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Full-Text Articles in Economics
Social Norms And Dishonesty Across Societies, Diego Aycinena, Lucas Rentschler, Benjamin Beranek, Jonathan F. Schulz
Social Norms And Dishonesty Across Societies, Diego Aycinena, Lucas Rentschler, Benjamin Beranek, Jonathan F. Schulz
ESI Publications
Social norms have long been recognized as an important factor in curtailing antisocial behavior, and stricter prosocial norms are commonly associated with increased prosocial behavior. In this study, we provide evidence that very strict prosocial norms can have a perverse negative relationship with prosocial behavior. In laboratory experiments conducted in 10 countries across 5 continents, we measured the level of honest behavior and elicited injunctive norms of honesty. We find that individuals who hold very strict norms (i.e., those who perceive a small lie to be as socially unacceptable as a large lie) are more likely to lie to the …
Agency, Benevolence And Justice, Prithvijit Mukherjee, J. Dustin Tracy
Agency, Benevolence And Justice, Prithvijit Mukherjee, J. Dustin Tracy
ESI Working Papers
We test for social norms regarding how Agents should select between risky prospects for Principals, including norms consistent with observations by Adam Smith. We elicit norms from subjects serving as ``impartial spectator[s]" about the choice of risky prospects selected by the Agents. We find strong evidence for the existence of norms, consistent with Smith's observations. Furthermore, we find that Agents are more likely to select more normative options. In contrast, we find that Principals' allocation for bonuses depends on the realization of the risky prospect rather than whether the Agents' choice was consistent with the norm.
Data For "Agency, Benevolence And Justice", Prithvijit Mukherjee, J. Dustin Tracy
Data For "Agency, Benevolence And Justice", Prithvijit Mukherjee, J. Dustin Tracy
ESI Data Sets
We test for social norms regarding how agents should select between risky prospects for principals, including norms consistent with beneficence and justice propositions from Adam Smith. We elicit norms from subjects serving as "impartial spectator[s]" about choice of risky prospect selected by the agents. We find strong evidence for the existence of norms, consistent with the Smith propositions. Furthermore we find that agents are more likely to select more normative options. In contrast, we find that principals' allocation for bonuses depends on the realization of the risky prospect rather than whether the agents choice was consistent with the norm.