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SelectedWorks

1996

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Articles 1 - 14 of 14

Full-Text Articles in Economics

The Posner Argument For Transferring Health Spending From Old Women To Old Men, Eric Bennett Rasmusen Dec 1996

The Posner Argument For Transferring Health Spending From Old Women To Old Men, Eric Bennett Rasmusen

Eric Bennett Rasmusen

Richard Posner suggests several arguments for increasing health care spending on males and reducing it on females in his book Aging and Old Age. I offer a new formalization of his verbal argument.

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Stigma And Self-Fulfilling Expectations Of Criminality, Eric Bennett Rasmusen Oct 1996

Stigma And Self-Fulfilling Expectations Of Criminality, Eric Bennett Rasmusen

Eric Bennett Rasmusen

In modelling crime, economists have focussed on the expected cost of government sanctions to the criminal, but private sanctions--- notably economic or social stigma--- may be just as important. In the model here, workers decide whether to commit crimes and employers decide how much to pay ex- convicts. In one equilibrium, individuals refrain from crime and economic stigma--- the wage loss from conviction--- is high. In a second, pareto- inferior equilibrium, individuals commit crimes and stigma is low, because employers realize that nonconviction does not imply noncriminality. The model may help to explain large shifts in crime, such as that …

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Review Of Competition, Commitment, And Welfare By Kotaro Suzumura, Eric Bennett Rasmusen Sep 1996

Review Of Competition, Commitment, And Welfare By Kotaro Suzumura, Eric Bennett Rasmusen

Eric Bennett Rasmusen

A short review of a book on oligopoly theory.

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Economics Of Time And Ignorance: 1996 Intro Survey, Mario Rizzo Sep 1996

Economics Of Time And Ignorance: 1996 Intro Survey, Mario Rizzo

Mario Rizzo

This is a review of the developments in Austrian-subjectivist economics during the period 1985-1996 from the perspective of the themes developed in the first-edition of "The Economics of Time and Ignorance." It is also a concise statement of a modern understanding of the classic ideas of Austrian economics with a view to seeing their connection to a broader set of perspectives in economics. (The version available here is the final draft of the text available in the book published by Routledge. This is available from Routledge as an e-book or from various Amazon.com sellers.)

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Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, And Optimal Investment, Aaron S. Edlin, Stefan J. Reichelstein Jun 1996

Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, And Optimal Investment, Aaron S. Edlin, Stefan J. Reichelstein

Aaron Edlin

In bilateral trading problems, the parties may be hesitant to make relationship-specific investments without adequate contractual protection. We postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing, and can freely renegotiate them after information about the desirability of trade is revealed. We find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages. Moreover, specific performance can induce both parties to invest efficiently if a separability condition holds. Expectation damages, on the other hand, is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems.

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The Genetic-Causal Tradition And Modern Economic Theory, Mario Rizzo Feb 1996

The Genetic-Causal Tradition And Modern Economic Theory, Mario Rizzo

Mario Rizzo

This paper is an analysis of a specific tradition of causal thinking in economics: the genetic-causal tradition. This was most self-consciously developed in the work of the Austrian School, but spilled over into other approaches. Genetic-causal explanations place emphasis, inter alia, on processes in time, emanating from changes in agents' desires and beliefs. The authors present a brief history of this approach, outline its major characteristics, differentiate genetic-causal explanation from other kinds of explanation, and illustrate the approach in mid and late-twentieth century economic theory

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How Charitable Organizations Influence Federal Tax Policy: "Rent-Seeking" Charities Or Virtuous Politicians?, Nancy J. Knauer Jan 1996

How Charitable Organizations Influence Federal Tax Policy: "Rent-Seeking" Charities Or Virtuous Politicians?, Nancy J. Knauer

Nancy J. Knauer

Tax-exempt charitable organizations exert considerable influence over Congress, the Department of the Treasury, and the Internal Revenue Service in matters dealing with exemption from federal income tax and the tax deductibility of charitable contributions. This Article uses both public choice and public interest analysis to help identify various features of the charitable community and explain how exempt organizations weild political influence despite the restrictions placed on their activities under the tax code. Arguing that the influence of charitable organizations over tax policy can be explained from either a public choice or public interest vantage point, the Article concluds that the …

