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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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- Consciousness (4)
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Articles 31 - 60 of 93
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Misperceiving And Underestimating The Ubiquitous Chicken, Carrie P. Freeman
Misperceiving And Underestimating The Ubiquitous Chicken, Carrie P. Freeman
Animal Sentience
Marino has provided an accurate and nuanced view about chickens’ complex capabilities as sentient individuals. I explore the implications of these findings for scholars as well as for activists in the protection of farmed animals.
Chickening Out Of Change: Will Knowing More About Thinking Chickens Change Public Perceptions?, Ewan Bottomley, Steve Loughnan
Chickening Out Of Change: Will Knowing More About Thinking Chickens Change Public Perceptions?, Ewan Bottomley, Steve Loughnan
Animal Sentience
This commentary examines the next step in Marino’s target article – changing people’s attitudes and beliefs about chickens. The scientific case seems clear: chickens are far more complex, psychologically and socially, than originally thought. Marino suggests we use this information to make people feel uncomfortable about their dietary choices in the hope of changing them. We review the psychological literature, examining how people maintain meat consumption despite the clash with their moral beliefs (the “meat paradox”). This work highlights the important gap between what science knows about animals and what people think about animals.
Experiment Versus Analogy In The Search For Animal Sentience, Geoffrey Hall
Experiment Versus Analogy In The Search For Animal Sentience, Geoffrey Hall
Animal Sentience
Deciding between rival accounts of an instance of an animal’s behavior can frequently be achieved by experimental tests of different predictions made by the alternatives. When, however, one (or both) of the alternatives is expressed in terms of the mental state of the animal, an experimental test to distinguish them can be hard to find. Although it is unsatisfactory in many ways, it may be necessary to fall back on argument from analogy with human behavior and experience.
Fishes Are Gaining Academic Respect, Jonathan Balcombe
Fishes Are Gaining Academic Respect, Jonathan Balcombe
Animal Sentience
I respond to five commentaries on my 2016 book What a Fish Knows. The commentaries express more harmony than dissent about my interpretation of fishes as cognitive, aware individuals deserving better treatment by humankind.
Cognitive Continuity In Cognitive Dissonance, David R. Brodbeck, Madeleine I. R. Brodbeck
Cognitive Continuity In Cognitive Dissonance, David R. Brodbeck, Madeleine I. R. Brodbeck
Animal Sentience
Zentall’s (2016) model of cognitive dissonance is compatible with cognitive continuity between humans and nonhumans. It may help explain cognitive dissonance-like behavior in many species, including humans. It is also consistent with Tinbergen’s (1963) ‘four whys’ in ethological explanation.
Changes In Behavior And Emotion Under Chicken Domestication, Martin Johnsson
Changes In Behavior And Emotion Under Chicken Domestication, Martin Johnsson
Animal Sentience
Marino’s target article provides an overview of chickens’ cognition, emotion, and personality, with the aim of changing how people view chickens. In this commentary, I will agree that chickens deserve better than their reputation, but contend with a statement about the lack of behavioral change under chicken domestication.
Reductionism And Accounts Of Cognitive Dissonance, Kent D. Bodily
Reductionism And Accounts Of Cognitive Dissonance, Kent D. Bodily
Animal Sentience
Zentall (2016) proposed within-trial contrast as an alternative account of cognitive dissonance with greater parsimony and generalizability between human and nonhuman species. This commentary describes forms of reductionism, categorizes several competing accounts of cognitive dissonance phenomena, and addresses the strengths and weaknesses according to the reductionist form each account takes. A focus on functional relations may make explanation more parsimonious while bridging theoretical divides between human and nonhuman research programs.
Evolutionary Continuity, Anne Benvenuti
Evolutionary Continuity, Anne Benvenuti
Animal Sentience
The principle of evolutionary continuity states that all animal capacities and behaviors exist — with variations in degree — in continuity with other species. Rather than assuming discontinuity, we should ask why any behavior observed in humans would not be found in at least some other sentient animals under similar conditions. In the case of suicide, the more pertinent issue might be the ethical one: our human responsibility for creating conditions under which other animals might deliberately seek to end their own lives.
