Economics Commons^™

Collusive Bidding In The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz

Jesse A. Schwartz

This paper describes the bid signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. Bidders in these auctions bid on numerous spectrum licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to raise the bid on any license. Simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. This “code bidding” occurs when one bidder tags the last few digits of its bid with the market number of a related license. We examine how extensively bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids …

The Existence Of Gender-Specific Promotion Standards In The U.S., Kathy Paulson Gjerde

Kathy A. Paulson Gjerde

This paper is motivated by the claim that promotion probabilities are lower for women than men. Using data from the 1984 and 1989 National Longitudinal Youth Surveys, this paper tests this claim and two related hypotheses concerning training and ability. It is found that females are less likely to be promoted than males, and females receive less training than males. The relationship between promotion and gender varies across occupations, however, suggesting that the alleged glass ceiling faced by women and other minorities in the workplace is not uniform across all labor markets.

Note: Link is to the article in a …

Quantity Over Quality, Darius Lakdawalla

Darius N. Lakdawalla

No abstract provided.

Follow The Market's Cues, Peter Navarro

PETER NAVARRO

No abstract provided.

Toward A Total-Cost Approach To Environmental Instrument Choice, Peter Grossman, Daniel Cole

Peter Z. Grossman

Note: full-text not available due to publisher restrictions. Link takes you to an external site where you can locate the article at your local library.

Evolution Of Social Behavior: Individual And Group Selection, Ted Bergstrom

Ted C Bergstrom

How selfish does our evolutionary history suggest that humans will be? We explore models in which groups are formed and dissolved and where reproduction of individuals is determined by their payoffs in a game played within groups. If groups are formed ``randomly'' and reproductive success of group founders is determined by a multi-person prisoners' dilemma game, then selfish behavior will prevail over maximization of group payoffs. However, interesting models exist in which ``group selection'' sustains cooperative behavior. Forces that support cooperative behavior include assortative matching in groups, group longevity, and punishment-based group norms.

The Journal Literature Of International Economics, Jorge Gonzalez, Joe Davis, Debra Patterson

Jorge Gonzalez

No abstract provided.

Practical Issues In Adopting Inflation Targeting In Croatia, Leo Bonato

Leo Bonato

No abstract provided.

The Meaning Of Property Rights: Law Versus Economics?, D. Cole, Peter Grossman

Peter Z. Grossman