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Product Differentiation, Uncertainty And The Stability Of Collusion, Michael Raith Jan 1996

Product Differentiation, Uncertainty And The Stability Of Collusion, Michael Raith

Michael Raith

The conventional view that product heterogeneity limits the scope for collusion among oligopolists has been challenged in recent theoretical work. This paper provides an argument in support of the conventional view by emphasising the role of uncertainty. I introduce the idea that, with stochastic demand, an increase in the heterogeneity of products leads to a decrease in the correlation of the firms’ demand shocks. With imperfect monitoring, this makes collusion more difficult to sustain, as discriminating between random demand shocks and marginal deviations from the cartel strategy becomes more difficult. These effects are illustrated within a Hotelling-type duopoly model.

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Spatial Retail Markets With Commuting Consumers, Michael Raith Jan 1996

Spatial Retail Markets With Commuting Consumers, Michael Raith

Michael Raith

In this paper we analyse a model of spatial competition with commuting consumers due to Claycombe (1991, International Journal of Industrial Organization 9, 303-313). We show that results different from Claycombe's are obtained if a rigorous game-theoretic analysis is applied to the model. Our results provide a theoretical basis for a later study carried out by Claycombe and Mahan (1993, International Journal of Industrial Organization 11,283-291) and lead to predictions which are in line with the empirical results of that later study. For small commuting distances (relative to the distance between firms), there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which the …

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A General Model Of Information Sharing In Oligopoly, Michael Raith Jan 1996

A General Model Of Information Sharing In Oligopoly, Michael Raith

Michael Raith

Under which conditions do oligopolists have an incentive to share private information about a stochastic demand or stochastic costs? We present a general model which encompasses virtually all models of the existing literature on information sharing as special cases. Within this unifying framework we show that in contrast to the apparent inconclusiveness of previous results some simple principles determining the incentives to share information can be obtained. Existing results are generalized, some previous interpretations are questioned, and new explanations offered, leading to a single general theory for a large class of models. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers C72, C73, …

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Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action At The Fcc Increased Auction Competition, Peter Cramton, Ian Ayres Jan 1996

Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action At The Fcc Increased Auction Competition, Peter Cramton, Ian Ayres

Peter Cramton

In recent auctions for paging licenses, the Federal Communications Commission has granted businesses owned by minorities and women substantial bidding credits. In this article, Professors Ayres and Cramton analyze a particular auction and argue that the affirmative action bidding preferences, by increasing competition among auction participants, increased the government’s revenue by $45 million. Subsidizing the participation of new bidders can induce established bidders to bid more aggressively. The authors conclude that this revenue-enhancing effect does not provide a sufficient constitutional justification for affirmative action—but when such justification is independently present, affirmative actions can cost the government much less than is …

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Business Cycle And Structural Time Series: Warnings And Hints, Riccardo Fiorito Jan 1996

Business Cycle And Structural Time Series: Warnings And Hints, Riccardo Fiorito

riccardo fiorito

Structural time-series model can help reconcile business cycle analysis with basic economic theory assumptions

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Some Syntactic, Semantic And Prosodic Characteristics In British English Conversation, Philadelphia University Jan 1996

Some Syntactic, Semantic And Prosodic Characteristics In British English Conversation, Philadelphia University

Philadelphia University, Jordan

No abstract provided.

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Rising Temperatures: Rising Tides, Prof. Elizabeth Burleson Jan 1996

Rising Temperatures: Rising Tides, Prof. Elizabeth Burleson

Prof. Elizabeth Burleson

Transboundary environmental problems do not distinguish between political boundaries. Global warming is expected to cause thermal expansion of water and melt glaciers. Both are predicted to lead to a rise in sea level. We must enlarge our paradigms to encompass a global reality and reliance upon global participation.

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