On Assisted Suicide, Clark Glymour
On Assisted Suicide, Clark Glymour
Animal Sentience
What would be the moral implications of the capacity for suicide in nonhuman animals? Humans can be helped to end their lives if they no longer find them bearable. Should captive animals not be given the same possibility?
What Is The Pressing “Animal Question” About? Thinking/Feeling Capacity Or Exploitability?, Gordon Hodson
What Is The Pressing “Animal Question” About? Thinking/Feeling Capacity Or Exploitability?, Gordon Hodson
Animal Sentience
Marino’s timely review highlights what humans go to great lengths to ignore and suppress: non-human animals such as chickens have rich inner lives. Although I share her belief that such evidence should provide the impetus for ending the exploitation of chickens, the psychological literatures on motivated reasoning and group-based dominance suggest not only that this is unlikely but that people will push back precisely because of the implications (as they do for climate change). Human psychology has done a great deal to suppress the recognition of sentience in animals, but it can also shed insights into ending exploitation.
Animals Do Not Commit Suicide But Do Display Behaviors That Are Precursors Of Suicide In Humans, David Eilam
Animals Do Not Commit Suicide But Do Display Behaviors That Are Precursors Of Suicide In Humans, David Eilam
Animal Sentience
Although my commentary begins with a report about a monkey committing suicide, I agree with the target article's concluding statement that we cannot currently prove that any animal has committed suicide. The author’s proposed continuist approach is based on animal behaviors reminiscent of symptoms preceding suicide in humans (e.g., deep depression and grief). However, in both humans and nonhuman animals, these are just potential precursors of suicide, and dying as a result of grief is not necessarily suicide. In the absence of supporting evidence, the continuist hypothesis of animal suicide is not sustained.
Understanding Animal Suicide And Death Can Lead To Better End-Of-Life Care, Jessica Pierce
Understanding Animal Suicide And Death Can Lead To Better End-Of-Life Care, Jessica Pierce
Animal Sentience
Peña-Guzmán’s target article on animal suicide will help inform end-of-life care for animals by emphasizing the need for a broad research focus on animal thanatology. Greater scientific understanding of the continuum of death-related awareness, experiences, and behaviors will help us improve veterinary care for animals at the end of life.
Is Psychological Science Committing “Suicide” By Linguistic Muddling?, Roger K. Thomas
Is Psychological Science Committing “Suicide” By Linguistic Muddling?, Roger K. Thomas
Animal Sentience
Beginning mainly with the “cognitive revolution” in psychology in the latter half of the 20th century, psychological science has been committing “suicide” slowly via linguistic muddling. Peña-Guzmán’s target article is but one of thousands of cuts contributing to this death by “suicide.” Having said that, given the current state of affairs in animal cognition research, there is much to commend in Peña-Guzmán’s article. I leave that to others, however. This commentary explains how the suicide by muddling of psychological science is happening in general, with the understanding that it applies also to Peña-Guzmán’s target article.
Complicated Grief, Teya Brooks Pribac
Complicated Grief, Teya Brooks Pribac
Animal Sentience
My commentary discusses complicated grief and the ensuing sense of helplessness that may lead to suicide. I close with a story about a pygmy pig.
What If All Animals Are Sentient?, Arthur S. Reber
What If All Animals Are Sentient?, Arthur S. Reber
Animal Sentience
Birch develops a useful framework for determining when the Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP) should be invoked. He rightly notes that there is a lack of agreement among social scientists, ethicists, and legislators even about whether the precautionary principle is useful, let alone when and how it should be implemented. His proposal is to establish a kind of cognitive threshold, and only when an animal shows a sufficient level of sentience would the ASPP be appropriate. From the point of view of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness model (Reber, 2016), all animals are sentient. If correct, the problems Birch identifies …
What Does It Feel Like To Be An Electroreceptive Fish?, Leo Bernd Kramer
What Does It Feel Like To Be An Electroreceptive Fish?, Leo Bernd Kramer
Animal Sentience
The weakly electric knifefish Eigenmannia emits an electric organ discharge (EOD) of constant frequency and sinusoidal waveform that varies with sex and age. Eigenmannia discriminates among these except when stimulated at the same frequency as its own EOD frequency. In that case, it needs to perform a Jamming Avoidance Response (frequency shift) which results in a beating mixed signal. By a sophisticated analysis of the amplitude and phase modulations of the beat signal, Eigenmannia derives the frequency difference, its sign, and the waveform of the stimulus, hence the signaller’s identity. The human ear is not capable of an equivalent waveform …
The Potential For Sentience In Fishes, Jay R. Stauffer Jr.
