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Full-Text Articles in Economics

Abmscore: A Heuristic Algorithm For Forming Strategic Coalitions In Agent-Based Simulation, Andrew J. Collins, Gayane Grigoryan Jan 2024

Abmscore: A Heuristic Algorithm For Forming Strategic Coalitions In Agent-Based Simulation, Andrew J. Collins, Gayane Grigoryan

Engineering Management & Systems Engineering Faculty Publications

Integrating human behavior into agent-based models has been challenging due to its diversity. An example is strategic coalition formation, which occurs when an individual decides to collaborate with others because it strategically benefits them, thereby increasing the expected utility of the situation. An algorithm called ABMSCORE was developed to help model strategic coalition formation in agent-based models. The ABMSCORE algorithm employs hedonic games from cooperative game theory and has been applied to various situations, including refugee egress and smallholder farming cooperatives. This paper discusses ABMSCORE, including its mechanism, requirements, limitations, and application. To demonstrate the potential of ABMSCORE, a new …


Hedonic Games And Monte Carlo Simulation, Sheida Etemadidavan, Andrew J. Collins Jan 2020

Hedonic Games And Monte Carlo Simulation, Sheida Etemadidavan, Andrew J. Collins

Engineering Management & Systems Engineering Faculty Publications

Hedonic games have applications in economics and multi-agent systems where the grouping preferences of an individual is important. Hedonic games look at coalition formation, amongst the players, where players have a preference relation over all the coalition. Hedonic games are also known as coalition formation games, and they are a form of a cooperative game with a non-transferrable utility game. Some examples of hedonic games are stable marriage, stable roommate, and hospital/residence problem. The study of hedonic games is driven by understanding what coalition structures will be stable, i.e., given a coalition structure, no players have an incentive to deviate …


Financing Strategies Of The R & D Firm, Lawrence Fogelberg, John M, Griffith Jan 2005

Financing Strategies Of The R & D Firm, Lawrence Fogelberg, John M, Griffith

Finance Faculty Publications

This paper investigates the financing strategies of the R&D firm. Our hypotheses are based on Cho's (1992) game theory model where the firm develops a product but needs additional financing to bring it to market. The model generates a particularly rich set of hypotheses: 1) to fund the completion of its project and bring its product to market, the firm initiates negotiations with an established firm; 2) the majority of the acquisitions will be partial cash acquisitions through private secondary offerings. Confirming the model's hypotheses, we find that the majority of the acquisitions are partial cash acquisitions by significantly larger …