Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Sell Unipolarity? The Future Of An Overvalued Concept, Jeffrey W. Legro

Political Science Faculty Publications

For at least the past thirty years, scholarship on international relations has been bewitched by a simple proposition: the polarity of the international system is a central cause of great power strategies and politics. The number of "poles" (dominant countries) in the system is like an invisible fence that shapes states as if they were dogs with electronic collars or a Skinner box that conditions national "rats." States can choose to ignore the fence or box, but if they do, they must pay the consequences. The polarity of the international system as defined by the number of great powers - …

Introduction: Navigating The Unknown, Melvyn P. Leffler, Jeffrey W. Legro

Political Science Faculty Publications

On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall came down. Hardly anyone had foreseen this event. When President Ronald Reagan had challenged Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in June 1987 “to tear down this wall,” he never anticipated that Berliners themselves would have the opportunity and courage to bring about such dramatic change. We now know that the Wall came down as a result of accidental circumstances, a series of mistaken statements and understandings among officials of the German Democratic Republic. No one had planned for this to happen, and no one had plans to deal with a new landscape that might …

Conclusion: Strategy In A Murky World, Melvyn P. Leffler, Jeffrey W. Legro

Political Science Faculty Publications

Making national strategy is a byzantine business in the best of times. When dramatic events happen, when the international arena is complex and changing, when threats and opportunities are uncertain, leaders struggle to understand and react effectively. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the attacks of 9/11 opened vistas that were unfamiliar and complicated. How did U.S. leaders manage those transitions?

Purpose Transitions: China And The American Response, Jeffrey W. Legro

Political Science Faculty Publications

We know that China is rising, but what will China do with that power? Distracted by power trends, both American policymakers and political scientists have not paid enough attention to purpose--what states intend to do with their power. Power is critical in international relations, but it is not destiny. The dominant lens for understanding the rise of China has been power transition theory, which insightfully probes the effects of power trajectories between rising and falling countries (e.g., the expected future of China and the United States). Yet what we also need to understand is "purpose transition"--that is, when and …

Introduction, Melvyn P. Leffler, Jeffrey W. Legro

Political Science Faculty Publications

For many Americans, the past decade has been a bewildering era. They have seen their country attacked and their husbands, sons, wives, and daughters sent to war in faraway places. They have read about orange alerts and red alerts. They have waited on long lines at airport security checks. They know that defense expenditures have soared and that Homeland Security has mushroomed. They have seen gruesome daily headlines about the carnage in Iraq, the strife in Afghanistan, and the turmoil in Pakistan. They read about the suicide attacks that were prevented or aborted in Europe, and they know, darkly, that …

Dilemmas Of Strategy, Melvyn P. Leffler, Jeffrey W. Legro

Political Science Faculty Publications

America’s crystal ball on strategy is murky. Officials in the next administration will face a complex world, will receive conflicting advice, and will need to mobilize domestic support for their policies. They must nonetheless act, most likely without the convenience of a single threat such as the Soviet Union during the cold war or terrorism in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. In this conclusion, our aims are to highlight the decisive issues of consensus and contention that resonate across the chapters. We seek to delineate the trade-offs involved in making choices, and we hope to illuminate the national …

Bilateralism, Jeffrey W. Legro

Political Science Faculty Publications

Bilateralism concerns relations or policies of joint action between two parties. It can be contrasted with unilateralism (where one party acts on its own) and multilateralism (where three or more parties are involved). Typically, the term has applications concerning political, economic, and security matters between two states. Bilateralism has both costs and benefits, and there is a debate on its merits relative to unilateral or multilateral approaches.

[Chapter 1 From] Rethinking The World: Great Power Strategies And International Order, Jeffrey W. Legro

Bookshelf

Stunning shifts in the worldviews of states mark the modern history of international affairs: how do societies think about—and rethink—international order and security? Japan's "opening," German conquest, American internationalism, Maoist independence, and Gorbachev's "new thinking" molded international conflict and cooperation in their eras. How do we explain such momentous changes in foreign policy—and in other cases their equally surprising absence?

The nature of strategic ideas, Jeffrey W. Legro argues, played a critical and overlooked role in these transformations. Big changes in foreign policies are rare because it is difficult for individuals to overcome the inertia of entrenched national mentalities. Doing …

Faux Realism: Spin Vs. Substance In The Bush Foreign-Policy Doctrine, Jeffrey W. Legro, Andrew Moravcsik

Political Science Faculty Publications

The Bush administration has coined a foreign-policy doctrine. President George W. Bush, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of State Colin Powell herald "the new realism." Think you know what they are up to? OK, then fill in the blank: The "new realism" is _______. If you find the blank hard to fill, don’t worry; so would most of today's international-relations scholars. Indeed, one fundamental problem with the Bush administration's new doctrine is that "realism" no longer has any real intellectual coherence.