The Potential For Sentience In Fishes, Jay R. Stauffer Jr.
Animal Sentience
Balcombe’s book is filled with information on the biology, behavior, and life history of fishes. I do not agree with all his premises. I am still somewhat perplexed about the discussion of whether fish feel pain; I am not sure whether the distinction between nociception and pain makes any difference. Overall, however, his treatment of the principles of both natural and sexual selection is comprehensive and accurate, and has greatly increased my knowledge and awareness of the biology, ethology, and potential for sentience in fishes. In summary, this work has exposed me to new ideas about how to examine fishes …
Consciousness, Evidence, And Moral Standing, Irina Mikhalevich
Consciousness, Evidence, And Moral Standing, Irina Mikhalevich
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) claims to have identified the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness (“p-consciousness”) in fishes, and argues that these neurological data, along with behavioral evidence, suggest that teleost fishes are in all probability sentient organisms. Woodruff’s case may be strengthened by challenging key assumptions behind a common criticism of accounts such as his: that fishes cannot be p-conscious because they lack the cortical structures necessary for p-consciousness. A more serious objection to Woodruff’s proposal would be that his evidence for p-consciousness establishes only that fishes are “access-conscious” (“a-conscious”), where a-conscious states are cognitive representations that are made available to cognitive …
Battlefish Contention, Sean Allen-Hermanson
Battlefish Contention, Sean Allen-Hermanson
Animal Sentience
Contrary to Woodruff’s suggestion, investigations into possible reasoning capacities of cichlid fighting fish and trace memory in goldfish do not support claims about sentience. This is disputed by research results about learning and implicit processing, sleep, vegetative states, amnesia, semantic priming, artificial network modeling, and even insects. A novel, deflationary, interpretation of Grosenick et al.'s experiments on A. burtoni is also offered.
Sentience In Living Tissue, Alfredo Pereira Jr.
Sentience In Living Tissue, Alfredo Pereira Jr.
Animal Sentience
I agree with Woodruff’s concept of sentience but must disagree about what he proposes as the biological correlates of feeling. Based on the interpretation of brain function originally presented by Camilo Golgi, I assume that feelings are instantiated by hydro-ionic waves in living tissue. From this viewpoint, the anatomical, physiological and behavioural criteria of Woodruff would not be necessary to argue for sentience in fish.
Nagel-Ing Worries About Fish Sentience, Hugh Lafollette
Nagel-Ing Worries About Fish Sentience, Hugh Lafollette
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleosts’ more sophisticated behaviors make sense only if they are sentient. Moreover, their neuroanatomy, although different from mammalian, is sufficiently complex to support sentience. I answer some potential objections to Woodruff’s argument, and try to trace its moral significance. In so doing, I briefly address Birch’s (2017) target article as well.
Of Cortex And Consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “Access,” Or Otherwise, Scott A. Husband
Of Cortex And Consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “Access,” Or Otherwise, Scott A. Husband
Animal Sentience
From the perspective of a comparative neuroanatomist studying the avian pallium, Woodruff’s (2017) claims about the behavioral and electrophysiological evidence for teleost sentience blur the lines between phenomenal and access consciousness (Block, 1995). I discuss the bias that complex cognition can only arise in the cortical layering typical of the mammalian pallium and conclude that Woodruff makes a good case that the tecto-pallial connections in teleosts are sufficiently complex to support something like sentience.
