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Full-Text Articles in Economics
Individually Rational Buyback Contracts With Inventory Level Dependent Demand, Lokendra Devagan, R K Amit, Peeyush Mehta, Sanjeev Swami, Kripa Shanker
Individually Rational Buyback Contracts With Inventory Level Dependent Demand, Lokendra Devagan, R K Amit, Peeyush Mehta, Sanjeev Swami, Kripa Shanker
R K Amit
In this paper, we consider a supply chain coordination problem when demand faced by a retailer is influenced by the amount of inventory displayed on the retail shelf. We assume that shelf space inventory is used as one of the levers to stimulate demand. Our objective in this research is to design individually rational contracts that coordinate the supply chain when the retailer faces inventory-level-dependent demand. We consider a buyback contract where any leftover inventory at the retailer can be returned to the supplier at a pre-specified terms of the buyback contract. The existing buyback contracts in the supply chain …
A Relational Contract For Water Demand Management, R K Amit, Parthasarathy Ramachandran
A Relational Contract For Water Demand Management, R K Amit, Parthasarathy Ramachandran
R K Amit
For necessary goods like water, under supply constraints, fairness considerations lead to negative externalities. The objective of this paper is to design an infinite horizon contract or relational contract (a type of long-term contract) that ensures self-enforcing (instead of court-enforced) behaviour by the agents to mitigate the externality due to fairness issues. In this contract, the consumer is induced to consume at firm-supply level using the threat of higher fair price for future time periods. The pricing mechanism, computed in this paper, internalizes the externality and is shown to be economically efficient and provides revenue sufficiency.
Aspects Of Exchangeability In The Shapley Value, R K. Amit, Parthasarathy Ramachandran
Aspects Of Exchangeability In The Shapley Value, R K. Amit, Parthasarathy Ramachandran
R K Amit
This paper characterizes the aspects of exchangeability in the Shapley value. We show that, in the Shapley value, each player’s prospects of joining a t-player game as the last member of the game is a moment sequence of the uniform distribution. We prove that, with finite exchangeability, the Shapley value is the only value in which the probability assignment is a unique mixture of independent and identically distributed probabilities. We also derive the Shapley value using the de Finetti’s theorem.
Repeated Contracts For Supply Chain Coordination: A Review And Future Directions, R K Amit, Peeyush Mehta
Repeated Contracts For Supply Chain Coordination: A Review And Future Directions, R K Amit, Peeyush Mehta
R K Amit
Supply chain coordination with contracts has emerged as one of the key strategies to reduce the inefficiencies arising from conflicting objectives of agents in a supply chain. In this paper, we critically analyze the literature on repeated contracts that are designed for mitigating inefficiencies in supply chains. We also provide some directions for future research in repeated contracts for supply chain coordination.
Optimal Design Of Water Distribution Networks A Review, R K. Amit, Parthasarathy Ramachandran
Optimal Design Of Water Distribution Networks A Review, R K. Amit, Parthasarathy Ramachandran
R K Amit
A water distribution network consists of pipes, reservoirs, pumps, valves, and other hydraulic components and its purpose is to provide reliable service to the customers under various demand conditions. The least cost design of water distribution networks is an optimization problem, which has been solved using linear programming, nonlinear programming, dynamic programming, and heuristic based optimization methods. In this paper, we review the current status of the optimization models in the design of water distribution networks and present recommendations for future research.