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Datos Para Replicar Los Cálculos Del Artículo "La Consar: Balanceando Los Intereses De Los Ahorradores Y Las Afores", Rodrigo Garcia-Verdu

Rodrigo Garcia-Verdu

Effect Of Non-Monetary Incentives On Women's Competitive Inclination: Experimental Evidence From Ancona, Italy, Kalkidan Shebi

Master's Theses

This study investigates how monetary incentives versus non-monetary incentives affect women’s decision to enter a competitive environment. This study was conducted in Ancona Italy, in a controlled laboratory experiment with a total of 60 participants; of which 29 were male and 31 were female. Participants were given mathematical addition problems to solve under alternative incentives. How they received these incentives differed based on their preference to enter or withdraw from the competition. The study also included components that assessed risk preferences and willingness to pay for the non-monetary incentive in the experiment. Results show no significant difference in performance scores …

Gender In Jeopardy!: The Role Of Opponent Gender In High-Stakes Competition, Michael Jetter, Jay K. Walker

Economics Faculty Publications

Using 4,279 episodes of the popular US game show Jeopardy!, we analyze whether the opponents' gender is able to explain the gender gap in competitive behavior. Our findings indicate that gender differences disappear when women compete against men. This result is surprising, but emerges with remarkable consistency for the probability to (i) respond, (ii) respond correctly, and (iii) respond correctly in high-stakes situations. Even risk preferences in wagering decisions, where gender differences are especially pronounced, do not differ across gender once a woman competes against males. Using a fixed-effects framework, and therefore exploiting within-player …

Gender And Competitive Preferences: The Role Of Competition Size, Kathrin J. Hanek, Stephen M. Garcia, Avishalom Tor

Journal Articles

In a series of 8 studies, we examine whether gender differences in competition entry preferences are moderated by the size of the competition. Drawing on theories of gender roles and stereotypes, we show that women, relative to men, prefer to enter smaller compared with larger competitions. Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate this effect in observational data on preferences for working in differently-sized firms and applying to differently-sized colleges. Studies 2a and 2b replicate the effect with real behavioral decisions in different domains. We also find empirical evidence that prescriptive gender norms and stereotypes underlie this effect. In Study 3, we …

Game, Set, And Match: Do Women And Men Perform Differently In Competitive Situations?, Michael Jetter, Jay K. Walker

Economics Faculty Publications

This paper analyzes potential gender differences in competitive environments using a sample of over 100,000 professional tennis matches. We focus on two phenomena of the labor and sports economics literature: the hot-hand and clutch-player effects. First, we find strong evidence for the hot-hand (cold-hand) effect. Every additional win in the most recent ten Tour matches raises the likelihood of prevailing in the current encounter by 3.1 (males) to 3.3 percentage points (females). Second, top male and female players are excelling in Grand Slam tournaments, arguably the most important events in tennis. For men, we also find evidence for top players …

Investigating The Endogeneity Of Risk Attitudes: Experimental Evidence Involving Cooperation And Competition, Erik Solli

Honors Theses

Individual decision making is at the core of microeconomics. Rarely, however, are decisions made in environments without some element of uncertainty or even in isolation. While people may differ in their inherent willingness to take on risk, their preferences could change when new information is learned or a new relationship is fostered. I designed an experiment in which participants were asked to make investment decisions involving different levels of risk. The participants completed task between these gambles which allowed me to introduce competitive and collaborative relationships. I was interested in: (1) understanding the factors that are important to explaining risk …

Cnh: Fine-Scale Dynamics Of Human Adaptation In Coupled Natural And Social Systems: An Integrated Computational Approach Applied To Three Fisheries, James A. Wilson, James Acheson, Robert Steneck, Yong Chen, Teresa R. Johnson

University of Maine Office of Research Administration: Grant Reports

The purpose of this project is to gain a better understanding of the way competition between individual fishermen lead to the emergence of private incentives and informal social arrangements that are (or are not) consistent with conservation of the resource. These informal arrangements and incentives are important because they help us understand the extent to which private interests might strengthen or weaken on-going resource management and, consequently, the sustainability of coupled human and natural systems. The broad hypothesis driving the study is that the informal social structure that emerges from competitive interactions among fishermen reflects the particular circumstances of the …

Does Market Competition Lead To Customization?, Wen-Tai Hsu, Yi Lu, Travis Ng

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper proposes a theory of competition and customization. When firms allocate their production to both custom-made and standardized products, the fraction of sales from the former will increase in the face of increased competition. Recent surveys conducted by the World Bank on Chinese firms provide a rare direct measure of customization that allows us to test the above-mentioned prediction. We find empirical results consistent with the prediction.

Multi-Player Bargaining With Endogenous Capacity, Gabriele Camera, Cemil Selcuk

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study equilibrium prices and trade volume in a market with several identical buyers and a seller who commits to an inventory and then offers goods sequentially. Prices are determined by a strategic costly bargaining process with a random sequence of proponents. A unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists, characterized by no costly delays and heterogeneous sale prices. In equilibrium constraining capacity is a bargaining tactic the seller uses to improve a weak bargaining position. With capacity constraints, sale prices approach the outcome of an auction as bargaining costs vanish. The framework provides a building block for price formation in models …

The N-Effect More Competitors, Less Competition, Stephen M. Garcia, Avishalom Tor

Journal Articles

This article introduces the N-effect—the discovery that increasing the number of competitors (N) can decrease competitive motivation. Studies 1a and 1b found evidence that average test scores (e.g., SAT scores) fall as the average number of test takers at test-taking venues increases. Study 2 found that individuals trying to finish an easy quiz among the top 20% in terms of speed finished significantly faster if they believed they were competing in a pool of 10 rather than 100 other people. Study 3 showed that the N-effect is strong among individuals high in social-comparison orientation and weak among those low in …