Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Buyer Alliances As Countervailing Power In Wic Infant-Formula Auctions, David E. Davis

David E. Davis

Buyer Alliances As Countervailing Power In Wic Infant-Formula Auctions, David E. Davis

David E. Davis

Collusive Bidding In The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz

Jesse A. Schwartz

This paper describes the bid signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. Bidders in these auctions bid on numerous spectrum licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to raise the bid on any license. Simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. This “code bidding” occurs when one bidder tags the last few digits of its bid with the market number of a related license. We examine how extensively bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids …

Improving Bid Efficiency For Humanitarian Food Aid Procurement, Aniruddha Bagchi, Jomon Aliyas Paul, Michael J. Maloni

Jomon A. Paul

The competitive bid process used by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) to procure food supplies and transportation services for humanitarian food aid is subject to bidder gaming that can increase prices and deter competition. Additionally, suppliers and carriers are matched after bid submission, preventing synergies from coordinated planning. Given these concerns, we determine the optimal auction mechanism to minimize gaming then justify pre-bid planning between suppliers and carriers using properties of the cost distribution functions. We operationalize these changes with a uniform price auction. The improved mechanism should deter gaming, enhance bid participation, and increase delivered food aid volumes.

Second Chance Offers In Auctions, Aniruddha Bagchi, Brett Katzman, Timothy Mathews

Aniruddha Bagchi

Auctions, Shyam Sunder

Shyam Sunder

No abstract provided.

Equilibria Existence And Characterization In Auctions: Achievements And Open Questions, Luciano De Castro, Daniel Karney

Daniel H Karney

Establishing existence and characterizing equilibria are both important achievements in the study of auctions. However, we recognize that equilibria existence results form the basis for well accepted characterizations. In this survey, we review the landmark results and highlight open questions regarding equilibria existence and characterizations in auctions. In addition, we review the standard assumptions underlying these results, and discuss the suitability of the Nash equilibrium solution concept. We focus our review on single-object auctions, but also review results in multi-unit, divisible, combinatorial and double auctions.

Auctions, Shyam Sunder

Shyam Sunder

No abstract provided.

Foreword To Ross Baldick's 'Single Clearing Price In Electricity Markets', Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Argues that consumers and suppliers are better off with the clearing-price auction in electricity markets.

“Selling Licenses For A Process Innovation: The Impact Of The Product Market On The Selling Mechanism, Aniruddha Bagchi

Aniruddha Bagchi

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Affidavit arguing that HQ manipulated the NYISO TCC and day-ahead energy markets. On behalf of DC Energy, LLC.

A View Of The Dutch Ipo Cathedral, Peter B. Oh

Peter B. Oh

This is the Keynote Address for “IPOs and the Internet Age: The Case for Updated Regulations,” a symposium held at The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of Law. Initial public offerings (“IPOs”) are an exercise in asymmetrical valuation. One mechanism for bridging these asymmetries is a private financial intermediary to conduct price discovery by meeting with preferred investors. An alternate mechanism is an auction, such as a descending-bid or Dutch procedure, to conduct price discovery by soliciting bids from all prospective investors. Recent disenchantment with the relationship between issuers and intermediaries has prompted some to hail (online) auction-based …

Ex Parte Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Ex parte communication on various auction rules for the AWS auction.

Uniform Pricing Or Pay-As-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma For California And Beyond, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors

Peter Cramton

Any belief that a shift from uniform to as-bid pricing would provide power purchasers substantial relief from soaring prices is simply mistaken. The immediate consequence of its introduction would be a radical change in bidding behavior that would introduce new inefficiencies, weaken competition in new generation, and impede expansion of capacity.

Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz

Jesse A. Schwartz

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We explore the extent that bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids in recent FCC …

Auction Design For Standard Offer Service, Peter Cramton, Andrew Parece, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

During the transition to a competitive electricity market, when a consumer does not select an electricity provider, who provides service to the customer and at what price? An auction for this "standard offer service" is a market-based way to assign the service responsibility and to determine its price. We explore the design issues in establishing rules for such an auction.

Using Auction Theory To Inform Takeover Regulation, Peter Cramton, Alan Schwartz

Peter Cramton

This paper focuses on certain mechanisms that govern the sale of corporate assets. Under Delaware law, when a potential acquirer makes a serious bid for a target, the target’s Board of Directors is required to act as would "auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stock-holders at a sale of the company.’’ The Delaware courts’ preference for auctions follows from two premises. First, a firm’s managers should maximize the value of their shareholders’ investment in the company. Second, auctions maximize shareholder returns. The two premises together imply that a target’s board should conduct an auction when at least …