Why Were Chemical Weapons Not Used In World War Ii?, Jeffrey W. Legro

Political Science Faculty Publications

Chemical warfare had played an important enough role in World War I that there was widespread expectation of its use in World War II. Certainly, Germany's army and its chemists had no qualms about adding poison gas to the Third Reich's arsenal. When war began, however, many of the latest chemical warfare agents were not available in deliverable form. The early successes of conventional-war making, combined with an increasing shortage of raw material, led Germany to deemphasize gas warfare even apart from the fear of Allied retaliation that significantly influenced at least the armed forces.

Is Anybody Still A Realist?, Jeffrey W. Legro, Andrew Moravcsik

Political Science Faculty Publications

Realism, the oldest and most prominent theoretical paradigm in international relations, is in trouble. The problem is not lack of interest. Realism remains the primary or alternative theory in virtually every major book and article addressing general theories of world politics, particularly in security affairs. Controversies between neorealism and its critics continue to dominate international relations theory debates. Nor is the problem realism’s purported inability to make point predictions. Many specific realist theories are testable, and there remains much global conflict about which realism offers powerful insights. Nor is the problem the lack of empirical support for simple realist predictions, …

Military Culture And Inadvertent Escalation In World War Ii, Jeffrey W. Legro

Political Science Faculty Publications

How can the use of "unthinkable" means of warfare be avoided? How can states successfully observe mutually desired limitations on "taboo" forms of combat? These questions are important because of concern that nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and terrorism will spread and be used. The growing number of states--e.g., Israel, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Ukraine--that have such means of inflicting harm increases the likelihood that any future conflict will involve a desire for restrictions. Countries may pursue restraint because popular opinion vilifies certain weapons; because leaders calculate that escalation would damage their domestic and international political support; or because states …

Trip Report: Admiral Crowe's Visit To The Soviet Union, March 17-25, 1990, Jeffrey W. Legro

Political Science Faculty Publications

I recently accompanied Admiral William Crowe, retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during his 9-day stay in the USSR. The trip was an extension of the U.S.-USSR military-to-military exchanges that were initiated under Crowe's leadership at the JCS. The purposes of the trip were to reciprocate Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev's visit to the United States and to testify to the Supreme Soviet's Committee on Defense and State Security. In addition to the Admiral, the delegation included his wife, his longtime aide, Captain Jay Coupe, Steve Sestanovich of CSIS, Kurt Campbell of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Harvard's JFK …

The Military Meaning Of The New Soviet Doctrine, Jeffrey W. Legro

Political Science Faculty Publications

The current ferment in Soviet military doctrine has led to uncertainty and debate over its implications. On one hand, Gorbachev's peaceful rhetoric, backed by force reductions, is competing with the Bolshoi's ballerinas for favorable Western press reviews. Public opinion-and many public officials-perceive a reduced military threat from the Soviet army. On the other hand, skeptics believe that recent doctrinal changes are compatible with a modernized, more efficient Soviet military machine. In their view, the Soviet army is definitely changing, but the threat will not. A review of the operational implications of the new Soviet security themes indicates that neither the …

Constraining Ground Force Exercises Of Nato And The Warsaw Pact, Robert D. Blackwill, Jeffrey W. Legro

Political Science Faculty Publications

Confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) have long been the neglected stepchild of serious arms control analysis. Some view CSBMs as "arms control junk food," frivolous, unworkable, or even detrimental. Others are so enamored of the concept that they expect proposals to be accepted as prima facie desirable. After all, the very term "confidence and security" connotes stability and peace. The problem with both positions is often the dearth of hard analysis in support of the ideas put forward and the abstract nature of the discussions of "security building." As witnessed in the contrast between the quiet success of the …

Soviet Crisis Decision‐Making And The Gorbachev Reforms, Jeffrey W. Legro

Political Science Faculty Publications

The Soviet Union led by President Mikhail Gorbachev has widely heralded the adoption of a new military doctrine which posits war prevention as its fundamental goal. Yet, as Akhromeyev acknowledges in the above quote, a reliable defence, or preparation for war, is also essential. What is not acknowledged, let alone resolved, is that the two desired goals - prevention and preparation - may come into sharp conflict, especially in a super-power crisis. Prevention of war may make it necessary to defer actions which ready forces for battle or reduce their vulnerability. If war appears likely, however, pressures will arise to …