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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
A Survey Of Theories Of The Family, Ted Bergstrom
A Survey Of Theories Of The Family, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
This review explores the theory of household technology and the associated possibilities for distributing utility among household members. It also explores decision theory within the household, drawing on standard consumer decision theory. The review discusses models of equilbrium in which families are formed by persons voluntarily choosing mates. This theory is analogous to ``Tiebout theory'' in urban economics, where the objects of choice include not only the amount of public goods supplied in each city, but also which individuals live in each place. An aspect of family life that has fewer parallels in the economics of market economies is intrafamilial …
Decption And Mutual Trust: A Reply To Strudler, Peter Cramton, J Gregory Dees
Decption And Mutual Trust: A Reply To Strudler, Peter Cramton, J Gregory Dees
Peter Cramton
Alan Strudler has written a stimulating and provocative article about deception in negotiation. He presents his views, in part, in contrast with our earlier work on the Mutual Trust Perspective. We believe that Strudler is wrong in his account of the ethics of deception in negotiation and in his quick dismissal of the Mutual Trust Perspective. Though his mistakes may be informative, his views are potentially harmful to business practice. In this paper, we present arguments against Strudler’s position and attempt to salvage the Mutual-Trust Perspective from his attack. Strudler’s work reaffirms the need for a more pragmatic approach to …
Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning From Disagreement, Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey
Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning From Disagreement, Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey
Peter Cramton
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed mechanism to some status quo. If equilibrium play in the status quo mechanism depends on the players’ beliefs, then the inference drawn if someone objects to the proposed mechanism may alter the participation constraints. We investigate this issue by modeling the mechanism design problem as a two-stage process, consisting of a ratification stage followed by the actual play of the chosen game. We develop and illustrate a new concept, ratifiability, that takes account of inferences from a veto in a consistent way.