Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Modernization, Sexual Risk-Taking, And Gynecological Morbidity Among Bolivian Forager-Horticulturalists, Jonathan Stieglitz, Aaron D. Blackwell, Raúl Quispe Gutierrez, Edhitt Cortez Linares, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan

ESI Publications

Sexual risk-taking and reproductive morbidity are common among rapidly modernizing populations with little material wealth, limited schooling, minimal access to modern contraception and healthcare, and gendered inequalities in resource access that limit female autonomy in cohabiting relationships. Few studies have examined how modernization influences sexual risk-taking and reproductive health early in demographic transition. Tsimane are a natural fertility population of Bolivian forager-farmers; they are not urbanized, reside in small-scale villages, and lack public health infrastructure. We test whether modernization is associated with greater sexual risk-taking, report prevalence of gynecological morbidity (GM), and test whether modernization, sexual risk-taking and parity are …

Why Do Women Have More Children Than They Want? Understanding Differences In Women's Ideal And Actual Family Size In A Natural Fertility Population, Lisa Mcallister, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan, Jonathan Stieglitz

ESI Publications

Objectives—We develop and test a conceptual model of factors influencing women’s ideal family size (IFS) in a natural fertility population, the Tsimane of Bolivia. The model posits affects of socioecology, reproductive history, maternal condition, and men’s IFS. We test three hypotheses for why women may exceed their IFS despite experiencing socioeconomic development: (H1) limited autonomy; (H2) improved maternal condition; and (H3) low returns on investments in embodied capital.

Methods—Women’s reproductive histories and prospective fertility data were collected from 2002 to 2008 (n = 305 women). Semistructured interviews were conducted with Tsimane women to study the perceived value of …

Fatty Acid Composition In The Mature Milk Of Bolivian Forager-Horticulturalists: Controlled Comparisons With A Us Sample, Melanie A. Martin, William D. Lassek, Steven J. C. Gaulin, Rhobert W. Evans, Sheela S. Geraghty, Barbara S. Davidson, Ardythe L. Morrow, Hillard Kaplan, Michael Gurven

ESI Publications

Breast milk fatty acid (FA) composition varies greatly among individual women, including in percentages of the long-chain polyunsaturated FAs (LCPUFA) 20:4n-6 (arachidonic acid, AA) and 22:6n-3 (docosahexaenoic acid, DHA), which are important for infant neurological development. It has been suggested that owing to wide variation in milk LCPUFA and low DHA in Western diets, standards of milk FA composition should be derived from populations consuming traditional diets. We collected breast milk samples from Tsimane women at varying lactational stages (6–82 weeks). The Tsimane are an indigenous, natural fertility, subsistence-level population living in Amazonia Bolivia. Tsimane samples were matched by lactational …

From The Womb To The Tomb: The Role Of Transfers In Shaping The Evolved Human Life History, Michael Gurven, Jonathan Stieglitz, Paul L. Hooper, Cristina Gomes, Hillard Kaplan

ESI Publications

Humans are the longest living and slowest growing of all primates. Although most primates are social, humans are highly cooperative and social in ways that likely co-evolved with the slow human life history. In this paper we highlight the role of resource transfers and non-material assistance within and across generations in shaping low human mortality rates. The use of complex cooperative strategies to minimize risk is a necessary precursor for selecting further reductions in mortality rate in late adulthood. In conjunction with changes in the age-profile of production, the impacts of resource transfers and other forms of cooperation on reducing …

Infidelity, Jealousy, And Wife Abuse Among Tsimane Forager-Farmers: Testing Evolutionary Hypotheses Of Marital Conflict, Jonathan Stieglitz, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan, Jeffrey Winking

ESI Publications

What causes marital conflict, and which marital conflicts are more likely to result in men’s violence against their wives? It has long been argued that men’s jealousy over women’s infidelity is the strongest impetus to men’s lethal and non-lethal violence against female partners. Less is known about the extent to which women’s jealousy over men’s infidelity precipitates men’s violence against female partners. Husbands are more likely than wives to commit infidelity, and men and women report a similar frequency and intensity of jealous emotions during recalls of potential infidelity. If men are likely to use time and resources for pursuit …

Managing A Duopolistic Water Market With Confirmed Proposals. An Experiment, Aurora García-Gallego, Nikolaos Georgantzís, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez, Praveen Kujal

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We report results from experimental water markets in which owners of two different sources of water supply water to households and farmers. The final water quality consumed by each type of consumer is determined through mixing of qualities from two different resources. We compare the standard duopolistic market structure with an alternative market clearing mechanism inspired by games with confirmed strategies (which have been shown to yield collusive outcomes). As in the static case, complex dynamic markets operating under a confirmed proposals protocol yield less efficient outcomes because coordination among independent suppliers has the usual effects of restricting output and …

