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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Deconstructing And Decolonizing Identities Of “Gender” And “Sex” When Viewed As Anti-Black: Black Narratives Outside Of The Binary, Didier Salgado Mar 2023

Deconstructing And Decolonizing Identities Of “Gender” And “Sex” When Viewed As Anti-Black: Black Narratives Outside Of The Binary, Didier Salgado

USF Tampa Graduate Theses and Dissertations

How is “Reality” experienced in the Black body? Is “Reality” an objective article which is outside of the realm of personal experience? Assigned sex is often assumed an objective biological phenomenon that exists everywhere and in all communities. Gender is often thought about as a socially constructed form of identity which is expressed in various ways. In this thesis, I critically examine the terror of “reality” on the Black body, looking at the ways that Black people who’ve experienced discomfort with gender and sex categories experience the “world” around them. Diving deeply into their own experiences and the meanings they …


Generasi Millenial Dan Absurditas Debat Kusir Virtual, Noveliyati Sabani Dec 2018

Generasi Millenial Dan Absurditas Debat Kusir Virtual, Noveliyati Sabani

Informasi

Head, Alison J. & Eisenberg, Michael B. (2009). “How College Students Seek Information in the Digital Age?” Project of Information Literacy, University of Washington.


Radical Social Ecology As Deep Pragmatism: A Call To The Abolition Of Systemic Dissonance And The Minimization Of Entropic Chaos, Arielle Brender May 2018

Radical Social Ecology As Deep Pragmatism: A Call To The Abolition Of Systemic Dissonance And The Minimization Of Entropic Chaos, Arielle Brender

Student Theses 2015-Present

This paper aims to shed light on the dissonance caused by the superimposition of Dominant Human Systems on Natural Systems. I highlight the synthetic nature of Dominant Human Systems as egoic and linguistic phenomenon manufactured by a mere portion of the human population, which renders them inherently oppressive unto peoples and landscapes whose wisdom were barred from the design process. In pursuing a radical pragmatic approach to mending the simultaneous oppression and destruction of the human being and the earth, I highlight the necessity of minimizing entropic chaos caused by excess energy expenditure, an essential feature of systems that aim …


The Death Penalty’S “Finely Tuned Depravity Calibrators” Fairness Follies Of Fairness Phonies Fixated On Criminals Instead Of Crimes, Lester Jackson Oct 2014

The Death Penalty’S “Finely Tuned Depravity Calibrators” Fairness Follies Of Fairness Phonies Fixated On Criminals Instead Of Crimes, Lester Jackson

LESTER JACKSON

It has been loudly and repeatedly proclaimed by opponents that capital punishment is “unfair.” In their view, it is unfair because (1) only some murderers receive the ultimate sentence and (2) they are not the most deserving. Underlying this view is the remarkable assumption that fairness is subject to “fine tuning” and “moral accuracy.” It is argued here that this assumption is indefensible both in theory and in practice. As a theoretical matter, it is insupportable to suggest that matters of conscience, right and wrong, are subject to calibration or “accuracy.” Right and wrong are not determined in the same …


Moore’S Paradox In Belief And Desire, John N. Williams Dec 2013

Moore’S Paradox In Belief And Desire, John N. Williams

John N. WILLIAMS

Is there a Moore’s paradox in desire? I give a normative explanation of the epistemic irrationality, and hence absurdity, of Moorean belief that builds on Green and Williams’ normative account of absurdity. This explains why Moorean beliefs are normally irrational and thus absurd, while some Moorean beliefs are absurd without being irrational. Then I defend constructing a Moorean desire as the syntactic counterpart of a Moorean belief and distinguish it from a ‘Frankfurt’ conjunction of desires. Next I discuss putative examples of rational and irrational desires, suggesting that there are norms of rational desire. Then I examine David Wall’s groundbreaking …


The Surprise Exam Paradox: Disentangling Two Reductios, John N. Williams Dec 2010

The Surprise Exam Paradox: Disentangling Two Reductios, John N. Williams

John N. WILLIAMS

One tradition of solving the surprise exam paradox, started by Robert Binkley and continued by Doris Olin, Roy Sorensen and Jelle Gerbrandy, construes surprise epistemically and relies upon the oddity of propositions akin to G. E. Moore's paradoxical 'p and I don't believe that p.' Here I argue for an analysis that evolves from Olin's. My analysis is different from hers or indeed any of those in the tradition because it explicitly recognizes that there are two distinct reductios at work in the student's paradoxical argument against the teacher. The weak reductio is easy to fault. Its invalidity determines the …


Moorean Absurdity And The Intentional 'Structure' Of Assertion, John N. Williams Dec 2010

Moorean Absurdity And The Intentional 'Structure' Of Assertion, John N. Williams

John N. WILLIAMS

No abstract provided.


Moore's Paradoxes And Iterated Belief, John N. Williams Dec 2010

Moore's Paradoxes And Iterated Belief, John N. Williams

John N. WILLIAMS

I give an account of the absurdity of Moorean beliefs of the omissive form (om) p and I don’t believe that p, and the commissive form (com) p and I believe that not-p, from which I extract a definition of Moorean absurdity. I then argue for an account of the absurdity of Moorean assertion. After neutralizing two objections to my whole account, I show that Roy Sorensen’s own account of the absurdity of his ‘iterated cases’ (om1) p and I don’t believe that I believe that p, and (com1) p and I believe that I believe that not-p, is unsatisfactory. …


Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity And Its Disappearance From Speech, John N. Williams Dec 2010

Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity And Its Disappearance From Speech, John N. Williams

John N. WILLIAMS

G. E. Moore famously observed that to say, "I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did" would be "absurd." Why should it be absurd of me to say something about myself that might be true of me? Moore suggested an answer to this, but as I will show, one that fails. Wittgenstein was greatly impressed by Moore's discovery of a class of absurd but possibly true assertions because he saw that it illuminates "the logic of assertion". Wittgenstein suggests a promising relation of assertion to belief in terms of the idea that one "expresses …


Moore's Paradox: One Or Two?, John N. Williams Dec 2010

Moore's Paradox: One Or Two?, John N. Williams

John N. WILLIAMS

Discussions of what is sometimes called 'Moore's paradox' are often vitiated by a failure to notice that there are two paradoxes; not merely one in two sets of linguistic clothing. The two paradoxes are absurd, but in different ways, and accordingly require different explanations.