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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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- Anticommons resource (1)
- Apology (1)
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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Building And Rebuilding Trust With Promises And Apologies, Eric Schniter, Roman M. Sheremeta, Daniel Sznycer
Building And Rebuilding Trust With Promises And Apologies, Eric Schniter, Roman M. Sheremeta, Daniel Sznycer
ESI Working Papers
Using trust games, we study how promises and messages are used to build new trust where it did not previously exist and to rebuild damaged trust. In these games, trustees made non-binding promises of investment-contingent returns, then investors decided whether to invest, and finally trustees decided how much to return. After an unexpected second game was announced, but before it commenced, trustees could send a one-way message. This design allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence and natural distribution of trust-relevant behaviors and focus on naturally occurring remedial strategies used by promise-breakers and distrusted trustees, their effects on investors, and …
Experimental Evidence On The Properties Of The California’S Cap And Trade Price Containment Reserve, Rachel Bodsky, Domenic Donato, Kevin James, David Porter
Experimental Evidence On The Properties Of The California’S Cap And Trade Price Containment Reserve, Rachel Bodsky, Domenic Donato, Kevin James, David Porter
ESI Working Papers
We report on a series of experiments to examine the properties of California’s Reserve Sale allocation mechanism to be implemented as part of the forthcoming cap and trade program and compare it with an alternative reserve sale mechanism. The proposed reserve sale mechanism allows covered entities to purchase allowances after the primary auction sale at fixed prices. If demand for units is greater the amount supplied in the reserve sale, a Proportional Rationing rule is used to distribute allowances based on submitted request for units. This rule is contrasted with to an alternative rule, Equal Rationing in which allowances are …
Do Liars Believe? Beliefs And Other-Regarding Preferences In Sender-Receiver Games, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields
Do Liars Believe? Beliefs And Other-Regarding Preferences In Sender-Receiver Games, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields
ESI Working Papers
We examine subjects‟ behavior in sender-receiver games where there are gains from trade and alignment of interests in one of the two states. We elicit subjects‟ beliefs, risk and other-regarding preferences. Our design also allows us to examine the behavior of subjects in both roles, to determine whether the behavior in one role is the best response to the subject‟s own behavior in the other role. The results of the experiment indicate that 60 percent of senders adopt deceptive strategies by sending favorable message when the true state of the nature is unfavorable. Nevertheless, 67 percent of receivers invest conditional …
Are You A Good Employee Or Simply A Good Guy? Influence Costs And Contract Design, Brice Corgnet, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara
Are You A Good Employee Or Simply A Good Guy? Influence Costs And Contract Design, Brice Corgnet, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara
ESI Working Papers
We develop a principal–agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft behavioral signal (the supervision signal) about the agent's level of effort. In our model, the agent can initiate influence activities and manipulate the behavioral signal. These activities are costly for the principal as they detract the agent from the productive task. We show that the agent's ability to manipulate the behavioral signal leads to low-powered incentives and increases the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium as a result. Interestingly, the fact that manipulation …
Buyer's Equilibrium With Capacity Constraints And Restricted Mobility: A Recursive Approach, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim
Buyer's Equilibrium With Capacity Constraints And Restricted Mobility: A Recursive Approach, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim
ESI Working Papers
We study a decentralized trading model as in Peters (1984), where heterogeneous market participants face a trade-o between price and trade probability. We present a novel proof of existence of a unique demand vector in Nash equilibrium, based on a recursive approach that exploits the monotonicity of matching functions.
Too Many Cooks Spoil The Broth: How The Tragedy Of The Anticommons Emerges In Organizations, Matthew W. Mccarter, Shirli Kopelman, Thomas A. Turk, Candace Ybarra
Too Many Cooks Spoil The Broth: How The Tragedy Of The Anticommons Emerges In Organizations, Matthew W. Mccarter, Shirli Kopelman, Thomas A. Turk, Candace Ybarra
ESI Working Papers
In organizations, conflict often revolves around commons resources because they are critical for influence, performance, and organizational survival. Research on property rights, territoriality, and social dilemmas suggests that to reduce such conflict, organizations should facilitate the (psychological) privatization of commons resources. We complement these three literatures by drawing from the legal, organizational, and social psychology literatures to model how psychologically privatizing organizational commons resources – to prevent a tragedy of the commons (an overuse problem) – can lead to the emergence of equivalently problematic tragedy in organizations: the tragedy of the anticommons (an underuse problem). Our model contributes to these …
Information Effects In Multi-Unit Dutch Auctions, Joy A. Buchanan, Steven Gjerstad, David Porter
Information Effects In Multi-Unit Dutch Auctions, Joy A. Buchanan, Steven Gjerstad, David Porter
ESI Working Papers
We design a multi-unit descending-price (Dutch) auction mechanism that has applications for resource allocation and pricing problems. We address specific auction design choices by theoretically and experimentally determining optimal information disclosure along two dimensions. Bidders are either informed of the number of bidders in the auction, or know that it is one of two possible sizes; they also either know the number of units remaining for sale or are unaware of how many units have been taken by other bidders. We find that revealing group size decreases bids, and therefore revenue, if units remaining are not shown. When group size …