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Full-Text Articles in Economics
The Effect Of Judicial Expedience On Attorney Fees In Class Actions, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick
The Effect Of Judicial Expedience On Attorney Fees In Class Actions, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick
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Judges facing exogenous constraints on their pecuniary income have an incentive to reduce their workload to increase their private welfare. In the face of an increase in caseload, this incentive will induce judges to attempt to terminate some cases more rapidly. In class action cases, failing to grant an attorney fee request will delay termination. This conflict is likely to lead judges to authorize higher fees as court congestion increases. Using two data sets of class action settlements, we show that attorney fees are significantly and positively related to the congestion level of the court hearing the case.
Judgment Proofing, Bankruptcy Policy, And The Dark Side Of Tort Liability, Charles W. Mooney Jr.
Judgment Proofing, Bankruptcy Policy, And The Dark Side Of Tort Liability, Charles W. Mooney Jr.
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No abstract provided.
Conflicts And Defense Lawyers: From Triangles To Tetrahedrons, Tom Baker
Conflicts And Defense Lawyers: From Triangles To Tetrahedrons, Tom Baker
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No abstract provided.