an …
An Ascending Auction For Interdependent Values: Uniqueness And Robustness To Strategic Uncertainty, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
An Ascending Auction For Interdependent Values: Uniqueness And Robustness To Strategic Uncertainty, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We consider an single object auction environment with interdependent valuations and a generalized Vickrey–Clark–Groves allocation mechanism that allocates the object almost efficiently in a strict ex post equilibrium. If there is a significant amount of interdependence, there are multiple rationalizable outcomes of this direct mechanism and any other mechanism that allocates the object almost efficiently. This is true whether the agents know about each others’ payoff types or not. We consider an ascending price dynamic version of the generalized VCG mechanism. When there is complete information among the agents of their payoff types, we show that the almost efficient allocation …