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Full-Text Articles in Economics
Appraising Merger Efficiencies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Appraising Merger Efficiencies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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Mergers of business firms violate the antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition, which generally refers to a price increase resulting from a reduction in output. However, a merger that threatens competition may also enable the post-merger firm to reduce its costs or improve its product. Attitudes toward mergers are heavily driven by assumptions about efficiency gains. If mergers of competitors never produced efficiency gains but simply reduced the number of competitors, a strong presumption against them would be warranted. We tolerate most mergers because of a background, highly generalized belief that most or at least many produce cost …
A Preface To Neoclassical Legal Thought, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
A Preface To Neoclassical Legal Thought, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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Most legal historians speak of the period following classical legal thought as “progressive legal thought.” That term creates an unwarranted bias in characterization, however, creating the impression that conservatives clung to an obsolete “classical” ideology, when in fact they were in many ways just as revisionist as the progressives legal thinkers whom they critiqued. The Progressives and New Deal thinkers whom we identify with progressive legal thought were nearly all neoclassical, or marginalist, in their economics, but it is hardly true that all marginalists were progressives. For example, the lawyers and policy makers in the corporate finance battles of the …
The Law Of Vertical Integration And The Business Firm: 1880-1960, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Law Of Vertical Integration And The Business Firm: 1880-1960, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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Vertical integration occurs when a firm does something for itself that it could otherwise procure on the market. For example, a manufacturer that opens its own stores is said to be vertically integrated into distribution. One irony of history is that both classical political economy and neoclassicism saw vertical integration and vertical contractual arrangements as much less threatening to competition than cartels or other horizontal arrangements. Nevertheless, vertical integration has produced by far the greater amount of legislation at both federal and state levels and has motivated many more political action groups. Two things explain this phenomenon. First, while economists …
Fiduciary Duties And The Analyst Scandals, Jill E. Fisch
Fiduciary Duties And The Analyst Scandals, Jill E. Fisch
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No abstract provided.
Criminalization Of Corporate Law: The Impact On Shareholders And Other Constituents, Jill E. Fisch
Criminalization Of Corporate Law: The Impact On Shareholders And Other Constituents, Jill E. Fisch
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No abstract provided.
Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, Jill E. Fisch
Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, Jill E. Fisch
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Regulators responded to the analyst scandals of the late 1990s by imposing extensive new rules on the research industry. These rules include a requirement forcing financial firms to separate investment banking operations from research. Regulators argued, with questionable empirical support, that the reforms were necessary to eliminate analyst conflicts of interest and ensure the integrity of sell-side research.
By eliminating investment banking revenues as a source for funding research, the reforms have had substantial effects. Research coverage of small issuers has been dramatically reduced—the vast majority of small capitalization firms now have no coverage at all. The market for research …
Institutional Competition To Regulate Corporations: A Comment On Macey, Jill E. Fisch
Institutional Competition To Regulate Corporations: A Comment On Macey, Jill E. Fisch
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No abstract provided.
The New Federal Regulation Of Corporate Governance, Jill E. Fisch
The New Federal Regulation Of Corporate Governance, Jill E. Fisch
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No abstract provided.
The Role Of Government In Corporate Governance, Cary Coglianese, Elizabeth K. Keating, Michael L. Michael, Thomas J. Healey
The Role Of Government In Corporate Governance, Cary Coglianese, Elizabeth K. Keating, Michael L. Michael, Thomas J. Healey
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Numerous corporate scandals in the past several years have fueled widespread debate over proposals for government action. The central challenge for government is how to restore corporate integrity and market confidence without overreacting and stifling the dynamism that underlies a strong economy. To examine this challenge, the Center for Business and Government's Regulatory Policy Program organized a conference in May 2004 on The Role of Government in Corporate Governance. The conference brought together government officials, business leaders, and academic researchers to discuss three fundamental public policy issues raised by recent corporate abuses. First, who should regulate corporate management - government …
Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen
Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen
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Following the collapse of the Enron Corporation, the ethical obligations of corporate attorneys have received increased scrutiny. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in response to calls for corporate reform, specifically requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to address the lawyer’s role by requiring covered attorneys to “report up” evidence of corporate wrongdoing to key corporate officers, and, in some circumstances, to the board of directors. Failure to “report up” subjects a lawyer to liability under federal law.
This Article argues that the reporting up requirement reflects a second-best approach to corporate governance reform. Rather than focusing on the actors …
Aggregation, Auctions, And Other Developments In The Selection Of Lead Counsel Under The Pslra, Jill E. Fisch
Aggregation, Auctions, And Other Developments In The Selection Of Lead Counsel Under The Pslra, Jill E. Fisch
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No abstract provided.
From Legitimacy To Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, Jill E. Fisch
From Legitimacy To Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, Jill E. Fisch
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On October 16, 1992, after a comprehensive review of its system of proxy regulation and after two separate amendment proposals that drew more than 1700 letters of comment from the public, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission" or the "SEC") voted to reform the federal proxy rules. The reforms were "intended to facilitate shareholder communications and to enhance informed proxy voting, and to reduce the cost of compliance with the proxy rules for all persons engaged in a proxy solicitation.' The SEC explained the amendments by stating that the rules were "impeding shareholder communication and participation in the corporate …
Corporate Law Through An Antitrust Lens, Edward B. Rock
Corporate Law Through An Antitrust Lens, Edward B. Rock
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No abstract provided.
Frankenstein's Monster Hits The Campaign Trail: An Approach To Regulation Of Corporate Political Expenditures, Jill E. Fisch
Frankenstein's Monster Hits The Campaign Trail: An Approach To Regulation Of Corporate Political Expenditures, Jill E. Fisch
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No abstract provided.