Resource Adequacy: Should Regulators Worry?, Hernan D. Bejarano, Lance Clifner, Carl Johnston, Stephen J. Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Regulators have proposed various institutional alternatives to secure network resource adequacy and reasonably priced electric power for consumers. These alternatives prompt many difficult questions: Does the development of Demand Response reduce the need for new capacity? How effectively can a government-mandated Capacity Market foster efficient investment? How does centralized generator commitment (with revenue guarantees) compare to a system in which Generators voluntarily commit themselves with no revenue guarantees? If exclusive distribution contracts were replaced by unregulated retail competition, what would be the effects on investment and market prices? We use laboratory experiments to address these questions.

The Herodotus Paradox, Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. De Vries

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with complete and incomplete information, and in so doing identify what we call the 'Herodotus paradox.'

Age Effects And Heuristics In Decision Making, Tibor Besedeš, Cary Deck, Sudipta Sarangi, Mikhael Shor

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Using controlled experiments, we examine how individuals make choices when faced with multiple options. Choice tasks are designed to mimic the selection of health insurance, prescription drug, or retirement savings plans. In our experiment, available options can be objectively ranked, allowing us to examine optimal decision making. First, the probability of a person selecting the optimal option declines as the number of options increases, with the decline being more pronounced for older subjects. Second, heuristics differ by age, with older subjects relying more on suboptimal decision rules. In a heuristics validation experiment, older subjects make worse decisions than younger subjects.

Nonlinear Dynamics And Stability In A Multigroup Asset Flow Model, Mark Desantis, David Swigon, Gunduz Caginalp

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

The multigroup asset flow model for asset price dynamics incorporates distinct motivations, e. g., trend and fundamentals (value) and assessments of value by different groups of investors. The stability and bifurcation properties are established for the curve of equilibria. We prove that if all trader groups focus on fundamentals, then all equilibria are stable. For systems in which there is one fundamental and one momentum (trend) group, we establish conditions for stability. In particular, an equilibrium that is stable becomes unstable as the time scale on which momentum investors focus diminishes. The computations examine the excursions, which we define as …

Coalitional Colonel Blotto Games With Application To The Economics Of Alliances, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

In Borel’s (1921) Colonel Blotto game two players simultaneously allocate their respective endowments of a resource across n battlefields, the higher allocation wins each battlefield, and players maximize the number of battlefields won. Here we examine two players who may form an alliance before separately competing in two disjoint Colonel Blotto games against a common adversary. Despite a lack of common interests, unilateral transfers — in a direction consistent with the exploitation hypothesis — arise for a range of parameter configurations. Such transfers alter the adversary’s strategy and the combination of the direct and strategic effects benefits both allies.

Social Norms, Discrete Choices, And False Dichotomies, Eric Schniter, Nathaniel Wilcox

Psychology Faculty Articles and Research

Eric Schniter and Nathaniel Wilcox comment on Bram Tucker's article, "Do Risk and Time Experimental Choices Represent Individual Strategies for Coping with Poverty or Conformity to Social Norms? Evidence from Rural Southwestern Madagascar", which "revisits a debate played out in Current Anthropology as to whether subsistence decisions are the result of individual strategy to cope with poverty and increase wealth... or conformity to social norms."

Cooperative Strategies In Anonymous Economies: An Experiment, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study cooperation in economies of indefinite duration. Participants faced a sequence of prisoner’s dilemmas with anonymous opponents. We identify and characterize the strategies employed at the individual level. We report that (i) grim trigger does not describe well individual play and there is wide heterogeneity in strategies; (ii) systematic defection does not crowd-out systematic cooperation; (iii) coordination on cooperative strategies does not improve with experience. We discuss alternative methodologies and implications for theory.

Political Legitimacy And Technology Adoption, Metin M. Coşgel, Thomas J. Miceli, Jared Rubin

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

A fundamental question of economic and technological history is why some civilizations adopted new and important technologies and others did not. In this paper, we analyze the effect that new technologies have on agents that legitimize rulers. We construct a simple political economy model which suggests that rulers may not accept a productivity-enhancing technology when it negatively affects an agent’s ability to provide the ruler legitimacy. However, when other sources of legitimacy emerge, the ruler will accept the technology as long as the new legitimizing source is not negatively affected. We use this insight to help explain the initial blocking …

The Lifeboat Problem, Kai A. Konrad, Dan Kovenock

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes (“lifeboat seats”). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes (“lifeboats”). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition (“a lifeboat”). Then each player competes for a prize in the subset chosen (“a seat”). We characterize and compare the subgame perfect equilibria in which all players employ pure strategies or all players play identical mixed strategies in the first stage. The partitioning of prizes can lead to coordination failure when players employ nondegenerate mixed strategies. In these equilibria some rents are sheltered and rent dissipation is …

Strategic Defense And Attack For Series And Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

The contest-theoretic literature on the attack and defense of networks of targets focuses primarily on pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Hausken's 2008 European Journal of Operational Research article typifies this approach, and many of the models in this literature either build upon this model or utilize similar techniques. We show that Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provides necessary conditions for his solution to hold. The complete characterization of mixed-strategy equilibria remains an open problem, although there exist solutions in the literature for special prominent cases.

