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Full-Text Articles in Economics
Macroeconomic Fluctuations As Sources Of Luck In Ceo Compensation, Hsin-Hui Chiu, Lars Oxelheim, Clas Wihlborg, Jianhua Zhang
Macroeconomic Fluctuations As Sources Of Luck In Ceo Compensation, Hsin-Hui Chiu, Lars Oxelheim, Clas Wihlborg, Jianhua Zhang
Business Faculty Articles and Research
Macroeconomic fluctuations in interest rates, exchange rates, and inflation can be considered sources of good or bad “luck” for corporate performance if management is unable to adjust operations to these fluctuations. Based on a sample of 2,091 US firms, we decompose the impacts of macroeconomic fluctuations on three measures of CEO compensation. Our study provides empirical support for the importance of considering macroeconomic fluctuations in designing CEO incentive schemes. It adds to the managerial power literature on moral hazard and CEO compensation by pinpointing the obvious risk that the CEO in an asymmetric and non-linear reward system will be inclined …
The Nonlinear Price Fynamics Of Us Equity Etfs, Gunduz Caginalp, Mark Desantis, Akin Sayrak
The Nonlinear Price Fynamics Of Us Equity Etfs, Gunduz Caginalp, Mark Desantis, Akin Sayrak
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We investigate the price dynamics of large market-capitalization U.S. equity exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in order to uncover trader motivations and strategy. We show that prices of highly liquid ETFs can deviate significantly from their daily net asset values. By adjusting for changes in valuations, we report the impact of non-classical variables including price trend and volatility using data from 2008 to 2011. We find a cubic nonlinearity in the trend suggesting that traders are not only aware of the underreaction of others, but also self-optimize by anticipating others' reactions, and sell when the uptrend is stronger than usual.
Game-Theoretic Foundations Of Monetary Equilibrium, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré
Game-Theoretic Foundations Of Monetary Equilibrium, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
According to theory, money supports trade in a world without enforcement and, in particular, in large societies, where gift-exchange is unsustainable. It is demonstrated that, in fact, monetary equilibrium breaks down in the absence of adequate enforcement institutions and it collapses as societies that lack external enforcement grow large. This unique result is derived by unveiling the existence of a tacit enforcement assumption in the literature that explains the advantages from monetary exchange, and by integrating monetary theory with the theory of repeated games and social norms.
Understanding The Distributional Impact Of Long-Run Inflation, Gabriele Camera, Yili Chen
Understanding The Distributional Impact Of Long-Run Inflation, Gabriele Camera, Yili Chen
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
The impact of fully anticipated inflation is systematically studied in heterogeneous agent economies with an endogenous labor supply and portfolio choices. In stationary equilibrium, inflation nonlinearly alters the endogenous distributions of income, wealth, and consumption. Small departures from zero inflation have the strongest impact. Three features determine how inflation impacts distributions and welfare: financial structure, shock persistence, and labor supply elasticity. When agents can self-insure only with money, inflation reduces wealth inequality but may raise consumption inequality. Otherwise, inflation reduces consumption inequality but may raise wealth inequality. Given persistent shocks and an inelastic labor supply, inflation may raise average welfare. …
The Coordination Value Of Monetary Exchange: Experimental Evidence, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
The Coordination Value Of Monetary Exchange: Experimental Evidence, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
What institutions can sustain cooperation in groups of strangers? Here we study the role of monetary systems. In an experiment, subjects sometimes needed help and sometimes could incur a cost to help an anonymous counterpart. In the absence of money, the intertemporal exchange of help, which could be supported by a norm of community punishment of defectors, did not emerge. Introducing intrinsically worthless tokens substantially altered patterns of behavior. Monetary trade emerged, which increased predictability of play and promoted cooperation when strangers could trade help for a token.