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Full-Text Articles in Economics
The Law And Economics Of Proportionality In Discovery, Jonah B. Gelbach, Bruce H. Kobayashi
The Law And Economics Of Proportionality In Discovery, Jonah B. Gelbach, Bruce H. Kobayashi
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This paper analyzes the proportionality standard in discovery. Many believe the Advisory Committee's renewed emphasis on this standard has the potential to infuse litigation practice with considerably more attention to questions related to the costs and benefits of discovery. We discuss the history and rationale of proportionality's inclusion in Rule 26, adopting an analytical framework that focuses on how costs and benefits can diverge in litigation generally, and discovery in particular. Finally, we use this framework to understand the mechanics and challenges involved in deploying the six factors included in the proportionality standard. Throughout, we emphasize that the proportionality standard …
Rethinking Summary Judgment Empirics: The Life Of The Parties, Jonah B. Gelbach
Rethinking Summary Judgment Empirics: The Life Of The Parties, Jonah B. Gelbach
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No abstract provided.
Locking The Doors To Discovery? Assessing The Effects Of Twombly And Iqbal On Access To Discovery, Jonah B. Gelbach
Locking The Doors To Discovery? Assessing The Effects Of Twombly And Iqbal On Access To Discovery, Jonah B. Gelbach
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Many observers believe the Supreme Court’s Twombly and Iqbal opinions have curtailed access to civil justice. But previous empirical studies looking only at Rule 12(b)(6) grant rates have failed to capture the full effect of these cases because they have not accounted for party selection—changes in party behavior that can be expected following changes in pleading standards. In this Note, I show how party selection can be expected to undermine the empirical usefulness of simple grant-rate comparisons. I then use a conceptual model of party behavior that allows me to derive an adjusted measure of Twombly/Iqbal’s impact and show …
Lawyers On The Auction Block: Evaluation And Selection Of Class Counsel By Auction, Jill E. Fisch
Lawyers On The Auction Block: Evaluation And Selection Of Class Counsel By Auction, Jill E. Fisch
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The lead counsel auction has attracted increasing attention. Auction advocates argue that auctions introduce competitive market forces that improve the selection and compensation of class counsel. The benefits of the auction, the;' claim, include lower legal fees and better representation. Careful scrutiny reveals that auction advocates have overlooked substantial methodological problems with the design and implementation of the lead counsel auction. Even if these problems were overcome, the auction procedure is flawed: Auctions are poor tools for selecting firms based on multiple criteria, compromise the judicial role, and are unlikely to produce reasonable fee awards. Although the existing record is …
An Analysis Of Fee Shifting Based On The Margin Of Victory: On Frivolous Suints, Meritorious Suits, And The Role Of Rule 11, Howard F. Chang, Lucian A. Bebchuk
An Analysis Of Fee Shifting Based On The Margin Of Victory: On Frivolous Suints, Meritorious Suits, And The Role Of Rule 11, Howard F. Chang, Lucian A. Bebchuk
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When plaintiffs cannot predict the outcome of litigation with certainty, neither the American rule (each litigant bears its own litigation expenses) nor the British rule (the losing litigant pays the attorneys' fees of the winning litigant) would induce optimal decisions to bring suit. Plaintiffs may bring frivolous suits when litigation costs are small relative to the amount at stake; plaintiffs may not bring meritorious suits when litigation costs are large relative to this amount. More general fee-shifting rules are based not only on the identity of the winning party but also on how strong the court perceives the case to …