Buyer's Equilibrium With Capacity Constraints And Restricted Mobility: A Recursive Approach, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim

ESI Working Papers

We study a decentralized trading model as in Peters (1984), where heterogeneous market participants face a trade-o between price and trade probability. We present a novel proof of existence of a unique demand vector in Nash equilibrium, based on a recursive approach that exploits the monotonicity of matching functions.

Building And Rebuilding Trust With Promises And Apologies, Eric Schniter, Roman M. Sheremeta, Daniel Sznycer

ESI Working Papers

Using trust games, we study how promises and messages are used to build new trust where it did not previously exist and to rebuild damaged trust. In these games, trustees made non-binding promises of investment-contingent returns, then investors decided whether to invest, and finally trustees decided how much to return. After an unexpected second game was announced, but before it commenced, trustees could send a one-way message. This design allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence and natural distribution of trust-relevant behaviors and focus on naturally occurring remedial strategies used by promise-breakers and distrusted trustees, their effects on investors, and …

Too Many Cooks Spoil The Broth: How The Tragedy Of The Anticommons Emerges In Organizations, Matthew W. Mccarter, Shirli Kopelman, Thomas A. Turk, Candace Ybarra

ESI Working Papers

In organizations, conflict often revolves around commons resources because they are critical for influence, performance, and organizational survival. Research on property rights, territoriality, and social dilemmas suggests that to reduce such conflict, organizations should facilitate the (psychological) privatization of commons resources. We complement these three literatures by drawing from the legal, organizational, and social psychology literatures to model how psychologically privatizing organizational commons resources – to prevent a tragedy of the commons (an overuse problem) – can lead to the emergence of equivalently problematic tragedy in organizations: the tragedy of the anticommons (an underuse problem). Our model contributes to these …

Experimental Evidence On The Properties Of The California’S Cap And Trade Price Containment Reserve, Rachel Bodsky, Domenic Donato, Kevin James, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

We report on a series of experiments to examine the properties of California’s Reserve Sale allocation mechanism to be implemented as part of the forthcoming cap and trade program and compare it with an alternative reserve sale mechanism. The proposed reserve sale mechanism allows covered entities to purchase allowances after the primary auction sale at fixed prices. If demand for units is greater the amount supplied in the reserve sale, a Proportional Rationing rule is used to distribute allowances based on submitted request for units. This rule is contrasted with to an alternative rule, Equal Rationing in which allowances are …

Information Effects In Multi-Unit Dutch Auctions, Joy A. Buchanan, Steven Gjerstad, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

We design a multi-unit descending-price (Dutch) auction mechanism that has applications for resource allocation and pricing problems. We address specific auction design choices by theoretically and experimentally determining optimal information disclosure along two dimensions. Bidders are either informed of the number of bidders in the auction, or know that it is one of two possible sizes; they also either know the number of units remaining for sale or are unaware of how many units have been taken by other bidders. We find that revealing group size decreases bids, and therefore revenue, if units remaining are not shown. When group size …

Do Liars Believe? Beliefs And Other-Regarding Preferences In Sender-Receiver Games, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields

ESI Working Papers

We examine subjects‟ behavior in sender-receiver games where there are gains from trade and alignment of interests in one of the two states. We elicit subjects‟ beliefs, risk and other-regarding preferences. Our design also allows us to examine the behavior of subjects in both roles, to determine whether the behavior in one role is the best response to the subject‟s own behavior in the other role. The results of the experiment indicate that 60 percent of senders adopt deceptive strategies by sending favorable message when the true state of the nature is unfavorable. Nevertheless, 67 percent of receivers invest conditional …

Are You A Good Employee Or Simply A Good Guy? Influence Costs And Contract Design, Brice Corgnet, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

ESI Working Papers

We develop a principal–agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft behavioral signal (the supervision signal) about the agent's level of effort. In our model, the agent can initiate influence activities and manipulate the behavioral signal. These activities are costly for the principal as they detract the agent from the productive task. We show that the agent's ability to manipulate the behavioral signal leads to low-powered incentives and increases the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium as a result. Interestingly, the fact that manipulation …