Mental Representations Are Not Necessary For Fish Consciousness, Luis H. Favela
Mental Representations Are Not Necessary For Fish Consciousness, Luis H. Favela
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleost fishes are capable of phenomenal consciousness. Central to his argument is the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is representational in nature. I think the commitment to a representational theory of consciousness undermines Woodruff’s case for teleost phenomenal consciousness. The reason is that organisms do not need to perceive the world indirectly via mental images/representations in order to have phenomenological experiences. My argument is based on considerations of ecological psychology and comparative ethology.
Dogs Consciously Experience Emotions: The Question Is, Which?, Ralph Adolphs
Dogs Consciously Experience Emotions: The Question Is, Which?, Ralph Adolphs
Animal Sentience
I discuss three themes related to Kujala’s target article. First, the wealth of emerging data on cognitive studies in dogs will surely show that dogs have a very rich repertoire of cognitive processes, for most of which we find homologues in humans. Second, understanding the internal states that mediate social behaviors, such as emotions, requires us to consider both a dog’s behaviors with other dogs, and the emergence of new behavioral patterns in interaction with humans. Third, all of this will certainly narrow the range of justifications for denying that dogs have subjective experiences of emotions.
Direct Perception Of Animal Mind, Paul Morris
Direct Perception Of Animal Mind, Paul Morris
Animal Sentience
Kujala’s (2017) target article is ostensibly focused on how everyday folk (fail to) make sense of canine emotions. However, the theories outlined in the article apply to making sense of all aspects of the mentality of both human and non-human animals. The target article neglects the fundamental arguments surrounding the problem of other minds. I explore the relevant arguments and briefly review approaches suggesting that our everyday-life sense that both human and non-human animals are thinking, feeling, emotional beings has a secure epistemological basis.
Do We Understand What It Means For Dogs To Experience Emotion?, Lasana T. Harris
Do We Understand What It Means For Dogs To Experience Emotion?, Lasana T. Harris
Animal Sentience
Psychologists who study humans struggle to agree on a definition of emotion, falling primarily into two camps. Though recent neuroscience advances are beginning to settle this ancient debate, it cannot solve the private-language problem at the heart of inferences about social cognition. This suggests that when we consider the emotional experiences of other species like canines, biological and physiological homologs do not provide enough evidence of emotional experiences similar to those of humans. Secondary complex emotional experiences are even more difficult to attribute to non-humans since such experiences rely, by definition, on social cognition. Given the contextual differences between human-human …
Social Dog — Emotional Dog?, Stefanie Riemer
Social Dog — Emotional Dog?, Stefanie Riemer
Animal Sentience
Based on their high sociability and their capabilities in social cognition, we should conclude that dogs experience rich emotions in the social domain. I discuss the importance of dog-human attachment and some of the controversial evidence for so-called secondary emotions, which leaves many questions to answer.
The Development And Expression Of Canine Emotion, Allison L. Martin
The Development And Expression Of Canine Emotion, Allison L. Martin
Animal Sentience
In her review of canine emotions, Kujala (2017) discusses how humans often attribute emotions such as fear, love, and jealousy to their canine companions. This attribution is often dismissed as anthropomorphism, suggesting that only humans can possess these emotions. I argue that emotions are not something we possess but features of certain behavioral patterns. Both human and canine emotions arise through evolution and conditioning; examining their development and expression may lead to new insights about both canine and human behavior.
Animal And Human Emotion: Concepts And Methodologies, Cátia Correia Caeiro
Animal And Human Emotion: Concepts And Methodologies, Cátia Correia Caeiro
Animal Sentience
The human-dog relationship is particularly interesting for the study of emotions. The underlying concepts need to be made explicit and methods need to be adapted to the characteristics of the species studied as well as the shortcomings of the human experimenter’s perception.
Beyond The Provable?, Márta Gácsi
Beyond The Provable?, Márta Gácsi
Animal Sentience
Reading Kujala’s (2017) target article, I wondered whether we really need to approach the issue of animals’ emotions the traditional way, asking whether animals have emotions that are identical, similar or precursors to those of humans. As an ethologist, I prefer to examine psychological phenomena from an evolutionary perspective, focusing on Tinbergen’s (1963) four questions (Bateson & Laland 2013).