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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Judicial Legitimacy: An Interpretation As A Repeated Game, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Judicial Legitimacy: An Interpretation As A Repeated Game, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
If society wishes to maintain an independent judiciary, it faces the problem of how to restrain judges from indulging their personal whims. One restraint is the desire of judges to influence future judges. To do so, they may have to maintain their own or the system's legitimacy by restraining their own behavior. This situation is usefully viewed as an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game.
Cheap Bribes And The Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game Among Rational Legislators, Eric Bennett Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer
Cheap Bribes And The Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game Among Rational Legislators, Eric Bennett Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Legislators in modern democracies (a) accept bribes that are small compared to value of the statutes they pass and (b) allow bans against bribery to be enforced. In our model of bribery, rational legislators accept bribes smaller not only than the benefit the briber receives but than the costs the legislators incur in accepting the bribes. Rather than risk this outcome, the legislators may be willing to suppress bribery altogether. The size of legislatures, the quality of voter information, the nature of party organization, and the structure of committees will all influence the frequency and size of bribes.