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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Economics
When Does Csr Payoff?, John A. Doukas, Rongyao Zhang
When Does Csr Payoff?, John A. Doukas, Rongyao Zhang
Finance Faculty Publications
We investigate whether firms engaging in corporate social responsibility (CSR) can preserve firm value during normal and unprecedented exogenous adverse events. Our evidence shows, in regular times, a negative relation between CSR engagement and firm value, but under adverse economic conditions, CSR protects firm value by decreasing firm risks. We also find that firms with high managerial attributes engage in greater CSR activities that benefit shareholders in both normal and aberrant financial times. Despite the controversy surrounding CSR, our evidence points out that CSR can be viewed as a set of intangible assets that can improve firm value across good …
What Influences The Changes In Reit Ceo Compensation? Evidence From Panel Data, John M. Griffith, Mohammad Najand, H. Shelton Weeks
What Influences The Changes In Reit Ceo Compensation? Evidence From Panel Data, John M. Griffith, Mohammad Najand, H. Shelton Weeks
Finance Faculty Publications
This study examines what influences the changes in REIT CEO compensation using the following performance measures: average three-year total returns to shareholders, market value added, Tobin's q, and change in funds from operations. The impact of managerial power on the change in compensation is also examined. The empirical evidence indicates that firm performance and size do not influence the change in CEO salary, while risk, tenure, title, ownership, and age have significant impacts. Bonuses are not influenced by risk, size, or CEO power; however, they are influenced by performance. Option awards are affected by performance and CEO power.
Do Analysts Influence Corporate Financing And Investment?, John A. Doukas, Chansog (Francis) Kim, Christos Pantzalis
Do Analysts Influence Corporate Financing And Investment?, John A. Doukas, Chansog (Francis) Kim, Christos Pantzalis
Finance Faculty Publications
We examine whether abnormal analyst coverage influences the external financing and investment decisions of the firm. Controlling for self-selection bias in analysts' excessive coverage, we find that firms with high (low) analyst coverage consistently engage in higher (lower) external financing than do their industry peers of similar size. Our evidence also demonstrates that firms with excessive analyst coverage overinvest and realize lower future returns than do firms with low analyst coverage. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts favor the coverage of firms that have the potential to engage in profitable investment-banking business.
Real Estate Mutual Funds: A Style Analysis, Crystal Lin, Kenneth Yung
Real Estate Mutual Funds: A Style Analysis, Crystal Lin, Kenneth Yung
Finance Faculty Publications
We find that the characteristics of real estate related securities are different from those of the general common equities. To help investors understand better the products offered by real estate mutual funds, we develop style descriptors that are specifically created for real estate related securities. Among the universe of real estate securities, we find real estate funds tilt toward large stocks and favor growth moderately over value. Growth managers outperform value mangers in this sector by 1.51% to 2.30% per year. However, there is evidence of shifts in the investment style among the funds. Our results help investors in evaluating …
Divergent Opinions And Value Stock Performance, John A. Doukas
Divergent Opinions And Value Stock Performance, John A. Doukas
Finance Faculty Publications
Those who believe that capital markets—that is, markets for stocks and bonds—operate efficiently and asset prices fully reflect all publicly available information are engaged in an ongoing debate about the exact interpretation of the “value premium” with those who reject this view. Value premium refers to the superior returns generated by the purchase of value stocks relative to growth, or glamour, stocks. Rationalists, the group believing in market efficiency, argue that because value stocks are fundamentally riskier than growth stocks, the value premium is compensation for bearing risk. Behavioralists, the group arguing that market asset prices don’t reflect all publicly …
Financing Strategies Of The R & D Firm, Lawrence Fogelberg, John M, Griffith
Financing Strategies Of The R & D Firm, Lawrence Fogelberg, John M, Griffith
Finance Faculty Publications
This paper investigates the financing strategies of the R&D firm. Our hypotheses are based on Cho's (1992) game theory model where the firm develops a product but needs additional financing to bring it to market. The model generates a particularly rich set of hypotheses: 1) to fund the completion of its project and bring its product to market, the firm initiates negotiations with an established firm; 2) the majority of the acquisitions will be partial cash acquisitions through private secondary offerings. Confirming the model's hypotheses, we find that the majority of the acquisitions are partial cash acquisitions by significantly larger …