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Optimal Debt With Unobservable Investments, Michael Raith, Paul Povel
Optimal Debt With Unobservable Investments, Michael Raith, Paul Povel
Michael Raith
We study financial contracting when both an entrepreneur’s investment and the resulting revenue are unobservable to an outside investor.We show that a debt contract is always optimal; repayment is induced by a liquidation threat that increases with the extent of default. Moreover, when the entrepreneur’s decision concerns the scale of his project, a contract that minimizes liquidation losses is optimal. When the decision concerns managerial effort or project risk, however, it may be optimal to write a contract with a greater threat of liquidation, to induce the entrepreneur to exert more effort or to choose a less risky project.