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Full-Text Articles in Economics

Committee Design With Endogenous Participation, Volker Hahn Dec 2016

Committee Design With Endogenous Participation, Volker Hahn

Volker Hahn

We analyze different committee designs in a model with the endogenous participation of experts who have private information about their own abilities. Each committee design involves a test of abilities whose accuracy influences experts’ decisions to participate. We derive the following findings. First, higher wages lead to lower quality experts. Second, an increase in transparency improves the quality of experts on the committee. Third, larger committees attract less able experts than smaller ones, unless the committee operates under full transparency. Fourth, we derive the properties of optimal committees. They involve low wages and can be transparent or opaque.

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A Model Of The Impact Of Reimbursement Schemes On Health Plan Choice, Emmett Keeler, Grace Carter, Joseph Newhouse May 1998

A Model Of The Impact Of Reimbursement Schemes On Health Plan Choice, Emmett Keeler, Grace Carter, Joseph Newhouse

Emmett Keeler

Flat capitation (uniform prospective payments) makes enrolling healthy enrollees profitable to health plans. Plans with relatively generous benefits may attract the sick and fail through a premium spiral. We simulate a model of idealized managed competition to explore the effect on market performance of alternatives to flat capitation such as severity-adjusted capitation and reduced supply-side cost-sharing. In our model flat capitation causes severe market problems. Severity adjustment and to a lesser extent reduced supply-side cost-sharing improve market performance, but outcomes are efficient only in cases in which people bear the marginal costs of their choices.

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