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Political Economy

Selected Works

2017

Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Economics

Crop Residues: The Rest Of The Story, Douglas L. Karlen, Rattan Lal, Ronald F. Follett, John M. Kimble, Jerry L. Hatfield, John A. Miranowski, Cynthia A. Cambardella, Andrew Manale, Robert P. Anex, Charles W. Rice Jun 2017

Crop Residues: The Rest Of The Story, Douglas L. Karlen, Rattan Lal, Ronald F. Follett, John M. Kimble, Jerry L. Hatfield, John A. Miranowski, Cynthia A. Cambardella, Andrew Manale, Robert P. Anex, Charles W. Rice

Douglas L Karlen

Synopsis In the February 15, 2009 issue of ES&T Strand and Benford argued that oceanic deposition of agricultural crop residues was a viable option for net carbon sequestration (43 [4], 1000−1007). In reviewing the calculations and bringing their experience to bear, Karlen et al. argue in this Viewpoint that crop residue oceanic permanent sequestration (CROPS) as envisioned by Strand and Benford will not work. They further propose alternative possibilities in agricultural methods to achieve a net decrease of CO2 emissions.

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Behavioral Public Choice And The Law, Gary M. Lucas Jr., Slaviša Tasić Mar 2017

Behavioral Public Choice And The Law, Gary M. Lucas Jr., Slaviša Tasić

Gary M. Lucas Jr.

Behavioral public choice is the study of irrationality among political actors. In this context, irrationality means systematic bias, a deviation from rational expectations, or other departure from economists’ conception of rationality. Behavioral public choice scholars extend the insights of behavioral economics to the political realm and show that irrational behavior is an important source of government failure. This Article makes an original contribution to the legal literature by systematically reviewing the findings of behavioral public choice and explaining their implications for the law and legal institutions. We discuss the various biases and heuristics that lead political actors to support and …

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Anatomy Of Foreign Aid To Ethiopia- 1960-2014.Pdf, Adugna Lemi Jan 2017

Anatomy Of Foreign Aid To Ethiopia- 1960-2014.Pdf, Adugna Lemi

Adugna Lemi

No abstract provided.

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The Unexpected Effects Of Criminal Violence Along The Mexico-Texas Border, Gaspare M. Genna Dec 2016

The Unexpected Effects Of Criminal Violence Along The Mexico-Texas Border, Gaspare M. Genna

Gaspare M Genna

The violence and insecurity that Mexico suffered during former
President Calderon’s war on the Mexican drug cartels have
come at a grave economic cost to many cities. The criminal
violence had an impact on interdependent borderlands, which
are geographic areas that have a symbiotic link between cities
and communities of adjoining territories. Mexican business
people and consumers that live in cities along the shared
border with the United States have the ability to shift their
economic transactions away from their insecure environments
and to US border communities. In addition, US residents that
would normally travel south for economic transactions would …

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Committee Design With Endogenous Participation, Volker Hahn Dec 2016

Committee Design With Endogenous Participation, Volker Hahn

Volker Hahn

We analyze different committee designs in a model with the endogenous participation of experts who have private information about their own abilities. Each committee design involves a test of abilities whose accuracy influences experts’ decisions to participate. We derive the following findings. First, higher wages lead to lower quality experts. Second, an increase in transparency improves the quality of experts on the committee. Third, larger committees attract less able experts than smaller ones, unless the committee operates under full transparency. Fourth, we derive the properties of optimal committees. They involve low wages and can be transparent or opaque.

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Conservatism And Switcher's Curse, Aaron Edlin Dec 2016

Conservatism And Switcher's Curse, Aaron Edlin

Aaron Edlin

This paper formally models the virtues of Edmund Burke's conservatism, characterizes the optimal level of conservatism, and applies the model to management, law, and policy.  I begin by introducing ``switcher's curse,'' a trap in which a decision maker systematically switches too often. Decision makers suffer from switcher's curse if they forget the reason that they maintained incumbent policies in the past and if they naively compare rival and incumbent policies with no bias for incumbent policies.   Conservatism emerges as a heuristic to avoid switcher's curse. The longer a process or policy has been in place, the more conservative one …

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