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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Economics
When Second Comes First: Correcting Patent’S Poor Secondary Incentives Through An Optional Patent Purchase System, Jordan Barry
When Second Comes First: Correcting Patent’S Poor Secondary Incentives Through An Optional Patent Purchase System, Jordan Barry
ExpressO
As research has advanced, technologies have become more closely knit, and the relationships between them—both complementary and competitive—have become increasingly important. Unfortunately, the patent system’s use of monopoly power to reward innovators creates inefficient results by overly encouraging the development of substitute technologies and discouraging the development of complementary technologies. This paper explains how an optional patent purchase system could help ameliorate such problems and discusses the implications of such a system.
Restraints On Innovation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Restraints On Innovation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Beginning with the work of Joseph Schumpeter in the 1940s and later elaborated by Robert W. Solow's work on the neoclassical growth model, economics has produced a strong consensus that the economic gains from innovation dwarf those to be had from capital accumulation and increased price competition. An important but sometimes overlooked corollary is that restraints on innovation can do far more harm to the economy than restraints on traditional output or pricing. Many practices that violate the antitrust laws are best understood as restraints on innovation rather than restraints on pricing.
While antitrust models for assessing losses that result …
Mandating Access To Telecom And The Internet: The Hidden Side Of Trinko, Daniel F. Spulber, Christopher S. Yoo
Mandating Access To Telecom And The Internet: The Hidden Side Of Trinko, Daniel F. Spulber, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust has long played a major role in telecommunications policy, demonstrated most dramatically by the equal access mandate imposed during the breakup of AT&T. In this Article we explore the extent to which antitrust can continue to serve as a source of access mandates following the Supreme Court's 2004 Trinko decision. Although Trinko sharply criticized access remedies and antitrust courts' ability to enforce them, it is not yet clear whether future courts will interpret the opinion as barring all antitrust access claims. Even more importantly, the opinion contains language hinting at possible bases for differentiating among different types of access, …
Keeping The Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu And Christopher Yoo Debate, Tim Wu, Christopher S. Yoo
Keeping The Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu And Christopher Yoo Debate, Tim Wu, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
"Net neutrality" has been among the leading issues of telecommunications policy this decade. Is the neutrality of the Internet fundamental to its success, and worth regulating to protect, or simply a technical design subject to improvement? In this debate-form commentary, Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo make clear the connection between net neutrality and broader issues of national telecommunications policy.